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This work will disclose the ambiguities of the modern exercise of power in the context of the 
French colonial encounter in the Middle East during the interwar years. The French 
administration in Lebanon attempted to expand its rule through the build-up of a large 
bureaucracy designed to oversee social, economic and political affairs in the country. At the 
same time, it hoped to establish among residents of the different territories brought together 
within the country a new relation of power according to a chain of command that extended 
from the remotest village to the Quai d’Orsay. The new modern bureaucracy would be 
anathema to the myriad of laws, statutes and religious interpretations that had governed the 
vanquished Ottoman Empire.  
 
In addition to these formal structures of power, the French sought to reproduce their rule and 
consecrate their position through informal networks with new and traditional political bosses 
in the region. Although the French had hoped to employ informal arrangements to strengthen 
the formal institutions of governance, in practice, something different emerged. The 
bureaucracy empowered informal networks to alter and, ultimately, undermine the efforts of 
the high commission to administer the country.  In these ways, it can be seen that the 
reproduction of space in the colonial setting was not a function of the imposition of formal 
institutions of government, but emerged through the capacity of informal networks to re-
shape and re-appropriate the practices that underpinned this supposed new order. As a result 
of these often latent networks operative within the reproduction of power, the post- colonial 
moment appears as the evolution of—and not rupture with—the inequalities of colonial rule 
and contradictions of modern forms of power. 
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A Note on Translation 
 
The work that follows incorporates phrases, names and titles that were (and remain) freely 
translated and transliterated between French, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish at a time in the 
first part of the twentieth century when no universal transliteration standards existed. 
Rendering these words into English has proven complicated and complex. Rather than 
presenting these terms from nearly one century ago according to current linguistic tastes and 
standards, I have selected for the sake of simplicity and coherence what I remember from my 
research as the most commonly used transliterations while also including in the footnotes 
alternative renditions.  
 






MAKING THE STATE IN THE NON-WEST 
“It is the state that makes the nation,” says Sami Zubaida.1 In keeping with Zubaida, 
statecraft in much of the world did not emerge from an imagined community or popular 
nationalist movement or awakening, but from imperialism, especially in many parts of Asia, 
Africa and the Americas. And if state-formation in some parts of the world was not a 
function of nationalist awakening but a product of imperial design, then how was colonial 
space produced in terms of discourse and practice? And what processes were instrumental to 
the reproduction of power within the colonial space?  
In order to address these questions, it is worth thinking about how colonial space was 
linked to modern forms of statehood. In terms of theory, the first task is to explore how 
statehood is related to the colonial experience. Critical in this examination is the capacity to 
understand the state as a series of practices and regulations that impact a social body of 
individuals. The second task is to analyze different schools of thought regarding the 
reproduction of power within a given space. Furthermore it remains necessary to examine the 
interplay between colonial mechanisms of authority, opposition to colonial rule and pre-
existing forms of political mobilization.  
To give context to these questions, one potential area worth examining is colonial 
Lebanon. The history of the colonial period in this part of the eastern Mediterranean reveals 
something about the nature of the reproduction of power relations through the production of 
space. In particular, the mechanisms to administer colonial space were integral to practices of 
domination and strategies of resistance. The different forms of contestation to the mandate 
administration challenged and in some ways redefined the exercise of power. As will be seen 
later, the practices that defined the national borders effectively divided the country between 
                                              
1 Zubaida, Sami. “The Fragments Invent the Nation.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (2002) 
206, 214. 
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Mount Lebanon and the annexed territories. The attempt to enforce these divisions not only 
transformed relations of power, but altered colonial designs as well. Seen from this 
perspective, examining the history of Lebanon raises the question of how statecraft is linked 
to colonial control as well as how the rearrangement of space affects political struggle?  
Whatever the goals of the metropole, colonial governance as practiced did not operate 
according to the designs of the mandate. Examining colonial state-building will highlight the 
ambiguities of power and resistance that underpin the production of space as well as the 
contradictions of colonial rule and their consequences for the post-colonial state. Colonial 
governance was not achieved through an overarching centralized logic that supplanted pre-
existing understandings of space or through the cultivation of new systems of subjectivity 
and citizenship among the population. Institutional meddling and maneuvering complicated 
and challenged the exercise of power whatever extent it bolstered the new world order that 
the French had envisioned for the Levant. That the informal networks and alliances that Paris 
had assumed would strengthen its foothold in the country actually undermined its connection 
with the population illustrates the ambiguities of colonial modernity. In this way, it can be 
seen that the reproduction of space in the colonial setting was not a function of the imposition 
of formal institutions of government, but emerged through the capacity of informal networks 
to re-shape and re-appropriate the practices that had underpinned this supposed new order. 
As a result of these often latent networks operative within the maintenance of power, the 
post-colonial moment appears as the evolution of—and not rupture with—the inequalities of 
colonial rule and contradictions of modern forms of power. 
THE LOCATION OF POWER  
Rather than an anachronism to the modern exercise of power within the system of 
nation-states, colonial rule was constitutive in the practices and techniques of controlling the 
population associated with the modern state. One the one hand, historically within academia, 
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the experiences of statecraft in the non-west is often considered to be outside of the trajectory 
of modern state building in Europe and North America, in general.2 The genealogy of what is 
known as the west has no space for the colonial experience.3 For, the commonly assumed 
facets of the modern state—such as territorial sovereignty, the separation between domestic 
and foreign affairs, and the capacity to guarantee social order within its domain4 —are 
assumed to be absent in the colony.  
On the other hand, the bodies of scholarship dealing with post-colonial thought assert 
that colonialism in the non-west can be considered an aspect of modernity out of place with 
common representations of the west. In an allusion to the scholarship of Homi Bhabha, 
political theorist Timothy Mitchell asserts that, “the non-west must play the role of the 
outside, the otherness that creates the boundary of the space of modernity.”5 That is, the 
boundaries and the processes that produce the non-west are vital to understanding what it 
means to be modern and western. Indeed, this tendency to revert to binaries of traditional-
modern, non-west and west is indicative of representations of differentiation. Such 
representations obscure the practices and discourses linking east to west. In turn, these latent 
links give rise to what Mitchell has described as colonial modernity.  
What is distinctive about colonial modernity, he contends, is that “the colonial-
modern involves creating an effect we recognize as reality, by organizing the world endlessly 
                                              
2
 See Homi Bhabha’s criticism on the erasure of the colonial experience in the thoughts of modernity of Michel 
Foucault. “By disavowing the colonial moment as an enunciative present in the historical and epistemological 
condition of western modernity,” Bhabha argues, “Foucault can say little about the transferntial relationship 
between the west and its colonial history. He disavows precisely the colonial text as the foundation for the 
relation the Western ratio can have ‘even with the society in which it historically appeared.’” Central to 
Bhabha’s argument is that the distinction between modern/ traditional as well as post-modern/modern relies 
upon a perspective of cultural difference. By re-examining the practices that constitute cultural difference, he 
says, it is possible to unfurl the ambivalences and contradictions within representations of modernity. See The 
Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 2004. 280-281.  
3 See Edward Said’s Orientalism, especially his critique of Marx’s oriental despotism. Said, Orientalism. 
London: Peregrine, 1985.  
4 Agnew, John. Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. London: Routledge, 2003. 53. 
5 In this, regard, Mitchell describes the “colonial experience as constant absence to the story of Europe.” 
Mitchell, Timothy.  “The Stage of Modernity.” Questions of Modernity. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P,  
2000, 16. 
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to represent it.”6 Within this system of representations, power is produced through the lines 
that divide the world into a precise picture of metropole and colony. The consequence of this 
picture of world order is that the modern exercise of power can only exist through a 
distinction with a binary opposite. In this manner, the practices and ideas that produced 
divide and rule, a new sense of the modern age distinct from the past, and a Europe separate 
from and superior to the non-west were but one aspect of colonial power. The counterpoint 
was imperial coercion and subjugation. In this way, the difference between traditional and 
modern is a function of political practices. In other words, the colonial encounter in the non-
west can be seen not only as a site of colonial modernity, but also as a political field in the 
operation of modern forms of power. In particular, it featured the capacity to invest territory 
with new meaning as well as affiliation to that meaning. At the same time, in thinking about 
colonial space as a site for the operation of power, there exists the possibility of variance and 
modification of the ideas and practices decreed from the metropole.7  
This distinction between image and reality is but one facet of the forms of distinction 
and fracture that shape experiences of modernity. Colonialism was not outside of modernity 
but a function of the forms of differentiation and contradiction that the modern reproduction 
of power demands. From this, it is possible to reach the tentative conclusion that the power to 
enforce colonial geography depended upon an array of complementary as well as 
contradictory practices of power. Examining power relations within the colony has the 
potential to reveal the forms of political, social and economic disjuncture that state-building 
produced. As a result, it is worth considering that if colonialism was an effect of the modern 
exercise of power, then what were the practices that maintained and reproduced this aspect of 
modernity? 
                                              
6 Mitchell, 2000, 17. 
7 Mitchell, 2000, 23. 
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Sites of Contestation 
 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to explore the role of spatial 
representations in shaping social relations. For statecraft can also be considered a product of 
the political strategies and practices to control the ways in which people think and behave in 
a certain space. Once unacknowledged within academic literature, the production of space 
has become a popular area of research to think about social control and political contestation. 
Within this discussion are two broad notions of spatial production, the theory of territoriality 
as well as the idea of critical geo-politics. The two schools of thought hold contrasting ideas 
of state power. This contrast becomes important in considering their implications for the 
ways in which state power is reproduced. Ultimately, the reproduction of socio-spatial 
relations transformed everyday local regions into sites for the exercise of power and national 
politics. Defining the location of power, then, contributed to reinforcing social hierarchy and 
political control.  
 Since the late 1970s, scholars have seen the need to reintroduce space as a category of 
social theory. No longer seen as a neutral and passive object where things simply happen or 
as a domain outside of political contestation, new scholarship understood the organization of 
space as a material product and function of power-relations.8 This new scholarship, following 
Edward Soja, had contended that “social and spatial practices are dialectically inter-reactive, 
interdependent…social relations of production are both space-forming and space 
contingent.”9 That is, power dynamics are constitutive in geographic design and vice versa. 
With regards to politics, the ordering of space, then, is a function of political contestation. In 
turn, this contestation helps to shape the behaviors of individuals within a specific area. Since 
the earlier work of the likes of Soja and Henri Lefebvre, the role of space as a reflection of 
                                              
8 Lefebrve, Henri. The Production of Space. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 
9 Soja, Eward. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso, 
1989. 80. 
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power relations has formed the basis of various academic studies and journals. Or, in the 
words of Daniel Neep, “how space is conceptualized, ordered and manipulated—provides 
fertile ground for the exploration of the internal workings of power, especially state 
power.”10 
From this perspective, it is possible to think of the production of space as both power 
over subjects as well the power to cultivate new social relations. That is, in serving as an 
instrument of power, the production of space contains productive as well as repressive 
prospects for statecraft. Already, it has been argued by the likes of Joseph Massad that 
colonial statehood carries both repressive as well as productive elements, especially in the 
context of nationalism.11 With regards to its repressive aspect, Massad insists that in order “to 
produce the new, the old has to be repressed.”12 That is, state power can come from coercive 
mechanisms. Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci describes this coercive mechanism as 
the power to elicit “spontaneous consent” from “the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.”13 In this 
perspective, state power appears as the capacity to elicit obedience from those within its 
sphere. This coercive function, argues John Agnew, “leads to a notion of power as a 
monopoly of control exercised equally over all places within a given territory or geographical 
area by a dominant social group or elite.”14 Implicit in his contention is the idea that the 
overemphasis on the coercive function of space production generalizes the operation of 
power as a simple appendage of the elite. Thus, Agnew goes on to say that “missing from 
                                              
10 Neep, Daniel. Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation. New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2012.  19. 
11 See Massad, Joseph. Colonial Effect: The Making of National Identity in Jordan. New York: Columbia UP, 
2000; as well as Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, 
London: Zed Books, 1993.  
12 Massad, 2000,4. 
13 Gramsci, Antonio. “The Intellectuals” Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Ed. Trans. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991. 12. 
14 Agnew, John.  Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. London: Routledge, 2003. 55 
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this account are the contingency and fragility of the infrastructural power” of the state. 15 In 
addition to its coercive functions, the state draws legitimacy through its provision of public 
goods and services.16 This missing component offers a more nuanced understanding of state 
power that opens up new visions of state-space.  
In contrast, the production of space also cultivates new forms of identity and 
belonging among individual subjects. In this manner, Agnew argues that, “the territorial state 
draws its power in capillary fashion from social groups and institutions rather than simply 
imposing itself upon them. Agnew’s perspective corresponds to the productive elements of 
colonial power mentioned by Massad. From this point of view, power is present in all 
relationships among people, animals and things and the power of the state relies on the wide 
range of sources that it can tap into.”17 This perspective emphasizes the potential agency of 
all individuals within a given matrix of power and resistance. This proliferation of agency 
makes the operation of power ubiquitous and ongoing. Or, as Agnew affirms, “the spatial 
monopoly of power exercised by a state is not and cannot be total when its power derives 
from that given up by and potentially retaken by others.”18 Whereas this productive potential 
of modern state power vis-à-vis space cultivates new fields of political contestation and 
subjectivity, the repressive component contains the potential to limit mass participation in 
acts of political contestation.  
These dual components are prominent in the different approaches to the study of 
space. Within the scholarship on space, there are two complementary schools of thought that 
can illuminate the mechanisms of establishing and maintaining imperial authority in the 
colonies. These theories include the notion of territoriality and the school of thought 
surrounding critical geo-politics. They offer contending hypotheses for the exercise of power 
                                              
15 Agnew, 2003, 55.  
16 Agnew, 2003, 55.  
17 Agnew, 2003, 56. 
18 Agnew, 2003, 56. 
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over subjects within a given territory. While, within territoriality, state power is seen to 
extend from the aims of a particular group over the population, critical geo-politics holds that 
the transformation of power relations is integral to the production of space, by extension, 
colonial power.  
Whereas, in general, the notion of territoriality privileges this repressive facet of the 
production of space, the critical geopolitics stance places a greater emphasis on its productive 
potentials. While both facets are instrumental in exploring the practices of colonial 
modernity, what can be added to this discussion is further consideration of the ways in which 
power-relations are reproduced at specific sites over time. In this regard, the critical geo-
politics approach is more helpful in understanding the potentials for rupture and challenge to 
the imposition of forms of power. From this perspective, state-building operates as an effort 
to regulate power relations. In this context, authority does not extend uniformly but 
reproduces a particular representation of power with the possibility of further variation.  
  To begin, the theory of territoriality emerged out of post-colonial human geography 
to take into consideration the transformation of place at the onset of colonialism. Following 
the scholarship of Robert Sack, the notion of territoriality describes the attempt “by an 
individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena or relationships by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”19 In this way, it addresses the 
asymmetry of power-relations that produced modern human geography, especially during the 
colonial period. Due, in part to new inventions in map-making technologies, the creation and 
promulgation of the new world order replaced visions of space held among the now subject 
populations of Africa, Asia and the Americas. Territorial control, then, functions as an 
instrument of power. To produce territoriality requires three components that Sack outlines: 
                                              
19  Sack, Robert David. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986. 21-
22. 
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it involves the classification of an area; a form of communication of this classification; and a 
mechanism to enforce access to this area.20 In this manner, within the school of territoriality, 
control lies in the capacity to reorder pre-existing forms of space and within the markers of 
delineation of that space.21  
While territoriality emphasizes the ways in which space comes to function as a 
symbol of a specific ruling faction, missing from this theory is an elaboration of the politics 
of resistance. Certainly, territoriality constitutes a means to assert power. Although Sack 
presents territoriality as a means to establish authority over a given community,22 missing 
from the notion is an equal description of the forms of contestation involved in resisting and 
even reproducing territorial control. The reason for this absence has to do with the question 
of evidence, or lack thereof, which lies at the heart of colonial historiography. For, the 
emphasis of Sack’s work comes from the historical capacity of territoriality to in his words, 
“displace attention from the relationship between controller and controlled to the territory.”23 
In other words, Sack’s main concern lies within the forms of erasure that resulted from 
colonial territoriality. In particular, it is the lack of evidence of the pre-existing social bodies 
that inhabited the colonized world that Sack aims to redress in his role as a historical 
geographer of the Americas. Despite the contradictions of its origins, state power over 
territory appears as something almost unchallenged and monolithic upon the onset of colonial 
rule due to these problems of evidence. As a result of this framework, a given territory 
becomes associated with the particular factions that ruled it. 
In contrast to territoriality, the body of literature that comprises critical geo-politics 
places a greater emphasis on the forms of contestation that occur between ruler and ruled 
                                              
20 Sack, 1986, 22. 
21 Winichakul, Thongchai. Siam Mapped: A History of the Geobody of a Nation. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
1994. 131. 
22 Sack, 1986, 39 
23 Sack, 1986, 33. 
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within territories. Emerging out of a reassessment of cold war studies of territories, critical 
geopolitics incorporates the scholarship of Michel Foucault to consider the mechanisms that 
shape power-relations rather than the strict sources and structures of power.24 The production 
of space, then, is but one dimension that helps to produce forms of association among 
individuals. In turn, these associations reproduce practices of power and resistance. Thus, this 
approach emphasizes the ubiquity of power relations across all aspects of social 
organization.25 Within the study of critical geo-politics, space is produced through the 
production of borders, which impact social relations in a number of ways.26  
The first function is that borders serve as sites of differentiation, as barriers between 
supposedly different entities. Through the imposition of boundaries, it has been argued that 
the production of space establishes a situational and contextual form of power. As Paasi 
insists, “power should not be understood merely as a commodity to be wielded by agents, 
usually the dominant social group, in order to control all the places and localities within a 
given territory,” but as a more diffuse set of practices that produce and reproduce binary 
distinctions.27 This approach contradicts the emphasis in territoriality on the symbolic 
significance of space for factional control.  
 The second function is that borders operate as sites of subject-making.28 It is the place 
where different conceptions of identity are enacted or set into practice. Considered as a 
practice, the reproduction of power-relations occurs within the subject population. In this 
manner, Kuus insists that “these actors [on the margins] do not only consume geopolitical 
concepts’ they also produce these concepts. Therefore we have to unravel the maneuvers of 
                                              
24 Kuus, Merje. “Critical Gepolitics” isacompss.com. June 2015. 5. 
25 Or as Joe Painter argues along similar lines, “The idea that social life is suffused with state practices not only 
extends the apparent spatial reach of state power but also reveals its geographical unevenness.” Painter, Joe. 
“Prosaic Geographies of Stateness.” Political Geography. 25 (2006). 755. 
26 Or, in Agnew’s words, “borders…make the nation rather than vice versa.” See Agnew, John. Sovereignty 
Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 95:2, 437-461. 2007. 
27 Paasi, Anssi, “Boundaries as social processes: Territoriality in the world of flows, Geopolitics, 3:1, 82, 
28 Kuus, 2015, 8. 
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relatively marginal actors vis-à-vis the dominant narratives of the center and vice versa.”29 In 
this way, the framework insists that the everyday practices of individuals across all social 
groups reproduce forms of authority as well as its contradictions. The onus on individual 
action enables for a wider understanding for the ways in which power is challenged or 
modified through its reproduction. Rather than a fait accompli, critical-geopolitics views the 
production of space as a mechanism for the reproduction of shifting power-relations that are 
prone to further change.  
Within critical geo-politics, space is constantly transformed and reconstituted through 
the practices that create borders. Since critical geo-politics does not attach the production of 
space to a particular faction, space has to be reshaped through the practices that lend it an 
apparent order. In this manner, it has been argued that within critical geo-politics, “both the 
material border at the edge of the state and the conceptual borders designating this as a 
boundary between secure inside and archaic outside are objects of investigation.”30 The 
authors of this quote highlight the ubiquity of spatial practices that problematize power 
relations within state-spaces as well as among them. In turn, the imposition of borders at 
these different sites across social life compounds political contestation.31 In this manner, 
space is constituted through the practices that mark borders. These borders, then, serve as 
sites of the operation of power and witness the potential for change. As a result, any 
representation that lends space an apparent order is also subject to transformation over time.  
 From this, it can be argued that critical geo-politics position is more helpful in 
studying how visions of space change in the course of shifting relations of power. For the act 
of resistance to forms of power creates new potentials and possibilities within social 
                                              
29Kuus, 2015, 12. 
30 Dalby, Simon and O Tuathil, Gearoid, eds. “Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics- Towards a New Critical 
Gepolitics. Rethinking Geopolitics. London: Routledge, 1998. 3-4  
31 These authors go on to say that “critical geo-politics bears witness to the irredeemable plurality of space and 
the multiplicity of possible constructions of space. Thus…it pays particular attention to the boundary drawing 
practices that characterize the everyday lives of states.” Dalby et.al, 1998, 3. 
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relations. In this manner, the production of space discloses that power relations, following 
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, are “diffuse and capillary” rather than some entity divided 
between the haves and the have-nots.32 That is, the exercise of power is subject to various 
forms of contestation with the potential to alter, reinforce or further transform the means of 
control within a given location. Political contestation has the potential to alter the power 
relations that enforce the production of space. As Adib-Moghaddam insists, “it is within that 
topological relation between inside and outside, subject and object, self and other, where 
resistance and power, in other words, the contested space in which agency unfolds itself, can 
be localized.”33 Due to this dialectical relationship between power and resistance, a given 
space becomes a site of political contestation. The production of space influences social 
practice to the same extent that social practice reorders localized sites of contestation.  
Imposing Order  
From this perspective, it is now possible to define state power within this dialectic of 
power and resistance. To borrow from Desbiens, et. al., the state “is not a unitary object, but 
is rather a set of practices enacted through relationships between people, places and 
institutions.”34 That is, statehood can be understood as a series of practices and regulations to 
administer and enforce spatial organization as well as to regulate power-relations between 
different segments of the population. In the colonial context, the re-ordering of space 
justified the imposition of new forms of hierarchy that were contested at the local level in the 
colony. The production of space, then, appears as a tool to maintain and produce forms of 
inequality in power-relations. To borrow again from Mitchell, state power in this case “is not 
simply a centralized force seeking local allies as it extends out from the political center, but 
                                              
32 Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin. On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution: Power and Resistance Today. 
New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, 89. 
33 Adib-Moghaddam, 2013, 95. 
34 Desbiens, Caroline, Mountz, Alison and Walton-Roberts, Margaret “Introduction: Re-conceptualizing the 
state from the Margins of Political Geography,” Political Geography, 23 (2004), 242. 
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is constructed locally whatever the wider connections involved.”35 That is, the capacity to 
reinforce state power at specific local sites is critical to the reproduction of hierarchy.  
 From this perspective of space and state power, it can be seen that social hierarchy is 
not something fixed but a variable element of political contestation. Helpful in this regard is 
Edward Said’s contention that “no society known to human history has ever existed which 
has not been governed by power and authority and…every society can be divided into 
interlocking classes of rulers and ruled.”36 Even this division of rulers and ruled, Said insists, 
remains subject to the dynamics of shifting social relations. For he goes on to say that “there 
is nothing static about these basic conceptions since, if we consider society to be a dynamic 
distribution of power and positions, we will also be able to regard the categories of rulers and 
ruled as [a] highly complex and highly changeable pair of categories.”37 In other words, the 
forms of hierarchy that emerge from social relations and the production of space help to 
constitute power and resistance. The institutions of the colonial state designed to regulate 
authority helped to maintain the asymmetry of power between empire and colonial subject.  
Yet, the various practices involved within state formation should not be considered as 
separate or distinct from one another. There is no external division within state power. The 
state should not be considered a coherent object onto itself. Instead, state power functions 
more like what Mitchell has described as a structural effect in that “the line between state and 
society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity,” but “a line drawn internally, within the 
network of institutional mechanisms, through which a certain social and political order is 
maintained.”38 In other words, there exists no natural boundary between state and society, nor 
is anyone outside of the matrix of power and resistance. Rather, distinctions are erected 
                                              
35 Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts. Berkeley: U California P, 2000. 169. 
36 Said, Edward. The World, the Text and the Critic. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983. 168.  
37 Said, 1983, 168.  
38 Mitchell, Timothy. “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. The American 
Political Science Review. 85: No. 1 (Mar., 1991).  90 
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internally within this matrix as an effect of more complex relations of power. As power 
relations become more internally constituted within social relations, they, paradoxically, 
appear to take the form of external structures.39 In this manner, the agencies of the state 
depend upon the production of difference between state and society.40 Here again, the notion 
of the state as a series of practices becomes prominent in Mitchell’s contention that “the state 
should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal 
arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the 
appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society.”41 Seen as series of 
practices, state power, even colonial state power, becomes localized.  
As such, we should consider the colonial modern as a new space to rethink the 
exercise of modern forms of power. The contradictory forces that distinguish the west from 
the east are also present in the production of the colonial space. Authority does not extend 
like the lines on the map but must be reproduced at specific sites. In this way, the power to 
produce and maintain colonial space operates through disciplinary practices and regulations 
that displace and coerce the social body and even challenge the metropole. Seen in this light, 
colonial modernity reveals the contradictions at work in the exercise of modern forms of 
power. It becomes possible to consider that local political contestation within the colony 
created a new space in the exercise of power beyond the intentions of the colonizers and 
independent of the practices of resistance to colonial rule.  
Unbundling Territoriality 
In considering state power circumstantial and contingent upon social relations, it 
becomes possible to understand the potential scenario that John Ruggie describes as the 
                                              
39 Mitchell, 1991, 93. 
40 Mitchell, 1991, 91. 
41 Mitchell, 1991, 95. 
 21 
unbundling of territoriality in which the reach of the state erodes to some degree.42 This 
capacity of disciplines to break down creates new possibilities to contest power. As Ruggie 
asserts, “even where systems of rule are territorial and even where territoriality is relatively 
fixed, the prevailing concept of territory need not entail mutual exclusion.”43 Examining the 
social forces and experiences that underpin state formation has the potential to disclose this 
unbundling. Following Ruggie, John Agnew contends that, “the critical theoretical issue, 
therefore, is the historical relationship between territorial states and the broader social and 
economic structures and geo-political order (or form of spatial practice) in which these states 
must operate.”44 Not only is territoriality socially mediated according to Agnew, it is 
historically constructed as well, and therefore, subject to the cultural, economic and political 
structures that challenge state power. Contrary to state-centered narratives of space, then, 
territoriality is socially mediated rather than geographically imposed. In this manner, Agnew 
would later write that, “the relative importance of territories and dispersed networks changes 
historically as a result of the changing geographical conditions under which political 
practices take place.”45 In the context of colonialism, the practices that underpinned state 
power in the colony relate to the processes of the unbundling of territoriality during the 
transition to the post-colonial era. For the exercise of state power in the colony was not 
simply the blueprint of imperial designs, but comprised the contradictions of modernity. In 
turn, these contradictions would pave the way for the unbundling of territoriality toward the 
post-colonial period.  In this manner, an examination of the historical circumstances of 
                                              
42 Ruggie, John Gerard. Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” 
International Organization 47, No: 1 (Winter 1993), 165.  
43 Ruggie, 1993, 149.  
44 Agnew, John, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” 
Review of International Political Economy, 1:1 (Spring 1994), 77. As Agnew goes on to say, although the 
territorial trap operates to produce a state-centered narrative of its history “in which the spate occupied by the 
state is timeless,” in practice, however, state power is subject to “decisions and  flows operating from networks 
of power not captured by singularly territorial representations of space” Agnew, 1994 72). Such networks are 
culturally and economically constituted.  
45 Agnew, John, “Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries,” Millennium Journal of International 
Studies, 28: 33 (1999), 502.  
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colonial state-building will disclose the ambiguities of territoriality as well as the 
contradictions of colonial rule.  
COLONIAL HISTORIES IN THE LEVANT  
Such considerations arise when considering the colonial experiences in the Levant 
during the French mandate of Lebanon from 1920 to 1946.46 The practices of reproducing 
colonial power and of securing the obedience of the masses to the institutions of the colonial 
administration were anything but traditional to the region. The history of Lebanon will 
indicate that power does not appear to be a matter of imposing new forms of rule from the 
center onto the periphery, but results from different forms of contestation and re-
appropriation of the practices of power. That is, the reproduction of space in the colonial 
setting was not a function of the imposition of formal institutions of government, but 
emerged through the capacity of informal networks to re-shape and re-appropriate the 
practices that underpinned this supposed new order. The efforts to reproduce the rigidities of 
the geographical boundaries within the colony transformed politics in the region, but not in 
the ways that the Quai d’Orsay had expected. While, state-building was part of a process to 
create a representation of hierarchy, its repercussions effectively undermined the capacity of 
the French high commission to properly administer the colony. This contradiction, then, set 
the stage for the post-colonial period. As a result of these often latent networks operative 
within the maintenance of power, the post-colonial moment appears as the evolution of the 
inequalities of colonial rule and contradictions of modern forms of power. 
To begin, the French declaration of statehood would witness the merger of multiple 
territories that had never existed as a single administrative unit, the historically autonomous 
                                              
46 Like many facets of this period, the precise termination of the mandate remains open to dispute. In Lebanon, 
independence from the French is marked in 1943 following the constitutional crisis, dis cussed in chapter five, 
which amended the constitution in ways that foreclosed formal French control in the country. Outside of 
Lebanon, however, the end of the mandate is said to have taken place in 1946 following the last withdrawal of 
French and British troops from Syria and Lebanon.   
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zone of Mount Lebanon as well as a series of territories from different provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire collectively known as the annexed territories.47 Throughout the period of 
French rule, the integration of these annexed territories was contentious and remained a 
major political issue in the new nation-state. Within Lebanese historiography, the question of 
gaining consent from those outside of this elite class is taken for granted.48 As a result, it 
remains necessary to examine how colonial mechanisms of authority were able to overcome 
forms of opposition to the mandate outside of this notable elite class centered in the capital of 
Beirut. 
This process began amid the upheaval of empires. Having previously made formal 
agreements with Britain and Tsarist Russia to carve up the territories of the Ottoman Empire 
amid the battles of World War I, the French and British would occupy the country in 1918. 
Following the surrender of the Ottoman Empire, Paris consecrated its occupation during the 
Treaty of Versailles Peace Conference and eventually received a formal mandate from the 
League of Nations to govern these territories. Although French foreign policy differed 
greatly under successive administrations, its penetration and economic influence within the 
Ottoman territories had expanded during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Upon 
receiving its mandate, Paris created multiple states within this contiguous territory. It is in 
this moment that General Henri Gouraud would declare the formation of the State of Greater 
                                              
47 While the historicity of Lebanon remains a contested subject among politicians and citizens, often colored by 
nationalist narratives, it is a conventional assertion among historians that these territories had unique histories 
prior to the establishment of the state. As Fawwaz Traboulsi writes, the borders of the country were a product of 
Franco- British patrician plans that hardly corresponded to the wishes of any political party in the country. 
Traboulsi, 2007, 75. 
48 Academic priorities aside, the main hindrance to colonial history in Lebanon is the scarcity of evidence. 
While the methodology section examines this issue in greater detail, it is worth mentioning a few dissertations 
that examine the fierce resistance to mandate rule: Atiyah, Najla Wadih. The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis 
towards the State of Lebanon, PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London, 1973.; Daher, Massoud, L’histoire 
socio-politique de la république libanaise sous mandat français (1926-1943) PhD Thesis: Sorbonne-Paris I, 
1980; Saliba, Nada, The Urban History of Tripoli during the French Mandate, 1920-1943, PhD Thesis: 
Department of History, SOAS University of London, 2016.  
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Lebanon in September 1920, inaugurating a protracted contest to define the status of the 
different areas within the new state.49  
 The borders that Gouraud decreed for the new state resembled the plans found within 
the private papers of one of the military governors from the 1918 occupation, Colonel de 
Piépape. The Levant, referred to as “le territoire ennemi occupé” was divided into three 
parts, a southern zone, an eastern zone and a western zone.50 In particular, the western zone 
under the command of Colonel de Piépape included “the city of Beirut, the sanjaks of Beirut, 
Mt. Lebanon, Tripoli, Lattakia and the cazas of Hasbaya, Rachaya, Baalbek, Giser al-
Chegour, Antioch, Arion, Bellan and Alexandretta.”51 With a few exceptions, this western 
zone under military administration would become the State of Greater Lebanon decreed by 
the colonel’s successor, Gouraud.  
Within the territory that he now ruled, Gouraud sought to create a special enclave 
around the area of Mount Lebanon (Mt. Lebanon) in which the French had long cultivated 
economic and cultural ties. Parts of the area west of Mt. Lebanon were annexed to form the 
new capital of Beirut; parts of the area south of the Mt. Lebanon were annexed to form the 
district of South Lebanon; parts of the area east of the mountain were annexed to form the 
district of the Bekaa; and parts of the area north of Mount Lebanon were annexed to form the 
district of North Lebanon. In total, then, there were four districts: North Lebanon, South 
Lebanon, the Bekaa and, of course, Mt. Lebanon as well as two autonomous zones in Beirut 
and Tripoli. In this way, regions that were historically governed under different 
administrative systems came to comprise a single country. Within each of the new 
                                              
49 Arrêté No. 386, Règlement provisoirement l’organisation administrative de l’Etat du Grand Liban. Signed by 
Gouraud. 6 September 1920.  
50 C2437. Administrateur en chef de Piépape. “Territoire Ennemis occupe zone nord.” No. 17. Beyrouth. 7 
November 1918. 1 The southern zone would include the Ottoman Sanjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre. The 
eastern zone would include all of the districts excluded from the western zone and southern zone, or in the 
words of Piépape, “tous les districts situés à l’est des territoire ennemis occupes au sud et au nord jusqu’aux 
limites de Gaza, de Djebel Saman et El-babe.” 
51 ibid.  
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administrative zones, Gouraud created a regional capital comprising Sidon in the south, 
Zahle in the Bekaa, Baabda for Mt. Lebanon and eventually, Tripoli would become the 
capital of the north.52 Spatially, these areas in the annexed territories revolved around the 
geographical center of the country, Beirut and Mount Lebanon. 
The maneuverings of Gouraud were critical in helping to expand Lebanon from a 
relatively small and landlocked sanjak within the Ottoman territory into a state with 
unprecedented frontiers. In the days and weeks before the 1920 declaration, as historian 
Wajih Kawtharani accounts in his study of the French Mandate, Gouraud had argued with 
President Millerand that among the areas occupied in 1918, the incorporation of Tripoli 
would deal a fait accompli to Syrian nationalists who had hoped to re-create the unified 
Ottoman territory of Greater Syria as a nation-state.53 For, Tripoli, in particular, had served as 
a strategic outlet on the Mediterranean for the nationalist forces led by Amir Feisal, with one 
official describing the city as the natural harbor of Syria.54 Against the objections of a 
majority within this territory who preferred union with Syria,55 Gouraud assured his superiors 
that these facts were a mere memory of the past following the defeat of the nationalists at the 
Battle of Marjayoun. He assured his bosses that it in the aftermath of the French victory, 
there was no longer any obligation to uphold promised to abstain from incorporating Tripoli 
                                              
52 See below Arrêté No. 386, Règlement provisoirement l’organisation administrative de l’Etat du Grand Liban. 
Although Tripoli initially functioned as an autonomous entity, it became the administrative center of North 
Lebanon in 1929, as described in Gulick, John. Tripoli: A Modern Arab City. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1967, 
34. Sidon is also known by its Arab name of Saida. Zahle is also known as Zahlé, Zahla, Zahleh, etc. 
53 Kawtharani, Wajih. “Le grand Liban et le proejet de la confederation syrienne d’apres des documents 
francais,” State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, Ed. Youusef Choueri. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993. 
54. 
54 C460 MAE letter to HCF, 6 March 1937, written by undersecretary of state, no 137, 460 
55 In its hostility to the French mandate, the residents of Tripoli espoused common sentiments throughout the 
region. As described in the work of Fawwaz Traboulsi, the July 1919 American initiated King-Crane 
commission surveyed the attitudes of the inhabitants of the Levant in 36 cities and towns as well as 1520 
villages while collecting an additional 1863 petitions. The commission found that 80% of respondents favored a 
unified Syrian state, of which 74% favored an independent Syrian state and 60% preferred this independent and 
unified state to be a democratic and decentralized constitutional monarchy. In the event of a mandate for Syria, 
60% of respondents favored an American mandate, and only 14% a French mandate. In Paris, the commission 
recommended a unified Syrian state under Emir Faysal and one mandatory power. Cited in Traboulsi, 2007, 78.   
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into the state of Greater Lebanon.56 Instead, Gouraud devised a new plan and urged his 
bosses to reconsider earlier commitments. For, he sought to take advantage of what he saw as 
a moment of weakness among his opponents. Thus he goes on to write that, “the  
disappearance of Emir Faysal has completely changed the aspect of this question and 
singularly diminished the importance of these demands. The Muslims of Syrian Tripoli today 
accept the attachment to Greater Lebanon under the condition of maintaining their 
administrative autonomy that is easy to guarantee them.”57 In this manner, Gouraud had 
expected to make a separate peace with the residents and leaders of Tripoli in the absence of 
a political truce or settlement with Amir Faysal and his nationalist forces. Crucially, 
Gouraud’s letters established the notion that the only necessary resolution to questions of 
political grievances and contestations involved administrative protocols and guarantees, a 
narrative that will be re-examined in subsequent chapters.58  
At the same time, the period of the French mandate would witness the culmination of 
a series of processes that integrated Beirut into the world economy and European capitalism. 
This transformation was marked with the expansion of the city as the financial, commercial 
and social capital of the new country at the expense of other towns and cities along the coasts 
and interior. In addition, this expansion would lead many to consider the environs around the 
capital to be the modern bastion of the country in contrast to the more traditional forms of 
life that pervaded in the countryside.  
This spatial configuration represented political, social and economic dynamics in the 
new state. The majority of state resources were concentrated in the area surrounding Mt. 
Lebanon and Beirut at the expense of the annexed territories. As internal French documents 
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Kawtharani, 1993. 54.  
57 Kawtharani, 1993, 54. 
58 C460, Notes of Franco-Lebanese Treaty and Tripoli, MAE au sujet des incidents de Tripoli, 27 november 
1936 page 2 
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reveal, “for political and economic reasons, the Lebanese government has treated the 
annexed territories like conquered territory.”59 In effect, the mandate regime instituted 
structural inequality between the area of Mt. Lebanon and Beirut on one side and the annexed 
territories on the other. One major grievance was that, although the French had redefined the 
region with Arrêté 386 in 1920, it kept in place the unique legal, religious and tax codes that 
separated Mt. Lebanon from other Ottoman territories in the region. An undated report 
revealed that, “until 1926, the residents of the autonomous Sanjak of Mt. Lebanon hardly 
paid any taxes; all of the fiscal expenses were supported by the taxpayers in the annexed 
regions.”60 In this manner, the division of space reflected the systematic inequality of the new 
state, which further marginalized the annexed territories. Such distinctions would create 
animosity between the leaders and inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon and the residents of the rest of 
the country. 
The perception of lawlessness in the annexed territories justified the appropriation of 
resources from the margins of the country toward the center of the new state. As Najla 
Atiyah writes in her doctoral dissertation, “the general impression was that the government’s 
neglect was due to the negative attitude of the inhabitants of these districts towards the state 
of Lebanon.”61 This production of difference between the two territories justified the 
inappropriate division of resources. Yet, as Daniel Neep affirms, “the boundary between the 
modern and the non-modern was created through representations and practices of 
violence.”62 For, systematic violence is critical to the policies, discourses and practices that 
divided the supposedly modern areas attached to Mt. Lebanon to the annexed territories. 
Within the annexed territories, state formation altered the links between the largely rural 
                                              
59 C460 Situation Politique, HCF Notes au sujet de le ville de triopli- el Mina, undated probably  1939. Pg 1. 
60 ibid. As Traboulsi states, tax disparities between the different regions did not end in 1926, but continued until 
the 1950s. See, Traboulsi, 2007, 104.  
61 Atiyah, Najla Wadih. The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon. PhD Thesis. SOAS, 
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masses and the political bosses of the countryside. The capacity of the government to 
dispense forms of patronage such as land and the rights to bear arms made political elites less 
dependent on agricultural production as the primary source of income, social prestige and 
political prominence, as will be seen in subsequent chapters.63  
In view of this perspective, power in colonial Lebanon does not appear to be a matter 
of imposing rule from the center onto the periphery, but a process whereby the local agents 
of the mandate exploited their public office for personal benefit. Not only did these networks 
undermine effective administration, it also marginalized and impoverished the majority of the 
population. In the case of Lebanon, statecraft was part of an effort to impose spatial 
boundaries on the population. The practices that attempted to regulate this spatial order relied 
upon different forms of systematic violence. In the course of exercising this institutional 
power, subsequent chapters will show the ways in which, far from helping Paris make 
inroads into the subject population, the institutions of statecraft animated opposition to the 
French mandate.  
METHODOLOGIES 
In the pages that follow, an examination commences with regard to the processes that 
underpinned the administration of the annexed territories of Lebanon and the contradictions it 
generated during the mandate. A large part of the evidence relies upon notes from top-secret 
diplomatic cables classified for over 60 years found in the Autumn of 2015 at the French 
Centre des Archives Diplomatiques in Nantes. Among the 5,000 volumes in Nantes relating 
to Syria and Lebanon,64 the most widely cited box of files—examined at length in chapters 
two and four—comprise what mandate agents entitled as La Situation à Tripoli, related to the 
decades of unrest and turmoil that roiled in the coastal city of Tripoli and its environs in 
                                              
63 Neep, 2012, 101. 
64 This figure comes from a scholar who worked in the archives and submitted her dissertation about one year 
before I did mine. Saliba, 2016, 56. 
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North Lebanon. These files were discovered in the course of seeking material for what would 
become chapter three in this study concerning the rural politics in Akkar, which, functioned 
as a locality under the jurisdiction of the regional capital of Tripoli during the mandate. In 
particular, the high commission’s writings on the city gathered pace in the aftermath of the 
November 1936 general strike and riot against the mandate regime discussed in chapter two. 
In attempting to learn more about Tripoli, I was able to discover the primary source material 
discussed in chapter five, which chronicles the end of the mandate system. In these ways, this 
study focuses on the events of the twilight of empire.  
To supplement the sources gathered at the French archives, additional material was 
sought in Lebanon in the winter and spring of 2016. In particular, more material was 
gathered in Lebanon at the Naami Jafet Memorial Library of the American University of 
Beirut as well as the Centres des Archives Nationales (Muassasat al-Muhafizat al-
Wataniyya).65 The bulk of the evidence gathered in Lebanon came from secondary sources. 
Although I had expected to use archival work in France to prepare for fieldwork in Lebanon, 
in practice, fieldwork in Lebanon became a way to further explore the developments 
discovered in France. Despite every effort to find first-hand accounts that bear witness to the 
experiences described in the French diplomatic archives, gaps remain, in large part due to the 
secrecy of these diplomatic cables. Later, additional evidence from secondary materials was 
gathered at the library of my alma mater, the Butler Library of Columbia University, in 
addition to the labyrinth that is the SOAS Library in London. In my desire to publicize 
untold, if incomplete aspects of the mandate, this dissertation focuses primarily on the 
experiences that took place in North Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, in South Lebanon at the 
expense of the eastern areas in the Bekaa.66 For one of the startling lessons learned in the 
                                              
65 For an overview of the challenges of research in Beirut, See Scalenghe, Sara and Sbaiti, Nadya, “Conducting 
Research in Lebanon: An Overview of Historical Sources in Beirut,” MESA Bulletin 37:1, (2003), 68-79.  
66 The area of the Bekaa valley has numerous transliterations, including Beqa, Biqa, Bikaa and Beka‘a.  
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course of this work was the degree to which colonial politics became localized and 
personalized.  Despite the distinct forms of politics within different communities and regions, 
a number of the trends discussed in the next chapters took hold across the country so that the 
overall tone of systematic hierarchy and inequality that resounds in this work is 
commensurate with the experiences that developed in the Bekaa, as well.  
In examining power relations in Lebanon, there are a number of methodological 
challenges. In particular, several issues arise related to a qualitative historical sociological 
approach to the study politics of imperialism. The first challenge involves analyzing the 
perspective of the writers and their intended audiences, who arrived in the colony with their 
own particular worldviews and biases. The second challenge involves acknowledging the 
role of violence and hierarchy within discourses of imperialism. This, in turn, leads to the 
third challenge, how to see beyond the elite perspectives of politics in order to evaluate the 
role of rural and urban poor in colonial Lebanon. Fourth, beyond such issues related to 
analyzing evidence is perhaps the most arduous challenge, the scarcity and secrecy of 
primary sources. Confronting these challenges has required several techniques and strategies.  
1. Colonial Perspectives 
As this work involves the use of colonial archives, it becomes necessary to consider 
the colonial perspectives, practices and attitudes that inform these materials. The overall tone 
of these French-language and French-translated documents reflects a certain noblesse oblige 
held among the officials within the high commission, as if the prescription to every problem 
was to be nicer to the darkies and savages. In the early part of the mandate, the diplomat 
aristocracy that arrived to serve the civilian posts within the high commission came from the 
military and espoused a conservative worldview and preference for a strict centralized 
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military authority.67 Certainly, the majority of colonial files under review reflected the work 
of tired and overworked anonymous bureaucrats. Yet, a handful of these documents disclose 
the candid remarks, observations and personalities of the French officials and citizens 
residing in the country in addition to the Lebanese subjects under their nominal remit. In the 
pages that follow, the more prolific of these materials have been emphasized as they disclose 
the contradictions and challenges that the delegates of Paris faced in the Levant. Despite their 
limitations, such texts reveal the plights of the marginalized through the perspective of the 
failures of mandate officials to make inroads with the population and to curb the rise of 
informal politics in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. These reports stand in marked contrast to the 
newspapers and journals of Beirut that have generally formed the primary source material for 
an array of studies of colonial Lebanon, which offer the world views of the emerging middle 
class that would come to power upon independence.68 From this alternative perspective, then, 
the de-classification of these French diplomatic materials in the past ten to fifteen years now 
offer an alternative portrayal of colonial affairs beyond the limited scope of Lebanese 
periodicals that have so far been available to researchers, scholars and students.   
In order to further grasp the complexities of the colonial archives, it is necessary to 
reflect upon the diverse perspectives of the writers, themselves, as well as their intended 
audience. Following Michael Taussig, colonial reports can be considered as narratives that 
bear witness to efforts of domination and colonial hegemony. By this he means that even 
everyday official reports helped to corroborate the system of thought that colonists sought to 
impose upon their objects of study.  Following Taussig, colonial discourse indicates an effort 
to impose a new system of reality onto the social life of the colonized. “People delineate their 
world, including its large as well as its micro-scale politics, in stories and story-like 
                                              
67 Iskandar, Adnan. Bureaucracy in Lebanon, Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1964, 1-60, 123-148. 
68 See Atiyah, Najla Wadih. The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon. PhD Thesis. 
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creations,” he says.69 For this reason, colonial narrative serves as a mirror that reflects back 
on the colonists their own social relations as much as those of the colonized.70 Narrative, 
then, is not some objective product but rather a deeply subjective indication of power 
relations. Within this context, determining objective fact from subjective point of view is 
impossible. In his words, colonial reports describe an attempt to make “an uncertain reality 
out of fiction, a nightmarish reality in which the unstable interplay of truth and illusion 
becomes a social force of horrendous and phantasmic dimensions.”71 With this interplay in 
mind, numerous and repeated efforts were made to supplement the diplomatic cables cited 
throughout this work. Although the more salacious claims could not be verified entirely, 
several works written in the post-colonial period of the 1950s and 1960s corroborated the 
problems—of violence, over-centralization, structural inequality, informal politics, etc.—that 
mandate officials and politicians criticized in the 1930s and 1940s. The overall impression, 
then, is that many of the problems confronting the political establishment built by the French 
during the mandate lingered long after the last forces of Paris had left the Levant. That much 
of the corroborating evidence was published well after the termination of the mandate 
demonstrates the level of secrecy though which politics took place during the interwar years. 
Finally, it is worth considering that the following pages feature a number of statements and 
opinions made by French, Syrian and Lebanese observers ranging from the vulgar and 
offensive to the maudlin and exaggerated, which do not reflect the attitude of this author but 
reveal the systems of thought that underpinned social, economic and political tensions 
throughout colonial rule in the region. Rather than an undisputed truth, these assertions 
disclose the various contradictions and forms of hostility that emerged during the mandate.  
 
                                              
69 Taussig, Michael. “Culture of Terror: Space of Death, Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the 
Explanation of Torture.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 494. 
70 Taussig, 1984, 495. 
71 Taussig, 1984, 492. 
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2. Recognizing Unspoken Violence and Suppression 
The second methodological challenge follows from the first. If colonial narrative is 
part of an effort to validate a particular belief system among the colonists, then how can one 
account for the experiences of the colonized? The colonial emphasis on hierarchy and the 
particular French fixation with centralization are evidenced in their obsession with the 
notable families of Lebanon. To address similar issues, Taussig portrays the failure to 
acknowledge coercion, as a function of the culture of fear that mediates colonial power.72 
The culture of terror that Taussig depicts becomes manifest through what is missing, namely 
the exclusion of violence and the experiences of the poor and powerless. Building upon 
Taussig, Timothy Mitchell sees discourse and the often latent nods to coercion within it as a 
necessary component of the framework that reproduces domination. In this manner, Mitchell 
contends that, “to acquire its usefulness in the play of domination, violence must be 
whispered about, recalled by its victims, and hinted at in future threats. The disappearance of 
the hidden act of terror gains its force as an absence that is continually made present.”73 
Rather than a complete absence of coercion, the reproduction of domination requires some 
narrative, which, in turn, has the potential to reveal a more complex glimpse of power 
relations. To impose silence among victims and witnesses, perpetrators of violence must put 
forth their own alternative version of events. In turn, this alternative version of events breaks 
a strict code of silence, and triggers whispers and rumors that contest the accounts of the 
perpetrators.  
With regard to Lebanon, the language that officials employed to address problems 
becomes instructive. The “administrative crises” that high commission delegates decried and 
the “administrative reforms” that they mooted as solutions become the gateways to explore 
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the complexities and contradictions of empire. Each subsequent chapter begins with an 
examination of particular administrative issues, framed by theoretical analyses that help to 
highlight the myriad forms of political turmoil typically suppressed by the bureaucratic 
language of reform. In doing so, it can be seen that while the plight of the marginalized was 
posited as a function of administrative constraints, in practice, it emerged directly and 
indirectly from French policy.  
3. Elite Focus 
 This orientation attests to the third major challenge, the focus on Beirut and its elite 
politics within academic accounts of mandate Lebanon.74 The most practical reason for this 
elite disposition is that among a largely illiterate population, much of the material in the 
archives came from informants and witnesses among this elite class, whether the journalists 
and editors that covered events or the French officials who reported them.75 While the literati 
did not serve as spokespeople for the majority, they did enjoy a flourish in publications and 
letters during the mandate period. Several accounts of state formation produce the narrative 
that the French creation of the state of Lebanon was sealed with an alliance between the 
                                              
74 See Attiyah, 1973; Johnson, Michael. All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of the War in Lebanon. 
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Illiteracy Rates According to the Unofficial Census of Lebanon for 1932 by Region 
 
District   Total Number of Illiterates % Illiteracy  
 
Beirut   42,682    42.06 
Mount Lebanon  91,644    50.38 
North Lebanon  89,934    66.56   
South Lebanon  81,294    71.18 
Bekaa   63,433    67.45    
Total   369,987    58.85  
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delegates of Paris and the political elites associated with Mt. Lebanon and Beirut.76 Most 
prominent in this alliance were the patriarchs of the Maronite Christian church who 
advocated for the creation of a sectarian Christian dominated state under the protection of 
Paris. This integration took place despite the opposition from the majority who preferred 
political union with the neighboring state of Syria or with a larger kingdom of Arab 
provinces from the former Ottoman territories. State formation, then, was presented as a 
contest between these contending visions of the future of the state, or, in other words, as a 
function of notable politics and feuds.  
In contrast to this activity among the elites, the poor are described as indifferent to the 
politics of the age. In this manner, comments like those of Najla Atiyah’s are common within 
the scholarship when she says that, 
The different ecological environment of the rural people, who are concentrated in  the 
North of Lebanon and who are divided into wealthy feudal lords and poor peasants, 
made them less responsive to political issues. Their greater economic dependence on 
feudal lords made them more submissive to their masters. Thus the people played no 
role whatsoever in determining the attitude of their spokesmen.77  
 
While political mobilization of the rural poor was marginal in comparison with political 
elites, the social relationships within Lebanon are worth examining in greater degree. Rather 
than indicate a general indifference to the politics of the country, the absence of the poor 
attest to changing social relations during the period. By introducing francs into the country, 
the mandate effectively bolstered the aegis of an elite that became increasingly less 
dependent on the underclass employed in the less lucrative agricultural industries. In place of 
agriculture, the new elite grew occupied with the new commercial banking sector and 
obtaining access to the government bureaucracy that the French introduced, as discussed in 
                                              
76 See Zamir, Meir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon. London: Croom Helm, 1988; Zamir, Meir, Lebanon’s 
Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926-1939, 1997; Salibi, Kamal. A House of Many Mansions: The History of 
Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkeley: U California P, 1988; Firro, Kais . Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the 
state under the Mandate. London : I.B. Tauris, 2003.  
77 Atiyah,1973, 100. A similar remark about the middle class orientation of periodicals from the mandate is 
found in Saliba, 2016, 57.  
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chapter two. Ironically, then, the discussion of the marginalized appears in the writings of the 
French elites in Lebanon. Certainly, a large portion of the files reviewed for this work touch 
upon the maneuverings and machinations of the rich and powerful. Yet, I did not want to 
contribute to the existing volumes on notable politics or imperial rivalries for the Arab world. 
Instead I sought to focus on the socio-economic upheavals that occurred during the 
transformative years of the mandate. Upon arriving in France, however, I discovered a cache  
of files dedicated to these same notables that I had tried to avoid, in the context of years and 
even decades of efforts that the French had dedicated to rallying the old notables in North 
Lebanon to support the mandate regime. Despite the formal focus on centralized hierarchies, 
French officials touched upon socio-economic issues from the perspective of their profound 
resentment toward the Lebanese government that had emerged during the mandate. The 
reasons for this resentment stemmed from what they considered to be petty personal 
vendettas among the leading families who used the mandate to settle old scores and establish 
patron-client relations, especially in the annexed territories. At the same time, these French 
officials harbored a certain noblesse oblige that comes across in their grievance against the 
Lebanese government over their failure to properly administer the colony. While this tableau 
of the residents of the annexed territories is far from complete, it offers some insight into the 
far-reaching transformations, upheavals and pressures that residents brooked. As discussed in 
chapter 4, the tensions and turmoil that faced the marginalized become manifest in the 
grievances between the French high commission and the Lebanese parliament. 
4. Scarcity and Secrecy of Resources 
 This grievance in particular sheds light on the fourth methodological challenge 
involving the secrecy and scarcity of materials. It never occurred to me beforehand, but the 
problem with accessing top-secret files is that many of the issues discussed within them still 
remain secret to large degree. At one level, the sources that informed this material and the 
 37 
audiences that consumed it preferred to keep secret claims that—quite literally—indicted the 
entire mandatory regime, as was the case with the papers reviewed in chapter five.78 In areas 
that were historically neglected and underdeveloped, and increasingly marginalized from the 
cultural and commercial hubs orbiting around the new capital of Beirut, it was possible to 
maintain secrets among the suppressed populations. Following Priya Satia, such secrecy is 
indicative of covert imperialism in which the colonial bureaucracy functioned as a cover for 
an “intelligence organization whose enforced informality would allow covert pursuit of 
empire.”79 Such covert pursuits precipitated other decisions that restricted the collection of 
evidence.  
In addition, ahead of the Nazi march on Paris, the entirety of the political documents 
of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1932 -1940 was destroyed on the order of the 
ministry’s secretary general, Alexis Léger.80 Since the Quai d’Orsay would have received the 
political documents sent from the Levant, the number of documents lost during this period 
remains unknown. In addition, other political considerations from the Levant have 
                                              
78 On active suppression and silencing, Michael Gilsenan would refer to his study of Lebanese power relations, 
commenting, “That forgotten, in the case of figures on the Lebanese political scene, that it seemed to require a 
certain amount of active suppression and silencing. One did not refer in public to the affair though everyone 
knew.’ More than social politeness was at stake. To refer to the story was to invoke practices and relations of 
power contradictory to what many wished to maintain and what often felt were appropriate modes of Lebanese 
politics. It was also too sharp a reminder of the fact that, nonetheless, such practices existed and might even be 
argued to be essential to the workings of power, rather than an aberrant or marginal.” Gilsenan, 1996, 323, Note 
6. While the affair to which Gilsenan refers is taken up in later, it is worth pointing out now that the active 
suppression and silencing that he recounts from his experiences in the 1970s was the product of transformations 
in relations of power that took place in the mandate. For the figure to which he refers to was the Sunni delegate 
of Akkar discussed in chapter 3. With regard to the criminality within the Lebanese government, a senior 
mandate official would comment in a document further examined in Chapter five that with regards to the 1937 
legislative elections, “The legislative elections that were at the root of the government, were in this country a 
public marketplace from the very first day in which illiterate and unconcerned voters sold themselves to the 
highest bidders. This cynicism and degradation has increased with each new election and are so well entrenched 
in the government’s mores that the election of the current parliament gives rise to official scandals present in 
everyone’s memories that are sufficient to indict the entire regime.” C463 HCF secrétaire-général No. 1536 13 
July 1939, rapport sur la situation politique et administrative au Liban par M. Gassouin, 2.  
79 Satia, Priya, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the 
Middle East, Oxford: Oxford UP: 2008, 264. 
80 White, Benjamin Thomas, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in 
French Mandate Syria, Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011, 7. Among the aliases of the then secretary-general 
Léger was Saint-John Perse, under which he would win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1960 following his exile 
from France in 1940 due to his anti-Nazi political stance.   
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suppressed related materials. On the order of the French High Commissioner under Vichy 
France, General Henri Dentz, the records of the political affairs cabinet, the bureau from 
which most of the documents reviewed in this work originated, were deliberately burned as 
the forces of the Free French and British mission defeated those of the Vichy government in 
1941.81 Among the existing evidence of police reports, intelligence files, private papers, 
journal articles and diplomatic cables, gaps remain and questions unanswered. Given the lack 
of evidence on the annexed territories during the mandate, it has been difficult to fill these 
gaps. Further complicating research in Lebanon was that during the country’s civil war of 
1975-1990, records from the mandate and Ottoman periods were destroyed, left unattended 
and eventually went missing.82 The scarcity of evidence not only comprises the paucity of 
reliable census information and medical records, but also more mundane souvenirs like maps 
and photographs of parts of the annexed territories such was the neglect. Researching and 
reflecting on such materials bring to mind the “traces of an ever-receding past” that 
anthropologist Michael Gilsenan describes in the footnotes of his book compiled from the 
ethnography that he conducted on the eve of the Lebanese civil war when he writes that,  
This book has sometimes seemed like a kind of archaeology of a world that vanished 
beneath the layers of the Lebanese wars. It speaks of ’20 years ago’ and a ‘then’ with 
which it is difficult to trace any link of continuity. The violence has been so great that 
a book loses any relevance—moral, intellectual or political. My notes, at such 
moments, appear to be traces of an ever-receding past. It is as if the world they record 
is effaced in the very act of remembering here; or memory becomes nothing but a 
pious offering to something—through what is not clear—now gone, crushed under 
the foot by years of conflict.83 
  
After spending a year in this endeavor, I returned to London to find that the path that I 
had trekked across three countries in pursuit of the study of the French mandate mirrored that 
                                              
81 See Méouchy, Nadine and Sluglett, Peter, eds. The British and French Mandates in Comparative  
Perspectives. Leiden: Brill, 2004 for a discussion on the difficulties of research on the French mandate. The 
Dentz decision is also recounted in White, 2011, 11.  
82 Saliba, 2016, 308. A similar claim about the loss of archival materials during the civil war was made to the 
author during a conversation with Nada Sbaiti in April 2016.  
83 Gilsenan, 1996, 324, Note 11. 
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of one of my colleagues at the School of Oriental and African Studies, Dr. Nada Saliba. 
Although we never met, her 2016 doctoral thesis, The Urban History of Tripoli during the 
French Mandate, 1920-1943, proved invaluable in helping to answer some of the questions 
that arose in the course of my fieldwork about the city of Tripoli and North Lebanon, in 
general, the subjects of chapters two and four.84 Upon finding her work after completing a 
rough draft of this dissertation, I discovered that despite our common missions to Beirut, 
London and Nantes, our two works hardly cover the same events and insofar as they do, offer 
different perspectives and reach different conclusions.85 Still, Dr. Saliba speaks much sense 
when she writes that “locating primary sources for Tripoli was a remarkable feat and 
therefore recreating an urban history with the available sources has required much 
imagination.”86 While this current work is neither an urban history nor a solitary study of 
Tripoli proper, the tone of her comments matches the experiences involved with the research, 
translation, writing and editing of this work. Gaps remain and questions unanswered. In spite 
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85 Although I have never met Dr. Saliba, the main factor that distinguishes her from mine is the background 
through which we approached this subject. A native of Tripoli, the focus of her history project was an attempt to 
engage in the conversation on the historiography of Tripoli over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. As historian James Reilly describes in his book, contemporary historians see Tripoli as a city whose 
fortune has declined since the mid-nineteenth century, often in indirect proportion to the rise of other 
Mediterranean coastal cities like Beirut and Lattakia, and in a different way, Haifa and Jaffa-Tel Aviv  (Reilly, 
2016, 154). In contrast, Saliba offers a riposte to this general gloomy trend by emphasizing the contributions 
that Tripoli made to events in the Levant. Thus she writes in her conclusion that, “the near absence of Tripoli 
from current relevant literature on mandate Syria and Lebanon has informed my endeavor to re-construct an 
urban history of Tripoli and its formative role in shaping the narrative of Tripoli and Lebanon.” (Saliba, 2016, 
206)  With this endeavor in mind, her work documents the expansion of the city that occurred during the 
transformative years of the mandate. Indeed, this desire to restore and recover the lost luster of her hometown 
also informs her commentary. For instance, she writes that “it is hoped that this dissertation will fill a gap in the 
growing literature on Levantine cities through a study that uncover key economic, socio-political and urban 
changes in Tripoli between 1920 and 1940” (Saliba, 2016, 306).  
 
For my part, however, I entered the French archives knowing very little about the city and the transformations 
that occurred within it. My initial attraction revolved around my curiosity with the water and health crisis that 
occurred in the North and why I had never heard of it. Though I was also interested in other areas of the 
country, my focus shifted to the forms of suppression and interference that allowed this crisis to unravel in 
silence. The overall impression that I have from reading her work on three occasions is that our works are very 
different. What most intrigues me is that even though we both cite the same sources, namely Carton 460 in the 
Nantes archives, the files that I used to describe the city are not mentioned in hers. Similarly, the newspaper 
archives that she cites came from the same Lebanese archives in which I was told that no such materials existed. 
86 Saliba, 2016, 308.  
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of these limitations, her work, like mine, breaks new ground on undisclosed aspects of life in 
mandate Lebanon. On a personal level, nothing would give me greater satisfaction than to be 
proven wrong with regards to the grim and dire conditions described below. Yet, what I hope 
does not preclude me from following the evidence, assessing it, and drawing the relevant 
conclusions. That such material has survived deliberate suppression, burnings, neglect and 
classification at various points over the past 100 years, one ought to feel encouraged that the 
gaps that remain will not last as long as it took for me to notice them, whatever my faults, 
omissions, mistakes, shortcomings and errors.    
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the experiences of the French mandate in Lebanon disclose that the 
production of space in the colonial setting was not the result of the imposition of European 
practices, but emerged through the capacity of the subject population to establish informal 
networks that reshaped and re-appropriated colonial designs. Territoriality was not so much 
enforced from the metropole as much as it was socially mediated within the colony. While 
both theories of the production of space reviewed so far assume that colonialism inaugurated 
new practices and technologies of discipline, the experience of Lebanon reveals something 
about the contradictions of power as well as the consequences that they generated for rulers 
and ruled. The French administration in Lebanon attempted to expand its rule through its 
bureaucracy with the hope that it would re-organize residents to obey a new relation of power 
headed by the Quai d’Orsay. In addition to these formal structures of power, the French 
sought to reproduce their rule and consecrate their position through informal networks with 
new and traditional political bosses in the region. Although the French had hoped to employ 
informal arrangements to strengthen the formal institutions of governance, in practice, the 
bureaucracy empowered informal networks. In turn, these networks undermined French rule. 
In other words, the very institutions through which the Quai d’Orsay had hoped to augment 
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its power within the region generated a series of unexpected situations that enabled a select 
few among the colonial subjects to bolster their authority at the expense—quite literally in 
some cases—of Paris.  
The question of colonial territoriality, then, may be tied to that of the social order 
within the colony. While the Americas that Sacks studies experienced centuries of European 
settlement, this strip of the Levant by and large did not brook the same waves of European 
settlement. Instead, the political class that emerged in the few decades of the mandate was 
able to boost its position by co-opting the practices of power that the French sought to 
impose. The result was not a new or modern system of rule in any strict sense, but an 
intensification of existing patterns of behavior and the contradictions that they generated for 
the population and the high commission as well.  
But if state power is circumstantial and contingent upon social relations, how was 
colonial state-space created and maintained as a distinct administrative unit? And in the 
context of a population divided on the question of colonial rule, what enabled the 
reproduction of colonial power relations? Answers to the above questions involve examining 
the interaction of the production of space with other institutions of statecraft. In keeping with 
Daniel Neep’s contention that the production of space is “above all a practiced quality, an 
enactment of dynamic movement which creates space as it unfolds,”87 it is possible to 
identify several practices that facilitated the production of space. For the purposes of this 
study, these institutions include urban design and the creation of public space; efforts of land 
reform and economic restructuring; municipal administration; and parliamentary elections. 
Underlying each of these institutions is the role of coercion in not only securing the 
obedience of dissident individuals, but also in re-shaping social relations.  
                                              
87 Neep, 2012, 118-119. 
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The chapters that follow offer greater insight into the ambiguities of power that 
proliferated in the age of imperialism. Chapter two reviews the theories of colonial 
administration through the lens of city planning. Although power in the age of imperialism 
has been seen along the dichotomy of direct and indirect colonial control, the resistance 
against the mandate that coalesced in North Lebanon discloses the role of informal politics in 
re-appropriating colonial designs. The dispatches from the chief French administrator reveal 
that the republic’s efforts to re-orient the city of Tripoli around the high commission office, 
ironically, helped to concentrate anti-mandate sentiments and bolster competing forms of 
political mobilization and organization. This shifting landscape, combined with the failure of 
the station chief to consider the demands of protestors, contributed to the outbreak of 
violence and the heightening of tensions that continued to menace the high commission.  
In a similar fashion, chapter three examines the ambiguities that the high commission 
confronted in response to its land reform policies. A discussion of different theories related to 
the production of space reveals that the arrival of European modes of discipline did not 
supplant existing practices of domination. As seen in the plains of Akkar, land reform did not 
accomplish the purported goal of returning the land to the peasants but increased the 
concentration of productive land held by the most unproductive segments of the population. 
In effect, what had long been considered as a feudal system of land tenure worsened under 
the mandate. By bankrolling the worst abusers in the countryside, Paris was not able to 
transform the countryside of Lebanon into a productive cotton field as expected. Instead, the 
effects of land tenure not only demoralized cultivators and exposed them to various forms of 
coercion, violence and intimidation, it made Paris more reliant on the new bureaucrats 
controlling the countryside and widened the gap between the French and the population.   
Chapter four returns our attention to the city of Tripoli and the shifting landscapes of 
the north. On one level, it explores different theories related to the formation of a colonial 
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political, social and economic elite. Rather than a one-off event, the processes of elite 
formation precipitate new fields of contestation that have the potential to challenge and 
undermine imperial objectives. The experiences of late mandate Tripoli and its surrounding 
dependencies reveal the ambiguities of colonial institution building and the ways in which 
territoriality is socially mediated rather than geographically imposed. Namely, in the hope of 
neutralizing indifferent and hostile elements within the population, the agents of the high 
commission unsuccessfully tried to recruit members of the elite families of the city into the 
newly established bureaucracy that oversaw municipal affairs. Rather than bolster its 
authority, however, the new bureaucracy undermined the Quai d’Orsay. Informal patronage 
networks and acts of sabotage altered colonial designs and further marginalized the high 
commission from the population to the extent that the chain of command that the French had 
envisioned became upended. As a result, Paris became increasingly beholden to the Lebanese 
government.  
Chapter five examines the unbundling of territoriality in the more conventional 
context of imperial rivalries. The contradictions of colonial rule become apparent upon 
considering the rationales and consequences of the parliamentary system that emerged from 
the 1926 constitution instituted by High Commissioner Henry de Jouvenel. Far from shoring 
up French rule, the legislature and executive office empowered informal politics and 
patronage networks. Over time, these maneuvers opened the door to foreign designs, which 
helped to facilitate France’s ouster from the Levant. Considering the fallout of such practices 
from the perspective of South Lebanon will shed new light on the tumultuous years of 1940-
1946. This capability of Lebanese officials and elites to re-appropriate colonial institutions 
designed to support France indicates the contradictions and shifting relations of power that 
underpinned colonial rule.  
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Finally, chapter six serves as the conclusion. In light of its political events, the post-
colonial period in Lebanon does not appear as an epistemological break from the system of 
thought and practices of domination and resistance that reigned in the before. Instead, 
colonial governance planted the seeds of the institutional practices and informal networks 
that would eventually flourish such as excessive centralization, de-development and 
marginalization of the annexed territories, a culture of violence and intimidation, neo-
patrimonialism and institutional mediation into the lives of citizens. In these ways, the formal 
as well as informal institutions that came into fruition during that mandate, typically in 






II. Order on the Barricades: A Summary of French Designs of 




UNE SORTE DE BLOCUS 
Le Comte Damien de Martel, the sixth High Commissioner of the French Republic 
for Syria and Lebanon, addressed his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 
November 1936 to describe the response of his office to a series of protests that had broken 
out in the city of Tripoli earlier that month. Demonstrations had reached a fever pitch as the 
residents rallied against the mandate and the agreement of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese treaty. 
The treaty would have further cemented the integration of the city into the state of Lebanon 
against the wishes of those who sought its attachment to the neighboring state of Syria. 
Explaining the success of the ongoing protests, the count cited the configuration of the city as 
an impediment to the strict surveillance and police presence that he desired. “Whereas Beirut 
was designed with large avenues in the heart of the city to, in part, facilitate circulation,” de 
Martel explained, “the old quarters of Tripoli where the Muslims are grouped, present an 
inextricable labyrinth of narrow alleyways conducive to barricades where one cannot engage 
the public without great risk.”88  
How the count sought to ensure French political, economic and military pre-eminence 
in a region that his forces could not penetrate without great risk touches upon an aspect of 
power in the colonial state that this chapter examines. Rather than strength in numbers or of 
arms, or from some supposed cultural superiority, the centerpiece of de Martel’s plan was a 
policy of transforming the layout of the city, like much of the Levant, to French advantage. A 
review of different theories of colonial governance will lay the groundwork for 
understanding the complexities of power that de Martel confronted. For, understanding 
debates around the nature of colonial rule and the native question will shed light on the 
practices of power in the colonial setting, and the ways in which these procedures were 
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November 1936 page 2. Signed by DE MARTEL 
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challenged. This theoretical review will, in turn, be supplemented with a review of the 
changing history of the city of Tripoli from the establishment of the Mandate in 1920 up to 
the events of 1936. Ultimately, it can be seen that the predicament facing de Martel indicates 
that the reproduction of space in the colonial setting was not a function of the imposition of 
formal institutions of government, but emerged through the capacity of informal networks to 
re-shape and re-appropriate the practices that underpinned this supposed new order. Rather 
than entrench imperial power, these practices transformed political contestation in ways that 
undermined the French mandate and precipitated unrest among the subject populations. 
Because territoriality was socially mediated rather than geographically imposed, the French 
administration failed to make inroads in the north. 
For the tension that had built up in the Old City was a function of the shifting 
landscape of Tripoli. The French efforts to incorporate this area into the new order it had 
designed for the Levant faced a backlash, the epicenter of which was the area that had served 
as the frontlines of the crusades centuries before. To de Martel, the narrow and cluttered 
quarters of the Old City—including the nearby Citadel of Saint Gilles, located on the site of 
the crusader camp of Raymond IV, Le Comte de Toulouse— represented the past and those 
who clung to the proud history of Tripoli. This supposed labyrinth stood at odds with the 
logical order that the high commission sought to develop in the city, characterized by the 
infrastructure projects under construction to the west of the Old City in the neighborhood of 
al-Tall modeled on La Place de L’Étoile in Paris. Although the new landscape was underway, 
the high commission would discover in 1936 that however much the configuration of the city 
shifted to match Parisian designs, political power dwelled within the area that the French 
could not penetrate within the gates of the Old City. The predicament of de Martel would be 
to find a way to exert French influence in an area that his agency could not easily enter.    
 48 
His solution relied upon the same strategies of administrative measures taken up by 
his predecessors in the high commission. Since the Old City represented an impenetrable 
labyrinth to his agents, de Martel had planned to reorient the land around a parallel cityscape 
that would effectively blockade the Old City. As de Martel went on to write, “it is because of 
this reason that a delegate of the high commission preferred to abstain from all active 
repression. Having established around the Old City une sorte de blocus, he was content with 
prohibiting access to the quarters where gunfire broke out.”89 Beyond a response to civil 
unrest, this blockade of sorts is representative of the predicament of French policy in 
Lebanon. For the delegates of Paris sought to redefine the very features of this city and 
overall landscape in order to control the flow of people and ideas.  
In these ways, it can be seen that the French administration in Lebanon attempted to 
expand its rule in Tripoli through the build-up of a large bureaucracy designed to oversee 
social, economic and political affairs in the north, but also to establish a new relation of 
power beholden to the Quai d’Orsay. In addition to these formal structures of power, the 
French sought to reproduce their rule and consecrate their position through informal 
networks with emerging and traditional political bosses in the region. Although the French 
had sought to incorporate the Old City within its new landscape of Tripoli, in practice, 
however, the shifting configuration of the city animated unrest in the Old City and threatened 
to undermine France’s position in the north, in general.  
THEORIES OF COLONIAL RULE 
In order to understand the predicament of the high commissioner, it is necessary to 
explore theories related to the exercise of power in the colonial setting. There are several 
ways to think of the exercise of power in the age of imperialism. First, Mahmood Mamdani 
posits colonial rule as a function of complementary practices of direct and indirect rule that 
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fragmented the colonial population.90 In contrast, Benjamin Tobias Dodge characterizes 
power-relations with the British mandate of Iraq as a reflection of a myriad of perspectives 
within the colonial office over the best way to rule the colony.91 Far from a uniform and 
coherent logic, he contends that the operation of power in the colonial state was a function of 
competing narratives about the subject population and derived from distinct institutional 
practices of domination. Still further, the scholarship of Jean-Francois Bayart on the African 
state offers insight into the ways in which patron-client relations underpinned practices of 
governance through the colonial and post-colonial experiences.92  
Beyond the structural framework of colonial rule, it is also necessary to consider the 
informal politics and latent forces constitutive in power as well as resistance.  The challenge 
with all three scholars is the complexity in determining the degree of agency between 
European colonial administrators, their native non-European colleagues, and the subject 
population. For either colonial control resulted from the imposition of European practices in 
the new world, or the failure of colonial administrators to penetrate into native societies 
dominated by supposedly tribal customs. Yet, as the French experience in Lebanon will 
disclose, these formal structures required what can be described as informal alliances and 
networks with new and traditional political bosses in the region. That is to say, the new 
relations of power that the French sought to impose through the formal structures of the 
bureaucracy depended on informal practices. Due to this contradiction that underpinned 
colonial statecraft, it can be seen that the reproduction of space in the colonial setting was not 
a function of the imposition of formal institutions of government, but emerged through the 
capacity of informal networks to re-shape and re-appropriate the new bureaucracy. Informal 
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politics were not only the reification of the colonial state, but also a challenge to the 
maintenance of authority that created a legacy beyond the intentions of the metropole.  
 For Mamdani, the recruitment of the native population into the colonial bureaucracy 
is seen as the key to understanding the re-production of power. Implicit in his framework of 
analysis is the idea that the informal alliances of customary rule became institutionalized as a 
reinforcement of colonial rule in Africa. For, he argues that the organization of the colonial 
state in Africa developed in response to what he characterizes as the native question, the 
mechanisms that facilitated the rule of a small and foreign minority over the indigenous 
majority in the colony.93 The answers to this question were two-fold and comprised a form of 
direct rule and a form of indirect rule. “In practice, direct rule,” he contends, “meant the 
reintegration and domination of natives in the institutional context of semi-servile and semi-
capitalist agrarian relations.”94 In this context, colonial populations under direct rule enjoyed 
no rights under the governing framework transposed from Europe onto the colony.  In 
contrast, indirect rule offered a veneer of spatial and institutional autonomy to select native 
communities in which “tribal leadership was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy 
of the local state or freshly imposed where none had existed as in stateless societies.”95 By 
this, he refers to the supposedly autonomous tribal zones that were incorporated into the 
colonial hierarchy. As colonial regimes sought to overcome different forms of resistance to 
their rule, colonial governance evolved into competing claims of authority, Mamdani insists, 
in which direct rule reigned in the cities in the name of civil power and respect for minorities 
while indirect rule dominated the countryside under the notion of customary power and rural 
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tradition.96 Part of the rationale for the persistence of colonial governance was that it 
promised a form of limited autonomy for recognized “tribes” even as it sought to incorporate 
these communities into a colonial hierarchy overseen by the metropole. For him, colonial 
institution building does not indicate the erosion of colonial control under the impact of 
growing anti-colonial resistance, but signifies the evolution of a mode of power inherent in 
colonialism.  
 In contrast to the underlying despotic portrayal of the colonial state that Mamdani 
provides, Dodge sees the colonial state as a compendium of competing interests in his study 
of the British mandate of Iraq. His approach to understanding colonial statecraft relies upon 
considering the different perspectives of colonial administrators with regards to their views 
of direct and indirect rule. In contrast to representations of the all-knowing colonial gaze, he 
posits that, “the state, far from being a whole is better described as a collection of distinct 
institutional practices reified to give the illusion of political coherence.”97 With this 
framework of analysis in mind, the shift to indirect rule that Mamadani presents was less of 
an institutional eventuality than it was the outcome of shifting perspectives among colonial 
administrators. From his perspective, power emerges from the different perspectives of the 
colonists with regards to direct and indirect rule as well as from their opinions of the subject 
populations. In this manner, the institutions of the colonial state appear largely as a reflection 
of the metropole.  At the same time, informal politics appear as an aberration of colonial 
governance protocols in which native agents emerge as either good or bad enforcers of social 
                                              
96 Mamdani, 1996, 18.  His main argument is that power operated through decentralized despotic practices that 
were justified under colonialism. To the extent that pre-existing relations of power remained after the onset of 
European penetration, they were incorporated into the complimentary efforts of direct and indirect rule. In his 
words, “direct rule was the form of urban civil power. It was about the exclusion of natives from civil freedoms 
guaranteed to citizens in civil society. Indirect rule, however, signified a rural tribal authority. It was about 
incorporating natives into a state-enforced customary order.” (Mamdani, 1996, 7, 24.) Anti-colonial resistance 
centered on expanding the freedoms of limited autonomy and, in the process, also acquired the tribalist tones of 
customary rule. After independence, the colonial regime of differentiation resembled institutionalized 
segregation, helping to sow the seeds of neo-patrimonialism across African states.  
97 Dodge, 2002, 8.  
 52 
policies crafted outside of the colony. In this sense, agency largely rests with policy-makers 
motivated by political affairs outside of the colony. While Dodge presents the colonial sate as 
an incoherent collection of practices, power-relations within the colony are seen to have 
derived from the imposition of European practices of governance to the colony.  
From a different perspective, Jean-Francois Bayart contends that patron-client 
relations underpinned colonial and post-colonial state in Africa. While his emphasis lies on 
African states, especially those in Francophone West-Africa, it remains helpful when 
considering the ramifications of French policy more broadly. For many of the colonial 
officers in Syria and Lebanon arrived there having previously served in different parts of 
Africa. The most notable example was the very man who decreed the State of Lebanon, 
General Henri Gouraud, a former colonial officer and administrator in West Africa and 
Morocco for twenty years prior to the onset of World War I. To Bayart, colonialism 
inaugurated a practice of institutional mediation in the lives of the native population and 
fostered the misuse of public office for personal interests. His notion of the politics of the 
belly, he contends, “can be applied more or less to any aspect of institutional mediation and 
to the ‘situations’ it engenders. It creates institutions itself in that it has directly contributed to 
excessive bureaucracy and bureaucratic structures.”98 From this perspective the exercise of 
power in the colonial setting was not the carbon copy of practices from the metropole. 
Instead, the attempt to transplant these practices created new networks of subordination and 
domination. In thinking about the exercise of power, Bayart writes that  “an apparatus of 
control or domination or a line of dependence are not just what the government or 
imperialism want them to be, they are also what the actors, even if they are subordinate, 
make of them.”99 In this, he means that the reproduction of power enabled select individuals 
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to acquire new forms of authority and status through access to colonial institutions of 
governance. Thus, Bayart describes the re-appropriation of colonial institutions as the fate of 
post-colonial Africa.100 
A consideration of the contradictions between the expansion—or even creation—of 
customary tribal rule and the social and political hierarchies of colonialism highlights the 
emergence of a new nexus of power within colonial power relations. Namely, the 
bureaucracy served as a way to initiate colonial subjects within a new chain of command 
underpinned by informal politics that relied more upon personal privilege than practices of 
effective administration. This shadowy intrigue comprises the shadow state that Charles 
Tripp has described in his study of post-colonial Iraq as the “networks of associates, chains 
of patronage and clients, circles of exclusion and privilege emanating from the office and 
person of the president.”101 Rather than supplant tribal and customary links, public office 
strengthened these supposedly pre-modern affiliations and networks. The configuration of 
informal power stands counter to the procedures of the modern bureaucracy. In this sense, 
Tripp writes that the shadow state “stood behind all public state organizations, turning their 
hierarchies upside down and answering to a very different set of commands.”102 Instead of 
the bureaucracy disciplining the population into modern subjects, it coerced different 
segments of the population into patronage networks. For Tripp, at the core of the shadow 
state were “the men attached to the president through common regional background, family 
or tribal affiliation or tried-and-tested dedication to his personal service.” Beyond this coterie 
that dominated the inner circle of privilege were “the networks of patronage and association 
that gave [these senior figures] weight” within the population.103  In this way, public office 
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contributed to the proliferation of informal practices that linked different segments of the 
population to the state in various ways.  
In contrast to Tripp, it can be argued that informal politics were not only a function of 
the operation of power following independence from imperial rule, but a legacy of colonial 
institution building. While Tripp sees the emergence of the shadow state as something that 
reinforced despotism after independence, when framed in the context of colonial rule this 
informal configuration appears as a more unstable force that tempered, if not altogether 
undermined, colonial rule.  By transforming the intended relation of power within the 
bureaucracy, the shadow state created new situations that imperial agents would have to 
address to maintain their rule. As a function of the shift to indirect rule, the shadow state 
represents a strategy of domination that colonial agents employed to incorporate the subject 
population within a chain of command dominated by the metropole. Despite these colonial 
ambitions, the bureaucracy generated the unexpected consequence in which power was 
increasingly personalized and localized in the hands of the native officers who could exercise 
state power in swathes of the colony otherwise untouched by imperial rule.  In this sense, the 
rise of informal politics indicates the limits of the colonial administration to penetrate the 
peripheries of the colony through its bureaucratic practices. Not only did informal politics 
serve the interests of the colonists, they contributed to the contestation of European 
encroachment, even by those who were entrusted to carry out its duties. Public office did not 
strengthen the rule of the colonial state as much as it contributed to the personalization of 
power in the hands of an ambitious few at the expense of the majority. The challenge in 
considering the colonial state, then, is to not focus solely on French policy, but also to think 
about the responses of colonial subjects to this general policy and its effects on power-
relations. For, power was challenged and undermined through its very exercise. In these ways 
colonial management was not solely a function of the imposition of formal institutions of 
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government, but emerged through the capacity of informal networks to re-shape and re-
appropriate the practices that underpinned this supposed new order. 
 In the case of the French mandate in Lebanon, this potential to undermine public 
office for private benefit created the unexpected scenario in which informal practices 
flourished despite the attempts of Paris to centralize authority. On the one hand, the French 
administration attempted to expand its rule through the build-up of a large bureaucracy 
designed to oversee social, economic and political affairs in the country, but also to establish 
among residents of the different territories brought together within the country a new relation 
of power according to a chain of command that extended from the remotest village to the 
Quai d’Orsay. These efforts resemble what Mahmoud Mamdani describes as indirect rule. 
The new modern bureaucracy would be anathema to the myriad of laws, statutes and 
religious interpretations that governed the now vanquished Ottoman Empire. On the other 
hand, there existed a series of unspoken (though well-documented) arrangements, 
understandings and intrigues on which French administrators relied to maintain order as they 
sought to extinguish other fires in the empire. Although the French had hoped to employ 
informal arrangements to strengthen the formal institutions of governance, in practice, the 
bureaucracy empowered informal networks to alter and, ultimately, undermine the efforts of 
the high commission to effectively administer the country. In this manner, it can be seen that 
the reproduction of space in the colonial setting was not a function of the imposition of 
formal institutions of government, but emerged through the capacity of informal networks to 
re-shape and re-appropriate the practices that underpinned this supposed new order.  
THE COLONIAL BLOCUS  
A thorough examination of the colonial bureaucracy in Lebanon will reveal that the 
French did not seek to immediately eliminate competing representations of space. Instead, it 
sought to limit the reproduction of these competing claims through an array of practices that 
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comprise what can be described as the colonial blocus, the field where an array of actors 
compete to exercise power through the institutions of the state as well as to re-appropriate 
these same institutions to different and contradictory effect. In a literal sense, the colonial 
blocus indicates a blockade, in general, like the one that de Martel outlined to his superiors. 
In another sense, it represents an attempt to concentrate resources and institutional authority 
in a specific place and with specific individuals at the expense of others. Moreover, this 
binary relation carries within it the threat of violence and coercion. At the same time, it 
implies more than just institutional interference. It also describes the networks through which 
these same institutions are reconfigured through acts of political appeasement and resistance. 
This capacity to alter ostensibly fixed relations of power creates new opportunities for 
domination and subordination.  
As mentioned previously, the maintenance of authority was underpinned by a number 
of formal and informal practices. First, the mandate established an immense bureaucratic 
structure to administer people and places. Second, it fostered a centralized vision of 
authority, more generally. Third, it cultivated a culture of strict surveillance. Fourth, it 
imagined all acts of resistance as nothing more than administrative concerns. In effect, this 
approach effectively depoliticized all political grievances. Fifth, it tacitly condoned the 
flourishing of informal political networks beside the formal offices of governance. Seen 
together, these trends illuminate the atmosphere of latent hostility that de Martel outlined in 
1936. Before discussing the informal networks operative in mandate Lebanon, the formal 
structures of the bureaucracy will first be reviewed.  
1. A Bureaucratic Logic  
The largest tool of power and legacy of the French mandate in Lebanon was the 
systematic transformation of the bureaucratic structures that had previously governed the 
country. The French had intended to maintain its control through the establishment of a 
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centralized rational bureaucratic administration for its mandates in Syria and Lebanon. The 
scope of this transformation is best understood when considering the claims of American 
University of Beirut scholar Fuad Mufarrij when he wrote in his master’s thesis that, “during 
the Ottoman times, the vilayets of Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo and the sanjaks of Mount 
Lebanon and Jerusalem were governed and administered [in 1914] by a total of 300 
functionaries.”104 The vast area governed by this relatively small number of officials was on 
a different scale to the state of Lebanon in terms of total area and population. Yet, for a 
country no larger than the American state of New Jersey, Mufarrij goes on to say that “the 
mandatory power, for one reason or another, has chosen to institutionalize so many heads of 
states, ministers, parliaments and so on that the total number of functionaries in the different 
parts of Syria [the state of Greater Lebanon] natives included, has risen to about 4,000.”105 
Mufarrij claimed that the bureaucracy for the roughly 800,000 inhabitants of Lebanon 
equaled the entire civil service for the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I.106 The state of 
the bureaucracy is best summed up by Mufarrij when he wrote that “the inefficiency, the lack 
of interest and initiative on the part of native officials as well as the red tape resulting from 
this duplication of functions and this multiplication of state services is considerable and tends 
to break down the system altogether.” 
The composition of this bureaucracy was further shaped by the peculiarities of the 
French mandate. At the bottom of this bureaucratic hierarchy were the new Lebanese citizens 
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of the mandate. This reflected a semblance of native rule that was in sharp contrast to the 
direct rule of the British in Mandate Palestine.107 Atop the Lebanese bureaucracy sat the 
French advisors, representatives of the high commissioner who advised Lebanese officials 
and largely came from the corps of seasoned colonial bureaucrats from diverse parts of the 
empire. Despite the overtures to native rule, the rank and file members of the civil 
administration were often at the mercy of more senior officials from France, or in the words 
of Mufarrij, “whenever such a conflict [between advisor and local civil servants occurred] the 
point of view of the adviser has prevailed and the dissenting native transferred to another 
post or rejected out of the service altogether.”108 Estimates of the number of French officials 
within the high commission ranged from 300-400 individuals during the mandate years.109  
Despite their authority, “experience has shown that the mandate formula has many 
inconveniences,” as Paul Gassouin, a senior mandate official, records in a letter circulated 
within the high commission.110 In the document, Gassouin outlines two forms of control 
exercised by the mandate: the office of le haut commissariat and the diverse French 
counselors beside the Lebanese government. Although these two arms of power were 
supposed to maintain the French position, it was often felt among Lebanese public opinion 
and even colonial officers that, in the words of Gassouin, “the high commission was 
preoccupied with Syria rather that Lebanon, leaving the counselors in charge of national 
affairs.”111 This preoccupation with the turbulent affairs in Syria often left the administrative 
counselors with, if not total influence, then a considerable scope of authority. Finally, one 
should remember that although the size of the bureaucracy was large, it did not guarantee 
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complete power. Given priorities elsewhere, Lebanon was often at the margins of official 
concerns, and the annexed territories at the margin of the margins. This status, then, gave 
colonial administrators an undefined status, or as Gassouin states, “the French counselors 
who are at the service of the Lebanese government, lack authority; as their name indicates, 
they offer their ‘counsel,’ but often they cannot do anything else and are not always 
heard.”112 As administrative control was often checked, the French established other 
instruments of power.  
2. A Centralized Vision of Power   
 The second trend is a centralized vision of power to reinforce social hierarchy. The 
mandate administration sought to concentrate power and resources within the new state in 
order to ensure the pre-eminent position of Paris in all local affairs. The Quai d’Orsay 
attempted to create this hierarchy through a divide and conquer policy that supported a class 
of political leaders who would be loyal to its authority at the expense of the majority 
marginalized from authority. In this manner, the colonial blocus represents an effort to re-
organize a political bloc through privileged access to state resources and offices. The result 
of this policy was the establishment of clear lines of social stratification, at the bottom of 
which were the majority of inhabitants. In this manner, state-building exercises in Lebanon 
did not reflect an attempt to empower citizens as the mandate charter indicated, or to create 
new forms of subjects or build an imagined community. Instead, such exercises were 
designed to prevent linkages between individuals and communities.  
French designs are laid bare in internal notes from June 1920 regarding proposals to 
reorganize the Jabal Amil region of South Lebanon in order to create a diversion from unrest 
in parts of the country, or as the writer explains, to prevent “the docile Shiites from rallying 
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around the Syrian re-unification calls from Damascus.”113 The official suggests bringing 
together local leaders in order to promise them a limited autonomy in a sort of “foyer 
nationale” zone of independence in exchange for their support of the mandate. 114 Despite 
this overture to native rule, in reality, this official says,   
The goals that I hope to attain are simply to bring a diversion to the current situation, 
to break the accord that reigns between the Shi‘a to our disadvantage, and to remove 
from the east zone an organized center in order to show the Jabal Amil that if we are 
to take concern with its future status, it is because we have the firm intention of 
staying.115  
 
Besides occupying the land of the Jabal Amil, the intention of the French High Commission 
was to break up the unity among the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon in order to bolster the 
authority of Paris. In this manner, it can be seen that implicit in the idea of state formation 
was a vision of centralized social hierarchies.  
3. A Culture of Surveillance  
The third trend in colonial politics was the culture of surveillance. The colonial 
blocus contains punitive measures to restrict and monitor individuals and the spaces they 
occupy. As Martin Thomas comments in his study of French imperial intelligence, “political 
policing and intelligence gathering were driven by a recognition of the limits of colonial state 
power in societies governed through uneasy clientage and elite cooption.”116 In other words, 
the heavy security presence indicates the degree to which the threat of force remained ever 
present for residents now policed in their own communities. The security and surveillance 
presence served as another tool to maintain social hierarchy. Rather than a sign of strength, 
the security apparatus reflects a limit of French control. As Thomas goes on to say, “the 
colonial environment in which the British and French security services operated was, in and 
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of itself, the principal barrier to their success.”117 The pressures to maintain law and order in 
an atmosphere of hostility to colonial rule remained constant throughout the mandate. Indeed, 
the numerous files of the offices of the Sûreté Générale and Renseignements Généraux 
reviewed in this study attests to the difficulties that the French encountered in this regard. 
Given that the break up of Syria and Lebanon was designed to prevent unified opposition to 
French rule, the French were constantly jostling to secure the area.  
Within days of establishing the state, one of the first decrees of Gouraud was the 
imposition of martial law, which would reign for more than four years until January 1925.118 
Next, he ordered the dissolution of the Ottoman gendarmerie and police forces in Syria and 
Lebanon.119 In its place, he organized an extensive military and police force.120 Moreover, 
this control was bolstered as the French banned the use of firearms within the country.121 In 
addition, within the new bureaucracy, the new ministry of the interior commanded the largest 
concentration of staff and money. It formed over 48% of the civil administration with its 
personnel of 1,802 individuals, of which 1,382 served in the gendarmerie and 347 in the 
police.122 As the numbers indicate, the preponderance of capital and labor invested in the 
Lebanese state was concentrated on security. For, 1 in 3 members of this vast bureaucracy 
served in either the military or police forces. As half of the budget was under the control of 
the ministry of finance, the ministry of the interior received a third of the remaining 
credits.123 In such circumstances, individuals hostile to the political regime became captive in 
their own homes, under the thumb of military and police supervision. In addition, among the 
                                              
117 Thomas, 2008, 294 
118 Mufarrij, 1935, 328.  
119 Arrêté No. 364. 20 September 1920. C1 Lebanese Archives 
120 Arrêté No. 366. 22 September 1920. C1 Lebanese Archives 
121 Arrêté No. 121 10 November 1920 and Arrêté No.130 10 November 1920. Lebanese Archives.  
122 Reprinted in Grassmuck and Salibi,1964, 7.  
123 Of the total budget of 1,219,270 Syro-Lebanese (LS) Pounds, a sum of 589,633 LS Pounds was allocated to 
the control of the ministry of finance or about 48.35% of the total budget. Of the remaining 629,637 LS Pounds, 
a sum of 234,833 LS Pounds was allocated to the ministry of the interior, or 37.30% of the total budget. The 
majority of this sum went to wages. Grassmuck and Salibi,1964, 7. 
 62 
military personnel were a number of servicemen brought from other areas of the French 
Empire. Of these men Mufarrij wrote, “the regular troops are composed as is officially 
concerned, of a majority of Africans, more than half of whom are black semi-savage 
Senegalese.”124 Whatever the veracity of his comments, its harsh tone bore witness to the 
tension between residents and troops.  
The intelligence apparatus that the mandate built was modeled on infrastructure that 
developed in other parts of the empire. Historically, the French secret service held close links 
to military intelligence, the most notable example being the Dreyfuss affair.125 In particular, 
the intelligence structures that developed in the Levant came from North Africa and recruited 
many agents and political officers who had worked in Morocco. This structure included a 
network of informants and allies and manifested both civilian and military aspects in the 
police and gendarmerie.126 As historian Meir Zamir contends in one of his volumes on the 
French mandate, the intelligence apparatus modeled other aspects of the bureaucracy in that 
it was “well structured and heavily bureaucratic, and tended to gather copious amounts of 
raw data and issues a large number of intelligence reports.”127 In these ways, the Deuxième 
Bureau headquartered in Beirut resembled the office of the same name in Paris.128  
4. Depoliticizing of Political Grievances  
As subsequent chapters will indicate, a recurring idea among the classified files of the 
high commission was the fourth trend, the notion held among French officials that essentially 
political problems and grievances could be addressed through civilian measures and 
reshuffling. The construction of the bureaucracy substantiated this idea, almost as if the 
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French administrators had complete faith that the bureaucracy could touch any aspect or 
subject within the new political society. In this way, the colonial blocus describes a type of 
fixation that blocks alternative ideas and possibilities. In the absence of a political alternative, 
French administrators assumed that they could manage political grievances through carrot 
and stick policies. On the one hand, the commissariat offered privileged access to resources 
to those who would support their notion that the ongoing demonstrations against the regime 
were the manifestation of poor municipal administration. As will be discussed in greater 
detail later, classified letters show an exchange between the high commission and the 
notables of North Lebanon arguing that the protests were in response to administrative 
concerns and not due to the political demands that de Martel had addressed to his 
superiors.129 In turn, those individuals who supported this narrative received rewards and 
political support. On the other hand, the French resorted to punitive measures against those 
who dissented to its rule like the blockade that de Martel explained. Either way, there was the 
belief that the inhabitants of the Levant were stuck with the system that the French dictated. 
Even as administrative reform was seen as the panacea for a myriad of issues, the French 
broached this possibility as a negotiating chip with local leaders in order to gain the consent 
of the population. The French believed that their word was final and therefore, their designs 
had to become reality. As a result, this approach dismissed regional political rivalries, 
contestation to the French regime as well as the Syrian nationalist movement. 
Indeed, this was the attitude of de Martel. Amid talks in Paris to cede North Lebanon 
and the Bekaa to Syria, de Martel insisted in a 1936 communiqué that the protests in Tripoli 
could be contained vis-à-vis negotiations with Lebanese politicians. Describing the actions of 
Sunni leader Riad el-Solh, de Martel said,  
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The tactical error of Riad Solh is not to have understood that as a Lebanese, in the 
Franco-Lebanese negotiations, he could not take the same stance as in Paris when he 
supported the cause of the Syrians and that if the Muslim claims were to be defended 
in Beirut, it would have to be in the framework of Lebanon and not in the name of 
pan-Arabism.130 
 
Amid the turmoil and ostensible negotiations for limited independence, de Martel dismissed 
the notion of altering the decree of Gouraud. For him, the rejection of popular claims for the 
(re-)attachment of the annexed territories to Syria was the basis of political negotiations. 
There was a desire to convey that people were stuck within the structure of the state. 
Eventually the French, themselves, believed this narrative as well. For instance, writing as 
late as 1939, officials assured one another that with regards to Tripoli, despite the twenty 
years of unrest in the city, “the imposition of a public works program would certainly suffice 
to make disappear the discontent that one observes from time to time in the Muslim city.”131 
Even as French designs on the Levant were born of political calculations, there was the 
dogged insistence that resistance to these plans was not political; but a response to poor 
implementation.  
5. Informal Politics 
 The counterpoint to this extensive system of bureaucracy and oversight was the 
reliance on informal politics. Seemingly in contradiction to the rigid French system of 
oversight and centralization, informal networks flourished in the time of the mandate.  The 
primary reason for this, as discussed previously, was that the mandate prioritized the 
tumultuous affairs in Syria to the extent of marginalizing and ignoring matters in Lebanon. 
So despite this large unprecedented bureaucracy, relations were often precarious. As 
Gassouin describes,  
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Their [the counselors’] rapports with the high commission are poorly defined. In 
principle, the mandate administration cannot give, officially, any written directive. In 
actuality, the action of the mandatory power is exercised primarily through oral 
communications, be it between counselors, leaders or and members of the 
government. All of this is surely empirical and our respect for Lebanese sovereignty 
diverts us, very often, from insisting on certain necessary reforms or from making the 
Lebanese government implement indispensable initiatives.132 
 
In effect, Gassouin confesses the limits of the French mandate. First, given priorities 
elsewhere, power generally rested within these tenuous arrangements and understandings 
between the notables and counselors. Second, this alliance was generally an unwritten 
understanding that ignored the formalities of mandate rule. Third, implicit within this 
understanding was that the French were either unable to implement reforms, or, at worst, 
turned a blind eye to the political troubles that concerned their allies. Gassouin concludes his 
statement with the ominous assurance that, “it is this collaboration [assembly of notables—
general French counselors] that will ensure effective French control of Lebanon and that will 
allow them to benefit from our experience in all domains.”133 While the mandate 
administration built up a bureaucracy unprecedented in its size, equipped with large amounts 
of cash and staff, and in possession of the potential to mediate the lives of residents, the task 
of running the country still relied upon unwritten rules between a select few.  
In sum, the colonial blocus refers to both the formal and informal means through 
which the French planned to secure and expand their control, as well as the myriad practices 
that emerged from the inherent contradictions within this system of thought. It was through 
this institutional mediation that informal politics proliferated and adherence to French rule 
eroded. The transformation of power-relations did not necessarily empower the French. 
Instead, it only added to the number of unexpected situations that they would have to 
confront in the annexed territories. Because only the high commissioner could give written 
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directives and the majority of officials within the high commission relied on oral 
communications with Lebanese notables of influence, informal politics had carte blanche to 
proliferate within Lebanon. The struggle of Paris to halt expanding inequality will reveal the 
contradictions and limits of its authority. The French clung to its blueprint even as informal 
politics expanded. Beyond the vocal resistance to the mandate, there existed the potential to 
undermine its institutions from within. In particular, disgruntled administrators could 
sabotage the rigid French system of centralization by neglecting their duties or interfering 
with municipal affairs. In these ways, the plethora of written rules, regulations and decrees 
served as a cover for an array of unwritten and top secret practices. As French officials 
confronted the consequences of these practices, the contradictions and restrictions that the 
French administration encountered in colonial Lebanon became manifest.   
Contradictions and Constraints  
Yet, as the case of Tripoli indicated to de Martel, the borders within the Levant were 
never secure. Beyond the very real threat of organized armed resistance, the imposition of 
this system of thought was based upon a series of inherent contradictions that would, 
ultimately, undermine French rule over the course of the mandate. The first contradiction was 
the notion that the gradual breakdown of the resistance would in turn bolster French 
authority. The high commission had a zero-sum understanding of power in which the 
weakening an enemy or potential adversary would, in turn, bolster its own authority. The 
dissolution of the Ottoman gendarmerie, the disarmament of inhabitants within the new state, 
and the arrest of protest leaders in Tripoli all contributed to this understanding that the 
marginalization of organized opposition to the mandate would strengthen French rule. Yet, as 
will be seen, the reliance on informal politics generated unintended situations that successive 
French high commissioners would struggle to confront. Indeed, even as these challenges 
arose, the French still adhered to this original strategy of blockade and administrative 
 67 
penetration of the annexed territories. It was with this strategy in mind that Paris assumed it 
would be able to both weaken opposition to its rule as well as strengthen its own presence 
within the region.  
 The second contradiction within French policy concerned the duality of time. The 
French sought to consecrate a permanent position in the region through a reliance on 
temporary, provisional alliances and intrigues. Underpinning this plan would be the men and 
women of influence that the French worked with, who, it was believed or assumed, would 
eventually fall in line with the system of centralized control that the French preferred. In 
other words, the hope of the high commission was that these initial unspoken informal 
arrangements would disappear once the French were in a better position to consolidate their 
control. In terms of theories of space, the initial phase of French policy resembled a more 
critical geo-political strategy of managing a given locality. The creation of the state would 
help to cultivate new relations of power that would serve as the bedrock of political affairs 
within the mandate. The second phase, in contrast, would involve a more territorial approach 
to transforming the ways in which people think of space. Over time, the French would have 
such a large presence in the region that their control would be considered as the natural order. 
At this later point, they would be able to exert power over the ways in which all—both ruler 
and ruled—conceived of the annexed territories.  
The third contradiction involved another transition that the French tried to implement, 
the eventual shift from a reliance on the use of force to administer the region to the 
bureaucracy. Even though French presence in the Levant came about through military 
occupation and the subsequent imposition of martial law in 1918, Paris hoped that the use of 
force would no longer be necessary to enforce its territorial vision of the Levant once it was 
able to consolidate its bureaucracy. Until this consolidation, the French dealt with opposition 
to its rule through detention, arrest, surveillance and the force of arms. In practice, however, 
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the transition from military to administrative rule would not be as simple as the Quai d’Orsay 
had assumed. As the case of the 1936 general strike and riots in Tripoli indicated, the borders 
within Lebanon were never secure. The threat of armed resistance lingered as the 
gendarmerie, police and soldiers remained sitting ducks whenever they tried to enter the Old 
City of Tripoli. As a result, the reliance on the security apparatus never abated. To the 
contrary, as long as officials within the Lebanese government knew that they could call on 
the high commission to send soldiers to thwart opposition within the annexed territories, 
there was no incentive to create a more effective bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the potential 
loss of life for both mandate agents and civilians was easier for Lebanese politicians to 
accept than conceding to the grievances of the resistance. In these ways, the bureaucracy that 
the French created was never too effective despite its size and largesse.  
Despite these limitations, French officials by far were loath to admit the 
contradictions within their policies. Instead it was much easier to admonish supposed bad 
apples for failing to fall in line with what they considered the most rational and best-suited 
policies. With others responsible for these deficiencies, the delegates of Paris could continue 
to apply the same frame of thought that yielded setback after setback. And as long as there 
existed someone else to blame, then there was never a need to reflect on the inherent 
contradictions and limitations of French policy in the Levant. 
UNE ATMOSPHERE D’HOSTILITÉ LATENTE 
To understand the political complexities that developed in the course of the exercise 
of power during the mandate, it is necessary to return to the terrain where de Martel 
encountered his troubles in 1936. It was in the city of Tripoli that de Martel would recount to 
his superiors the atmosphere of latent hostility to the French mandate. Ancient Phoenician 
city, crusader town, center of Islamic scholarship and original Ottoman province, Tripoli 
would undergo a series of transformations over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth and 
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twentieth centuries concomitant with the shifting fortunes of the empire and world, at large. 
Ultimately, the unrest that the count described was the fallout from its latest transformation. 
Upon its annexation into the state of Greater Lebanon in 1920, French rule transformed 
Tripoli from the administrative center of an Ottoman sanjak and crossroads for trade routes 
stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the hinterlands of Syria into a medium-sized 
second city in the new state deprived of its historic dependencies. The clashes that broke out 
amid the 1936 general strike were part of a popular campaign to bring pressure on the 
mandate authorities to (re)unify Tripoli with neighboring Syria, thereby threatening the 
territorial integrity of Lebanon. Not only did this unrest challenge the composition of the new 
state, it also called into question the long-standing French policies that had underpinned 
state-formation in the Levant.  
Despite efforts to incorporate the city within the national bureaucratic hierarchy, there 
remained in Tripoli a nexus of power recalcitrant to the mandate that was, ironically, 
strengthened by the reforms decreed from Paris. It was within this sphere that the protests 
had raged for over three days until the high commissioner was able to break up the strike. In 
this manner, the shifting landscape of Tripoli reflects the different political currents vying for 
power in the north. On the one hand, the French administration continued or accelerated 
long-standing trends designed to re-orient Tripoli around a Western influence, in this case 
centered around the newly remodeled civil administration building housing the delegate of 
the high commissioner. Paris had hoped to break ground on the vacant lots that surrounded 
the old quarters and connect them to other neighborhoods so that all roads in the city would 
lead to the new administration building. This plan would be the culmination of a series of 
urban transformations that had occurred in this part of the Levant for over two centuries, 
which would inaugurate a new order for the region. On the other hand, threatening this new 
order was the apparent disorder that now emanated from the Old City of Tripoli. Much to the 
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surprise of de Martel and his delegates, the persistence of the clashes in Tripoli disclosed that 
the new configuration fostered opposition to the regime into a single, concentrated area.  In 
lieu of the modern administration building, power was reproduced within the gates of the Old 
City to strengthen the protest movement at the expense of the mandate administration. Under 
threat of canon fire from higher ground, the civil administration was unable to make inroads 
into the population protected by the layout of the medieval city. If the French regime 
harbored any hope of surviving this threat, then it would have to find a way to penetrate the 
labyrinth of intrigue that it saw within the gates of Syrian Tripoli.  
A review of the history of Tripoli under the Ottoman Empire will elucidate the 
transformations that occurred in the Levant in the lead up to WWI as well as the scope of 
reforms instituted by the mandate regime. Upon understanding the shifting landscape of  the 
Levant, the contradictions and shortcomings of mandate policy will become clear. 
Ultimately, this historical overview will disclose the ways in which French designs for 
Tripoli strengthened informal politics, which undermined effective administration. In this 
manner, the experience of 1936 Tripoli strike reveals that power did not center around the 
buildup of mandate institutions, but involved the old configuration of power that had 
animated political energies.  
A History of Tripoli 
The city that de Martel described had recently been designated as the capital of the 
Sanjak of Tripoli in the Ottoman Empire. It consisted of two parts, the oldest being the area 
clustered around the harbor, known as al-Mina, previously the site of the ancient Phoenician 
city of Tripoli.134 As the area witnessed raids, invasions and occupations by different 
conquering armies, the ancient Phoenician city would be destroyed time and again. 
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Eventually, the residents of the area would regroup to form the Old City of Tripoli further 
inland, creating by the Middle Ages a prosperous city of narrow streets and alleyways.135 
Cutting through the two parts was a river, known locally as the Abou Ali, along which ran 
small houses and settlements as the water flowed into the Mediterranean. Surrounding the 
city were the dependencies of the Ottoman sanjak. After 1888, this sanjak, in turn, was part 
of the larger administrative district within the Vilayet of Beirut that stretched along the 
eastern Mediterranean from Nablus and Haifa, to Latakia in modern day Palestine, Israel and 
Syria, respectively. To the north of the city was its historic dependencies known as Alawite 
country and the Sanjak of Latakia. To the west of the city was the Mediterranean and to the 
east the Sanjak of Hama in the Vilayet of Damascus. To the south, however, was a different 
entity. Nestled between Tripoli and Beirut was the independent Mutessarif of Mt. Lebanon, 
home to the Maronite Christian and Muslim Druze religious communities based around the 
Mt. Lebanon range and governed by a separate legal entity, known as the mutessarif.136  
While the French would institute efforts to change the landscape in 1918, the city had 
recently undergone a series of transformations initiated during the European encroachment of 
the eastern Mediterranean and the Tanzimat period of Ottoman reforms in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. These changes contributed to the declining fortunes of the city that the 
British and later French would occupy beginning in 1918. Although Tripoli had been one of 
the original provinces of the Ottoman Empire upon the defeat of the Mamluks rulers in 1516, 
its fortunes eventually changed. 137 Its regional importance waned as the bustling cities of 
Homs and Hama were transferred from Tripoli’s jurisdiction to that of Damascus in 1725 
during political disputes with the rulers of Mt. Lebanon.138 In addition, as Paris cultivated 
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commercial and cultural links with the Christian rulers within Mt. Lebanon during the 
nineteenth century, Tripoli’s commercial influence further dimmed.139 Worse was to come in 
1888 when Ottoman reformers demoted Tripoli’s status from a vilayet province to that of a 
more minor sanjak within the dependencies of the new capital of Beirut.140 Although 
somewhat déclassé, by the turn of the twentieth century, the city’s reputation as a center of 
commerce possessing a formidable harbor and agricultural gardens attracted craft workers, 
sailors, fisherman, dockworkers, construction workers and agricultural laborers to find 
employment throughout the city. 141 The picture of Tripoli on the brink of WWI among 
circles of Ottoman officials was that of a falling star within the empire, rich in potential and 
flushed with substantial tax revenues, but home to a crumbling infrastructure, an 
underdeveloped municipality and idle leadership.142 Such shortcomings exposed the city to 
the harsh realities of the Great War and the imperial designs of its protagonists.  
In several ways, the ravages of the WWI would leave their mark in Tripoli and its 
environs. By the declaration of war in July 1914 against the Entente powers, Ottoman 
officials had already instituted the mandatory conscription of all males, Muslim and non-
Muslim, into the Ottoman army, thus shattering the family structures and social orders in the 
city.143 The women, children and elderly left in the city, too, were exposed to the violence of 
the war. The great famine that brought death to neighboring Mt. Lebanon did not spare 
Tripoli and the Syrian hinterlands. According to urban historian of Tripoli Nada Saliba, 
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“toward the end of the war, the sight of corpses of children and beggars in Tripoli as well as 
Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo became commonplace.”144 Conservative estimates of the 
casualties of the famine range from 300,000 to 500,000 dead in Greater Syria, including 
200,000 victims in what would become North Lebanon.145 With railroad lines linking the city 
to the breadbasket of the Syrian interior suspended, food prices soared and poverty festered 
during the war.146 Starvation became so dire that by 1918, according to dispatches from the 
German embassy, inhabitants resorted to murdering abducted children for their flesh, eating 
dead dogs lying in the streets, and in one case, a mother in Tripoli killed and consumed her 
own children.147 At the same time, in 1918, the harbor of el-Mina suffered a blockade at the 
hands of the Entente forces from 25 August until Christmas Day 1918, triggering the closure 
of markets and the exodus of residents from the neighborhood to higher ground in the Old 
City.148  
At the time of its incorporation into the state, Tripoli served as the second largest city 
in Lebanon behind the capital of Beirut. Although census information is unreliable given the 
hesitation of residents to participate in mandate institutions and the tenuous reach of the 
government, Tripoli was considered the most prominent Sunni Muslim city within the new 
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country.149 As a result of this concentration of peoples, resistance to the French mandate was 
seen to have expressed a religious/sectarian tone as well. It is de Martel who writes that the 
majority Sunni residents of Tripoli resented what they saw as their subordination to the rule 
of Christians in Mt. Lebanon. Among these populations, unrest reached a point that the city 
became the center of anti-mandate protests in the region. On the one hand, residents resented 
their integration into the borders of Lebanon, still harboring hopes for the re-unification of 
Syria. As one petition of leading notables of the north to the high commission  testifies,  
The zone of Tripoli-Akkar has been separated from Mother Syria against the will of 
its inhabitants. It does not recognize any convention that does not realize its 
attachment to Syria. It will continue its battle while trusting in the law and the 
nobility and equality of the French people until it has gained its national pact.150  
 
Not only did nationalist sentiments animate unrest, there were also several popular 
grievances. Residents resented the administration of the city, its high tax rates, and the 
intermittent violence that erupted from clashes between demonstrators and the police.151  
In an effort to cement their rule, the delegates of Paris attempted to make inroads into 
the population through the establishment of the bureaucracy. The symbol of this effort 
centered around plans to re-build the damaged administrative building first constructed by 
the Ottomans in the late 1880s. The initial construction of the saraya took place as a part of 
Ottoman reforms designed to modernize national affairs. In Tripoli, this initiative took the 
shape of a new administrative building and clock tower, the establishment of a tramway 
connecting different neighborhoods, as well as the construction of a railroad linking Tripoli 
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to the city of Homs in the Syrian hinterlands.152 Subsequent to these improvements, however, 
the war brought much damage in the city and the administrative building was in need of 
repair. This old administrative center would now house the delegates of the high commission 
installed to oversee municipal affairs in the city and in North Lebanon, in general, similar to 
the town halls in the cities of France. The French-sponsored administrative building would 
remain in the al-Tall neighborhood located amid the citrus orchards and barren strips of land 
that existed between the al-Mina neighborhood to the west and the Old City to the East.153 To 
mark its territory, the high commission planned to build a public garden in the plaza across 
from the administrative building, which would surround the clock tower built there by the 
Ottomans.154 From the administrative building to the clock tower and public gardens, all 
public life would soon revolve around this space that the French now occupied. Further proof 
of this new order would be the wide boulevards and avenues that the French planned to build 
which would connect the quarters of the Old City to Tall Square on one side and al-Mina on 
the other. 155 This creation of public space in the hitherto vacant lands was part of an effort to 
create a new nexus of power that could regulate the lives of inhabitants in the surrounding 
territory. Like the wide boulevards of the capital of Beirut, the new space under construction 
would enable the agents of the high commission to monitor and interfere in social, political 
and economic affairs—or as de Martel wrote in the letter already mentioned, “to engage the 
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public.”156 In effect, the transformations that occurred in the new heart of Tripoli were 
reflected in the efforts to centralize authority in the country around Beirut and Mt. Lebanon.  
  Despite the intentions of Paris to transform al-Tall into La Place de L’Étoile, the 
construction of the new city strengthened opposition in the old quarters of the city against the 
mandate. Because the narrow alleyways and streets of the Old City stood as anathema to the 
Haussmannian developments in Tall Square, organized planning concentrated resistance to 
the mandate regime in the Old City, where protestors could find sanctuary in the mazes of 
streets that confounded the colonial gaze of the high commission. This apparent pocket of 
discontent continued to challenge these changing political developments. As one French 
administrator wrote, “Tripoli, a Muslim city, never ceased to protest since 1920 against its 
annexation to Lebanon.”157 By 1936, there had erupted 13 strikes during the years of the 
mandate, from 1919, 1923 and 1931 to 1936 in the city.158  
Amid these developments, there emerged repeated disputes among Lebanese and 
French officials regarding the status of Tripoli and the Bekaa valley vis-à-vis Lebanon. In 
1926 and again in 1932, eventual president and France’s man in the Levant Emile Eddé 
broached the subject of ceding Tripoli and the Bekaa to the Syrian confederation.159 In this 
regard Eddé was not motivated by the popular sentiments of the residents of Tripoli, but by 
the sectarian goal of removing Muslims from the new state and thereby maintaining a 
Christian majority within it. First, in April 1926, Eddé agreed with then High Commissioner 
Henri de Jouvenel to re-attach Tripoli and Akkar to Syria.160 As proof of his support, Eddé 
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sent two hand-written notes to the Syrian President, who chose not to publish them.161 
Second, after the dissolution of his government, Eddé met with the new high commissioner 
Auguste Henri Ponsot to express his concerns that the mooted proposals of granting 
independence to Syria and supporting its admission to the League of Nations would animate 
the demands for union with Syria among the Muslim segments of the population.162 Two 
years later, in 1932, Eddé penned a memorandum to the Quai d’Orsay in which he raised 
concerns that the recently completed census and parliamentary elections presaged the erosion 
of the Christian majority in the country and suggested the attachment of the Bekaa and 
Tripoli to Syria.163 
By 1936, there were ongoing protests in February, March, June, July, September and 
October as well as a general strike in the city that November.164 By this time, Tripoli 
remained among the last areas within the new country that the French had yet to penetrate, 
presumably due to its large population and concentration of people within the Old City. 
Stripped of its historic, the Old City became the last refuge for an array of anti-colonial 
forces and its acquiescence would likely have created a domino effect in the Levant. Without 
the city, the campaign to re-launch the old Ottoman Vilayet of Greater Syria into a nation-
state would have been doomed. Because protestors could take cover within the higher ground 
and complex alleyways of the Old City that blended in with homes and businesses, the 
mandate regime was not able to exercise the practices of regulation under construction in al-
Tall. As events will show, protestors against the regime were able to take advantage of the 
divisions that the French had imposed between the new city and the old one to reinforce and 
even fortify their positions against the regime. 
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The 1936 Strike  
The level of agitation and uncertainty that resulted from this milieu created what de 
Martel described to his superiors as “une atmosphère d’hostilité latente,” an atmosphere of 
latent hostility.165 Since the state of Lebanon was constructed as a bulwark against Syrian 
nationalists, the struggle to retain Tripoli within the boundaries of Lebanon became a 
political field in the effort to maintain the imperial designs for the Levant. These overt and 
covert competing claims increased the pressures within the city. In one corner were internal 
pressures from demonstrators and leaders agitating for the re-attachment of the city to Syria. 
In addition, there existed international unrest in neighboring countries. Not only had Syrian 
nationalists created an even more hostile atmosphere against the French mandate, but also 
Turkish leaders appealed to the UN to recognize its competing claims to Syrian territories 
under the French mandate. Beyond the region, there were murmurs that French socialists 
agitating for power in upcoming French elections supported a Tripoli delegation to France 
that demanded reunification with Syria in 1936. Added to this were French imperial interests. 
The mandate had established a railroad as well as an oil pipeline from Iraq to the 
Mediterranean through Syria that ended in Tripoli.166 Finally, there were military interests 
that the French had prepared.  
As early as 1937, de Martel disclosed the strategic importance of Tripoli amid the 
threat of war. He insisted to the Minster of the Air force, that, “Tripoli is the only place in the 
Levant that, thanks to its proximity to a good airfield and unique (highlighted in original) 
usable water plan, is ready for the establishment of a base capable of receiving important 
                                              
165 C460, Dossier Entitled Notes of Franco-Lebanese Treaty and Tripoli, MAE a/s incidents de Tripoli, 27 
November 1936 page 2 SIGNED BY DE MARTEL. He goes on to say that there emerged “an atmosphere of 
latent hostility that warrants a strict and severe surveillance.” 
166 C 1542. Papiers de Martel. Au Sujet du problème Libanais. September 1933.  
 79 
units of the Garde Aérienne to safeguard our imperial interests.”167 Among, then, the other 
concerns that kept de Martel interested in Tripoli were geo-strategic objectives. His 
statements laid bare the reality that the goal of the French mandate was neither liberty, 
fraternity nor equality for all, but the task of maintaining imperial order by any means. 
Concomitant with this internal pressure were turbulent developments in the region such as 
the 1936 Arab revolt and general strike against the British mandate in Palestine in addition to 
organize opposition to imperial rule in Egypt, Syria and Iraq.  
Despite efforts of the mandate regime to establish law and order in the Levant, there 
remained the conundrum of the impenetrable labyrinthine alleyways of the Old City. By 
November 1936, the unrest from these competing claims had reached a fever pitch in the one 
area that the French could not penetrate, the Old City of Tripoli. What remained unabated 
was the overall hostility of the inhabitants to the mandate regime. Residents clung to the 
Syrian nationalist vision of a unified modern-nation state that comprised the territories of the 
historical Ottoman provinces of Greater Syria.  
The latest spark of dissent was the news of the negotiation of the Franco-Lebanese 
treaty, brokered between the high commissioner and the Maronite President of Lebanon, 
Emile Eddé (1935-1941). If ratified on both sides, the treaty would have extended the French 
presence in the new state for another 25 years.168 In response to this proposal, the city was 
closed by another general strike protest that would last for more than 33 days until November 
27.169 A copy of a telegram from earlier September protests outlined some of the grievances 
that protestors sought to address. It proclaimed that, “Tripoli closes in retaliation of acts of 
terror and assassination committed by the gendarmerie and the police who fired gunshots 
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against defenseless inhabitants, including women and against children. We demand the 
punishment of those responsible.” 170 The use of violence by the agents of the mandate only 
exacerbated tensions within the region and portended more hostility to come. Yet, added to 
this lists of grievances was the historical demand to reunify the Ottoman state of Greater 
Syria that had included Tripoli. For the letter of the demonstrators ends defiantly with, “the 
people of Tripoli will not cease from its demand for Syrian unity despite the terrorism.”171 
Such social pressures only worsened later that autumn by November.   
A review of the crisis in 1936 reveals the ways in which French administrators had 
overestimated the reach of the high commission to influence affairs in the north and 
underappreciated the possibilities of informal alliances within the Old City to menace the 
new order under construction. Recently de-classified diplomatic archives provide an account 
of the unrest that led up to anti-colonial riots in late November 1936 from the perspective of 
the highest ranking French official in Tripoli, Le Comte Charles Mercier du Paty de Clam, a 
figure we will meet again in chapters four and five. A scion of a military family, graduate of 
Saint Cyr military academy like Gouraud, and hero of WWI in his own right, the count then 
served as the French administrator of the north. On November 1, 1936, the count and acting 
army commander encountered on their drive to the new saraya in al-Tall a large procession 
of thousands in the streets carrying Syrian flags with the slogan ‘vive l’unité syrienne, nous 
ne voulons pas être libanais’ and ran into a barricade erected by protestors.172 On his orders, 
the native troops managed to restore order after a brisk exchange of gunfire and arrested 
around 16 demonstrators.173 The following day, the count met with nationalist leaders who 
petitioned for the withdrawal of French military forces in return for the restoration of calm; 
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and, in response, du Paty de Clam scoffed at these demands and dismissed these anti-colonial 
leaders, opting instead to maintain the curfew in the city from 6:00pm to 5:00am.174 The 
count must have assumed these measures and the preponderant forces under his command 
sufficient to maintain law and order.  
Two weeks later, however trouble would return, as a demonstration following Friday 
prayers in the Muslim quarter of West Beirut against the signing of the Franco-Lebanese 
Treaty festered into a riot, with automobiles and tram cars set alight and shops looted, 
prompting another crackdown, during which many people were arrested and over 100 
injured.175 A few days later, the unrest again reached the gates of the Old City. Only hours 
after another unsuccessful meeting with du Paty de Clam, a group of residents led some 300 
demonstrators in a procession in Tripoli from the Great Mosque during which some members 
allegedly opened fire on plainclothes policemen without any provocation, prompting a series 
of reprisals between gendarmes and armed civilians in nearby houses.176 By November 19, 
the city was gripped by riots. Amid skirmishes between protestors and agents of the 
Lebanese police and French gendarmerie, more shots were fired. In response, the attempts to 
apprehend the suspects of the killings led to more reprisals.177 As violence shifted from the 
front lines of the strike to the heart of the Old City, more protestors took up arms and even 
set up artillery units.178 As one French official in north Lebanon recounted in his notes on the 
riots, “the population was able to realize that by taking refuge in the inextricable maze of 
alleyways of the Old City, they could, without great risk, maintain their significant 
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numbers.”179 The protestors took advantage of the divisions that the French had imposed 
between the new city and the old to reinforce and even fortify their positions against the 
regime. Once this series of demonstrations and suppressions turned violent, this ancient 
complexity became the security of protestors. As another report of these clashes went on to 
say that, “the rioters attacked troops with fire arms and bombs; also raising the barricades and 
digging trenches around the Old City.”180 The barriers that the French had erected between 
the city and its historic dependencies had not only failed once again to bring about order, it 
even contributed to more unrest.  
Une Sorte de Blocus 
These numerous activities to fortify these divisions suggest an organized resistance 
movement against the regime. Indeed, French informants within the Old City reported a 
campaign of organized activities to maintain the general strike. Several committees were 
formed to pursue the goals of the resistance campaign. These included a popular committee, 
a youth committee, a strike committee as well as a committee for the anti-mandate Syrian 
Nationalist Populist Party.181 The proliferation of these committees indicated the discontent 
with the mandate. The success of the strike then owed as much to its popular support as well 
as to the physical landscape and artificial divides that concentrated this level of discontent 
within a single area.  
As mandate officials described to de Martel, these natural and artificial divisions 
prohibited the French from successfully penetrating the area. One officer explained that, “it is 
extremely dangerous for troops to penetrate the 8 quarters of the city, where neither tanks nor 
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armored vehicles could operate, and where firearms are ineffective.”182 Not only did this 
landscape render the French preponderance of the use of force null, it also provided an 
advantage to protestors within the barricades who, according to officials, already, “had a 
month’s experience of artillery use.”183 For, once the French soldiers and agents breached the 
divides to enter the Old City, they effectively became sitting ducks to the gunfire and artillery 
used by the resistance. As a result, then, Tripoli was effectively impregnable to the French 
forces. As the gateway to the north, Tripoli represented a major conundrum to the French. It 
could not be penetrated without the use of force that carried the threat of major casualties; yet 
the use of violence only served to radicalize the population already hostile to imperial rule.   
 Eventually, however, the revolt subsided after three days, taking the length of this 
general strike to 33 and ½ days in total.184 It is likely that a number of factors contributed to 
the cessation of tensions including: the intervention of the city’s notables who urged for 
peace and promised political negotiations with the Lebanese government and mandate 
authorities;185 the arrest of the nationalist leaders who had organized the protest;186 the threat 
of the continued imprisonment of the protest leaders, which forced residents to surrender 
their remaining firearms;187 the arrival of further reinforcements of military vehicles, troops 
and Senegalese snipers from Beirut.188 These multiple influences, then, enabled de Martel to 
assure his superiors in Paris that his office was able to extinguish the flames of unrest and 
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bring about the return of law and order by reinforcing surveillance and the perimeter around 
the city.189   
But even as the violence subsided, the threat of further conflict and discontent in the 
region persisted. In the words of du Paty de Clam, “nothing assures us that the separatists 
would not be supported indirectly by the Syrian government, open to supporting the 
campaign to reclaim Tripoli in compensation for the [loss of] Alexandretta.”190 Not only did 
the troubles in Tripoli carry the potential to affect internal political dynamics, they also 
threatened the even more delicate balance of powers in neighboring Syria. In effect, Tripoli 
represented the spark that could stretch throughout the region. Or following the 
administrator, “in this case, the movement, instead of being localized to the city, risks 
extending to the south and to Akkar and it could require political concessions to reduce this 
risk, like in 1926. In this case, the inconsequential politicians of the Lebanese government 
where,” the count insists, “most of the members know nothing of the Tripoli problem, risks 
once again leading us into an adventure of which our soldiers will bear the brunt.”191 This 
potential loss of the annexed territories also threatened more violence. In total then, violence, 
hostility and social discord were ripe and the potential for more a possibility on the horizon.  
CONCLUSION 
The experiences in Tripoli show that however much the French had broken ground on 
its new designs for the annexed territories through its colonial civil service, gendarmerie, city 
planning, military bases, roads and imposition of martial law, the population could be 
mobilized through alternative processes. Beyond the reach of Paris were the capabilities to 
marshal general strikes including the closure of commercial markets, mass mobilizations 
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through the mosque, the force of arms like canon fire and higher ground. This contradiction 
between expectation and outcome shows the limits of colonial institutions to penetrate the 
region under its nominal authority. The consequence of these restrictions meant that the 
administration had to resort to the tactics of the anti-colonial movement, relying upon the use 
of force against a largely unarmed civilian population. This putative atmosphere of latent 
hostility against the regime stood behind the colonial apparatus. Not only did this atmosphere 
limit effective administration, it escalated political intrigue and the potential of more 
violence. By attempting to create a new and conspicuous order in this corner of the Levant, 
the French administration transformed the Old City of Tripoli into the site of disorder. While 
this configuration signaled to Paris the pressing need for constant vigilance and guard, it also 
created a new space of resistance around which anti-colonial and nationalist forces in Syria 
and Lebanon could organize.192 As the practices that underpinned the new and the old, order 
and disorder, increasingly mirrored one another, the boundaries between the colonial and pre-
colonial eroded and the capability to re-appropriate these competing institutions grew.  
The implications of these issues challenge us to rethink the workings of power and 
resistance. What is clear at this stage is the precariousness of mandate rule. As de Martel 
wrote upon the assumption of his post in September 1933, “from the French point of view, 
Lebanon is the traditional center of our influence in the Levant. If we want in the future to 
continue to exert ourselves in the region, Lebanon will constitute the necessary base of this 
action in any domain where we intend to act.”193 The foundation of this base was anything 
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but firm, but subject to competing claims. The success of de Martel and his office, as well as 
the future of Lebanon, would depend upon manifesting these designs and suppressing 
alternative claims prevalent in the annexed territories. “If the question of Tripoli and the 
Bekaa and South Lebanon finds itself opened,” he warns, then, “the Syrians would also 
demand of us…the pure and simple return of pre-war Mt. Lebanon, an autonomous sanjak in 
the cadre of Syria, which would in effect remove the international status that it currently 
enjoys, and threaten its future status as a member of the League of Nations.”194 Given this 
threat to colonial order, the administration of the annexed territories was not a simple matter 
of municipal administration of neglected areas, but a political struggle to impose a certain 
vision of space conceived during martial law and imperial quest. Any loss of concession of 
these areas would have a snowball effect in an already turbulent region teeming with latent 
hostility.  
As de Martel wrote in one of his typical fits of grandiloquence, “in effect, the reality 
or the fiction of Syrian independence, the possibility of entente between the two countries, 
the probability of their future union, everything will depend on the Lebanon of tomorrow.”195 
With regard to Tripoli, the Old City remained the center of opposition to French rule. 
Stripped of its dependencies and reduced in size, Tripoli remained a conundrum and potential 
challenge to the implementation of French policy. This political struggle would roil beyond 
the years of de Martel’s tenure and beyond World War II, in fact. But by the end of 
November 1936, Tripoli was under greater surveillance, now encircled by Lebanese forces 
and the French army.196 Amid the riots, five had died, 50 were injured and 76 arrested.197 
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A MESSAGE FROM THE DEPUTY 
“This region of Akkar remains more than ever faithful to the principle of Lebanese 
unity,” writes the Sunni deputy of Akkar Muhammad Abboud in a letter to the 
undersecretary of state of the French foreign ministry in July 1936.198 Despite the deputy’s 
claim, his constituency had a more contested history than he would have cared to admit.  
Historically, the constituency that he represented was once a part of the Ottoman Sanjak of 
Tripoli and belonged to the narrow stretch of land along the Mediterranean coast toward the 
city of Tartus known (among the French anyway) as le pays des alaouites. At the time of 
Gouraud’s 1920 decree of statehood, this Alawite country would be split into two and the 
southern portion incorporated into the northernmost region of the State of Greater Lebanon 
as the qada of Akkar. Regardless, the delegate sought to assure the Quai d’Orsay of the 
fidelity of his constituency to Paris, no matter the goings-on in nearby Tripoli and Syria. “In 
effect,” he says, “the attachment of Tripoli cannot work without inevitably causing the 
attachment of Akkar given the geographical layout, and this would be completely against the 
aspirations of the people of Akkar who remain faithful to their Lebanese homeland.”199  
In different ways, not all of which are stated in the text, the letter of the deputy 
discloses the contradictions of the mandate’s policy of land tenure and their direct and 
indirect consequences on the population. As the following pages will disclose, far from 
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crumbling at the end of war, informal practices such as debt, coercion, intimidation and loan 
sharking reached their peak during and immediately after the French mandate through the 
turmoil of land reform and economic restructuring. A discussion of different theories related 
to colonial governance reveals that the arrival of European modes of discipline did not 
supplant existing practices of domination. As seen in the plains of Akkar, notorious for the 
culture of violence in a landscape teeming with exploitation across the Levant, land reform 
did not accomplish the purported goal of returning the land to the peasants but increased the 
concentration of productive land held by the most unproductive segments of the population. 
Much to the surprise of Paris, what had long been considered as a feudal and timeless system 
of land tenure persisted under mandate rule. By bankrolling the worst abusers in the 
countryside such as the delegate’s family, the Quai d’Orsay was not able to transform the 
countryside of Lebanon into a cotton field and silk farms to rival the plains of the Nile in 
Egypt or the Mississippi Delta in the United States as it had expected. Instead, the effects of 
land tenure not only demoralized cultivators and exposed them to various forms of coercion, 
violence and upheaval, it also made France more reliant on the new bureaucrats controlling 
the countryside and widened the gap between the high commission and the population. In 
this latter sense, the context of the letter proves important. Composed in July 1936 five 
months before the series of protests and demonstrations against the mandate coalesced into 
armed revolt and canon fire in Tripoli, the letter illustrates that territoriality in the 
countryside was precariously enforced through social practices rather than the whims of 
Paris. Therefore, however much the agents of the administration were aware of the 
challenges that confronted the mandate, the policies of the Quai d’Orsay and its reactions to 
these policies effectively constrained the high commission from addressing such problems in 
a way that would have effectively curtailed the animosity and violence that eventually 
erupted.   
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While the ostensible purpose of the letter was to reassure Paris of the affinity of the 
delegate’s constituents to the mandate, it nonetheless throws light on an array of 
contradictions and inconsistencies that, whatever his words, would continue to mount in an 
unstable region rife with calls for detachment.200 Prior to the mandate, the hills and plains of 
Akkar belonged to a stretch of territory in the Levant infamous for its Bedouin raids and 
rivalries. Even by the 1920s, Akkar proved a battlefield for the mandate. The Great Arab 
Revolt of 1925-1927 against the French mandate spread from the Jabal Druze in Syria to 
Akkar where protests mounted in the village of Akrum. In response to clashes there, French 
forces applied a policy of collective punishment, laying assault to the village in attacks that 
left of 35 residents dead and another 65 imprisoned.201 Despite this history of conflict, the 
delegate’s letter offers a different narrative. In effect, the letter serves the same function as 
the description of the blockade of sorts around Tripoli described by de Martel to his bosses. It 
ought to come as no surprise, then, that the two letters were found in the same file in the 
French archives. For, the letter suggests that, because Akkar lies in between Tripoli and the 
Syrian frontier, the rootedness of its predominately farming population to the land would 
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prevent any feasible re-unification. The coastal plains of Akkar primarily served as farmland 
within the new state. But beyond these geographical constraints, there were also ethnic ties to 
consider. As the minister explains, “the people of Akkar, for whom I am a Sunni Deputy in 
the Lebanese chamber and who come from Kurdish and Circassian origins 200 years ago, see 
within the demands of the people of Tripoli an attack to their rights because they have the 
completely different aspirations of another race whose rights the people of Tripoli themselves 
have always respected.”202 Given that his constituents come from Kurdish and Circassian 
backgrounds, it follows that it would be necessary to respect their minority rights rather than 
the subject them to the sectarian rule of the majority Arab population of Syria. The recourse 
to the endangered rights of minorities, in fact, resembles another theme found within French 
writings of the Levant, the threatened rights of the Christian Maronite population scattered in 
the villages of Mt. Lebanon, menaced by the machinations of the Druze community and the 
indifference of the Porte in the mid-nineteenth century.203 It was in protection of this 
community that France created ties with Mt. Lebanon, which eventually contributed to the 
French mandate.  
Yet another trope found in his letter is the contention that the unrest in Tripoli was not 
born of true bona fide nationalist fervor and grievance against the mandate regime, but a 
misplaced discontent among the population dissatisfied with the regrettable municipal 
administration of the Lebanese government. In this manner he writes that, “in effect, there 
are certain material and moral prerogatives made by certain Lebanese individuals to the 
detriment of others, and these numerous prerogatives and injustices create a fertile ground for 
the trumpets of detachment,” he explains. In other words, the source of the resistance 
movement in Tripoli was the petty grievances and prejudices among the functionaries of the 
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government, which foment inequality and the neglect of the annexed territories. While the 
forms of injustice mentioned by the delegate will be discussed later, it is worth mentioning 
his analysis of the ways in which political dynamics in Beirut affected his constituency. At 
the heart of the troubles, he admits, were political inequalities. Thus he writes that, “it pains 
me to add that the Lebanese government has always recognized the existence of these 
inequalities without doing anything to erase them.”204 During the mandate, the farmlands 
within the annexed territories represented 64% of the cultivatable land within the new state205 
and served as a lucrative source of tax revenue for a government impoverished by the Great 
Depression. As such, areas like Akkar proved fertile grounds for vice. Despite this, the 
deputy pledges, “the people of Akkar will never cease from being faithful to its motherland 
and permit me to assure you that if the unjust differences cease to exist…a good part of this 
movement for detachment will be muffled.”206 
Nonetheless, the delegate and his family held a rather different reputation among 
some officials in the high commission. As early as 1933, three years prior to the composition 
of his letter to the Quai d’Orsay, the notes of Commandant Pechkoff disparages the influence 
of the delegate’s father, Abboud Bey abd al-Razzaq. His role in political affairs, Pechkoff 
contends, was “solely due to his property status and the fear that he inspires within his 
numerous debtors.”207 For, prior to passing along his seat in the legislature to his son, 
Abboud Bey belonged to the minority class of powerful landlords who were able to expand 
the size of their domains at the expense of the poor during the mandate. Among these 
influential latifundia, the delegate’s father was characterized as one of the cruelest landlords, 
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“little liked in the region because of his greed (l’âpreté au gain) and harshness toward his 
farmers.”208 In addition to his avarice and cruelty, a dossier on the candidates of North 
Lebanon seeking election to the House of Delegates credits the expanding status of Abboud 
Bey to the family’s other source of income as usurers, loaning money to the farmers on his 
property at extortionate rates. It goes on to say that in contrast to the prestige that he 
presented to Paris, the future delegate was nothing more than a subservient protégé of 
Bechara al-Khouri, who, save for President Eddé, was the most prominent politician in the 
country.209 Moreover, while in office, the deputy’s father abolished in 1926 the village 
council designed to serve as a local elective body for the plains communities in 1918.210 
However maligned as the son of a cruel landlord, greedy usurer and docile politician, the 
delegate, remained a key figure in mandate politics to the extent that French officials called 
upon him during the mounting unrest in Tripoli. The bitterness with which he was described 
reflects the contradiction at the heart of mandate policy toward the countryside of Lebanon—
that although officials within the high commission knew of rampant abuse and violence, their 
administration came to rely upon the very figures responsible for these informal practices.  
Under different circumstances, however, the high commission would have preferred 
to disavow any association with such beys. As will be discussed, the initial goal of the 
mandate had been to undermine men who had come from backgrounds like that of the 
delegate and his family. French land reform decrees in the 1920s had intended to alter labor 
relations between landlords and cultivators so as to create a class of small land-owning 
farmers. In turn, this change in power-relations would end the cycle of debt, usury, coercion 
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and violence that had dominated land tenure and agricultural production in the Levant, 
particularly along the strip of land across the northern frontier of Lebanon and Syria known 
as le pays des alaouites. The primary mechanisms of these reforms were the introduction of 
private property and the dissolution of the large estates. By the time of the 1936 strikes, 
however, the consequences of French policy had unraveled in such a way that mandate 
officials felt compelled to rely upon these landlords.  
The pages that follow detail how the policy designed to broaden popular support for 
the French by producing a new socio-economic class allied to the high commission not only 
failed, but actively facilitated the empowerment of the very classes that French policy 
initially sought to undermine.  Rather than the development of a structured bureaucratic 
hierarchy in the countryside, the formal institutions of governance—that already 
concentrated authority in the hands of a few—generated informal patronage arrangements of 
power beside them. In this way, the worst practices of domination thrived in a countryside 
already suffering from exploitative social practices.  
Power did not flow through the new bureaucracy as Paris had hoped, but through the 
capacity of the ambitious to bolster their informal privileges through the new methods of 
domination. Rather than generating a new relation of power through the imposition of a 
bureaucratic hierarchy, French reforms led to the reproduction of patronage networks. Within 
this context, the landlord of a given cultivator was also the policeman and strongman, 
creditor and something like the village mayor. In this way, the reproduction of space in the 
colonial setting was not a function of the imposition of formal institutions of government, but 
emerged through the capacity of informal networks to re-shape and re-appropriate the 
practices designed to underpin this supposed new order. Instead of supplanting existing 
forms of domination, the technologies of power brought from France—in this case the franc 
and the cadastral survey—bankrolled the status quo that had relied upon debt and coercion. 
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The capacity to enforce the frontiers across the countryside was not born of disciplinary 
power as much as it derived from social practices, which, in this case, contributed to the 
obfuscation of the lines between public and private, modern and medieval. The inability of 
the high commission to resolve these inextricable links and conflicts contributed to the forms 
of unrest that Abboud described on the eve of the Tripoli riots.   
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 Land reform is an ideal issue with which to begin our examination of the production 
of space. The ways in which the French sought to administer the predominately agricultural 
society in the Levant can disclose the practices of power instrumental to the reproduction of 
its authority. In order to understand these processes, it is necessary to explore a number of 
theoretical issues and debates regarding the reproduction of power in the colonial setting. The 
first theory relates to the notion within territoriality of what can be considered power over 
with regards to the imposition of colonial authority over the subject population. The second 
theory concerns the notion of power through transformation of social relations found in 
critical geo-politics. Yet missing from these accounts is a thorough analysis of how colonial 
agents challenged and modified the dictates of the metropole. Ultimately, however, it can be 
seen that the reproduction of power did not occur through the imposition of formal 
mechanisms of governance or the creation of new forms of subjectivity, but through the 
proliferation of pre-existing informal institutions and networks within the expanding 
bureaucracy.  
  To begin, the theory of territoriality emerged out of post-colonial human geography 
to take into consideration the transformation of place at the onset of colonialism. Following 
the work of Robert Sack, the notion of territoriality describes the attempt “by an individual or 
group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena or relationships by delimiting and 
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asserting control over a geographic area.”211 In this way, it addresses the asymmetry of 
power-relations that produced modern human geography, especially during the colonial 
period. Due, in part to new inventions in map-making technologies, the creation and 
promulgation of the new world order replaced visions of space held among the now subject 
populations of Africa, Asia and the Americas. Territorial control, then, functions as an 
instrument of power. To produce territoriality requires three components that Sack outlines: 
it involves the classification of an area; a form of communication of this classification; and a 
mechanism to enforce access to this area and the things within it our outside of it.212 It is in 
this manner, that within the school of territoriality, control is not seen to expand across 
unproblematic and passive geographic dimensions, rather control lies in the capacity to 
reorder pre-existing forms and markers of authority.213 In this manner, territoriality 
emphasizes the coercive aspect of state power vis-à-vis the production of space. It says that it 
is through the negation of previous concepts of space that imperial rule was able to 
reproduce.  
In contrast, the body of scholarship around critical geo-politics objects to this uniform 
depiction of power. It bristles with what John Agnew has described as “a notion of power as 
a monopoly of control exercised equally over all places within a given territory or 
geographical area by a dominant social group or elite.”214 Implicit in his contention is the 
idea that overemphasis on the coercive function of space production generalizes the operation 
of power as a simple appendage of the elite. Thus, Agnew adds that, “missing from this 
account are the contingency and fragility of the infrastructural power” such as state provision 
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of public goods and services from which modern states draw their legitimacy.215 With this in 
mind, critical geo-politics emphasizes the relations of power that underpin the production of 
space. Agnew argues that, “the territorial state draws its power in capillary fashion from 
social groups and institutions rather than simply imposing itself upon them. From this point 
of view, power is present in all relationships among people, animals and things and the 
power of the state relies on the wide range of sources that it can tap into.”216 This perspective 
emphasizes the potential agency of all individuals within a given matrix of power and 
resistance. The access of subjects to the disciplinary practices of the state creates the 
potential for them to alter the exercise of power. Crucially, this protracted struggle makes the 
operation of power vulnerable to resistance. In the words of Agnew, “the spatial monopoly of 
power exercised by a state is not and cannot be total when its power derives from that given 
up by and potentially retaken by others.”217 In other words, the exercise of power remains 
susceptible to strategies of resistance. The very institutions that are designed to discipline 
people within a new system of administration contain the potential to generate unintended 
consequences.  
Still, both schools of thought overlap in that the modern practice of power appears as 
the supplanting of traditional practices and worldviews with new systems of domination.  To 
summarize, while the notion of territoriality privileges this repressive facet of the production 
of space, the critical geopolitics stance places a greater emphasis on its productive potentials. 
As mentioned previously, there are both productive as well as destructive elements within the 
exercise of colonial rule and state power. Whereas critical geo-politics focuses on this 
productive potential of modern state power vis-à-vis space cultivates new fields of political 
contestation and subjectivity, the notion of territoriality emphasizes the repressive component 
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that can mass participation and political contestation. Colonial power manifests itself within 
both perspectives as something anathema to pre-existing forms of domination. The onset of 
colonial rule is seen to have disrupted and even displaced pre-colonial systems of thoughts 
and practices of domination. The old, pre-colonial other has to be first identified within 
European schools of thoughts and then systematically replaced with the new. The 
differentiation between the modern and the ancient must be made as stark as night and day. 
Within this framework, colonized subjects are seen as either obedient adherents to European 
modes of behavior or intractable anti-modern natives.  
In order to enhance this mode of study, more attention must be paid to the actions of 
colonial agents, themselves. They not only functioned as enforcers of mandate policy, but 
also managed to assert their own interests within the networks of power that emerged with 
the onset of imperial rule. It can be seen that the imposition of bureaucratic institutions was 
met with resistance, not only in terms of overt anti-colonial protest, but also by the 
bureaucrats, themselves. The administration of space was tempered by the scramble for 
office and influence. As Bayart contends, “the social struggles which make up the quest of 
hegemony and the production of the state bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which 
all actors—rich and poor—participate in the world of networks.”218 In this sense, Bayart’s 
analysis can underscore the various roles that colonial agents played. Beyond functioning as 
enforcers of dictates from the metropole, they were able to augment their own personal 
networks of status and patronage, even to the extent that they were able to undermine official 
policy. From this perspective, the field of contestation emerges within the system of 
domination. As Bayart adds, “corruption is a method of social struggle, in the fullest sense of 
the term, and how much it rests squarely upon a lively political consciousness of 
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inequality.”219 Aware of the hierarchy imposed from abroad, individuals of means sought 
ways to maintain and expand their own power now under threat from imperial rule. In this 
manner, Bayart contends, “the strategies adopted by the great majority of the population for 
survival are identical to the ones adopted by the leaders to accumulate wealth and power.”220 
This social struggle absorbed all individuals within the colony, opening the door to new 
modes of domination, resistance and violence. From this perspective, it is easy to see how 
land reform was also concomitant with the re-appropriation of colonial institutions and an 
upswing in coercive modes of domination.  
 In this manner, the operation of power in colonial Lebanon can be thought of as the 
re-appropriation of the formal mechanisms of government to fulfill informal ends. The 
monopoly of power of the new state was constantly challenged, not just through armed 
revolt, as was the case in Tripoli, but also through the covert misuse of public office to 
establish patronage networks. Contrary to the development of a landowning elite loyal to the 
regime, as students of the modern Arab world have learned was the case in colonial Egypt, 
Palestine and Iraq, there emerged in mandate Lebanon an uneasy alliance between the rural 
bosses and colonial officials. French advisors resented their reliance on what they described 
among each other as feudal elements. In turn, rural bosses often flouted their official duties to 
reinforce the practices of debt, coercion, violence and intimidation of inhabitants in the 
countryside. In turn, these same supposedly feudal lords would ascend the ranks of the 
parliament to dominate the region. In lieu of the original designs to undercut their control, 
these landlords used mandate policies to strengthen their grip on the rural population. In 
these ways, the failure of the high commission to implement a more effective land reform 
indicates a social struggle that occurred during the mandate as the latifundia and French 
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advisors competed for power at the expense of the increasingly marginalized and 
impoverished majority.  A review of the mechanisms and effects of French land reform 
policy reveals that power flowed through indiscipline to the new practices of domination 
decreed by the high commission rather than through the new technologies of control. Upon 
considering the reproduction of power as a re-appropriation of resources rather than the 
supplanting of traditional practices with new and modern systems of domination, the 
contradictions and limits of effective control become clear. In this context, the failure of land 
reform to redistribute land or redefine power relations appears as a function of entrenched 
patronage networks within the new administration.  
LA TERRE AUX PAYSANS 
The topic of much scholarship at the onset of the mandate, land reform was one of the 
earliest institutions with which the French had hoped to stamp its authority. While Paris 
generally thought in absolute terms of space, the processes of implementing its new order for 
the Levant were hindered by a number of unexpected situations that compromised the 
influence of the Quai d’Orsay in the villages of the new colony. Initially, French land reform 
efforts centered on the creation of a class of small tenant farmers who would support the 
mandate in addition to supplanting the influence of the existing large landowners. In other 
words, the French hoped to implement their vision of space by transforming relations of 
power in the countryside. By turning the commonly held lands of tenant farmers into the 
private property of a new cadre of landowners, the French hoped to upturn the informal 
practices that had historically governed land administration. Yet the application of this policy 
did not go according to plan. The attempt to create a new relation of power failed. An 
examination of the results of this policy in the Akkar region north of Tripoli will disclose the 
limits and contradictions of French land reform policies.  
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 A review of land tenure in this region prior to the mandate will lay the groundwork 
for understanding the reforms that the high commission hoped to introduce as well as the 
complications that they eventually faced. It will be seen that rather than displacing pre-
existing practices associated with land tenure, the mandate bankrolled the worst forms of 
exploitation, usury and debt used against already impoverished farmers to create what one 
local scholar at the time described as a combination of many evils.221 In so doing, the ways in 
which informal relations flourished within the new bureaucracy become manifest. The 
consequences of this policy will then be analyzed in relation to the unrest surrounding the 
movement for the re-annexation of the annexed territories to Syria around 1936.  
Land Tenure under the Ottomans  
Situated along the plains north of Tripoli and south of the Alawite Mountains along 
the Mediterranean, the narrow strip of land historically known as Alawite country had 
functioned as an agricultural region under the Ottoman Empire. Historically, this cluster of 
villages among the coastal plains had served as a dependency of the Ottoman Sanjak of 
Tripoli. After 1920, it was split into two areas: the north was ceded to the Alawite State that 
was eventually absorbed into Syria, while the southern portion became a part of the State of 
Greater Lebanon within the muhafaza of North Lebanon.222 In an area reliant upon 
agricultural production, the region suffered from several challenges. First, there existed, 
irregular levels of rainfall, rocky soil, labor-intensive methods of cultivation, as well as the 
constant threat of raids from the nomadic bands roaming the countryside, all of which 
yielded inconsistent harvests.223 Second, cultivated land, in general, was overpopulated due 
to the scarcity of mineral resources and thin soil so that agriculture offered low wages and 
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seasonal employment to cultivators.224 Third, illiteracy was so common that according to the 
informal census of 1932, the illiteracy rate for North Lebanon, in which the Akkar was 
located, was 66.56% of all inhabitants, or nearly 90,000 people.225 In these ways, Akkar 
became one of the poorest regions in the new country upon the declaration of statehood. 
Describing land tenure in this region, one local scholar at the time of the mandate lamented 
that, “the Syrian peasant is more like a miner than a farmer. He exploits the soil without 
restoring its fertility.”226 
Underpinning agriculture in the region were practices that French sources had 
characterized as semi-feudal relations of power. Before, during and after the occupation of 
the Levant and establishment of the mandate, French observers and Orientalists had long 
publicized the coercive practices that reigned in the Levant. The literature on Alawite country 
often depicted a stratified society dominated by ancient, indeed medieval, practices. In doing 
so, they ascribed the poverty and low productivity of the region to power-relations more so 
than to its precarious ecology. One such depiction of rural politics comes from La Politique 
des Mandats dans Le Levant, published in 1923 by Jean Luquet, a self-described doctor of 
law and administrator of colonies.227 According to these sources, dominating this system was 
a small cadre of lords who were keen to expand their influence in a region that lacked 
defined property rights. Rather than profiting from the harvest of the land, this political class 
profited from collecting taxes on behalf of the Ottoman coffers. Originally, in the plains of 
Akkar, these beys and aghas settled in the region in the 18th century in order to keep order for 
the Ottomans and to subdue rebellions by the communities of predominately Shia Muslim 
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cultivators who then lived in the plains and or in the Alawite Mountain to the north.228 In 
time, these men were able to dominate the land through economic arrangements as well as 
violent means. In addition to collecting taxes, these men loaned money to tenant farmers for 
faming equipment with rates as high as 400%.229 The profit that these large landlords 
received derived not so much from the fickle harvests of the land but from the people who 
were forced to take out loan advancements prior to the harvests. The power of the landlords 
was related to the debt of their tenants. Or, in the words of French Orientalist Jacques 
Weulersse of the Institut Français de Damas, “the large estates, in effect, are nourished by 
poverty.”230 Having profited from poverty, this landlord elite was more interested in 
acquiring additional lands and subjugated cultivators than in investing new capital or labor to 
increase productivity on existing lands.231 In these ways, the scourge of the countryside, 
French writers contended, was the uninspired and greedy latifundia who maintained this 
system of exploitation and low productivity.  
At the other end of this spectrum, they claimed, were the majority of subsistence 
farmers with little rights on the lands that they cultivated. The precarious and squalid 
conditions of these tenant farmers is summed up by Luquet when he writes that, “as for the 
peasant, nearly always completely illiterate, he lives like a savage, most often, in destitute 
huts among living conditions that hardly differ from those of the populations of central 
Africa.”232 The fertile ground for these conditions of poverty was the métayer tenancy system 
that dated back to medieval times.233 Similar to Europe and the Americas, the lords would 
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lease a portion of their land to tenants in exchange for a share of their harvests. Within this 
system tenants were at the mercy of the property owners who determined the yearly length of 
leases and charged a variable rent that was a portion of the annual yield, typically one-half of 
the produce after the tithe and taxes have been paid to the state.234 Still worse, tenants often 
held no lease on the land they worked and were subject to dismissal at any time by the 
landlord.235 Even if this were not the case, harvests were subject to the dreaded dîme, a fixed 
tax rate of 12.5% that all cultivators paid to the Porte, regardless of harvest yields, which was 
typically collected by the same unscrupulous landlords.236 Under such pressures, tenants 
often had to resort to borrowing credits from landlords, especially out of season or when 
harvests were less than expected. As Luquet explains, “the prospect of contracting new debts 
in order to live was less dire than searching for new living conditions equally precarious.”237 
In these ways, the pressures on tenants appeared to create a cycle of debt, impoverishment 
and exploitation. Summarizing labor relations in the countryside, Weulersse would lament in 
a later publication, that, “Oriental society is a starkly divided society, without intermediate 
degrees, without a middle class. Socially speaking, there is no more than two groups that 
oppose one another; the notables—aghas, beys or  [sic] shaykhs enjoying de jure or de facto 
privileges—and the little man.”238Within this divided system, the fruit of labor relations was 
a demoralized majority of farmers under the thumb of a select minority who relied upon an 
array of informal practices to reap their profits.  
The overall picture presented to the French public was of an Oriental society 
recalcitrant to the changes in agriculture that had bloomed in Western Europe. In contrast to 
mechanized agriculture in Europe and the Americas, poor farmers relied upon ancient 
                                              
234 Khuri, Tenure,1936, 58.  
235 Khuri, Tenure,1936 59.  
236 Luquet, 1923, 159.  
237 Luquet, 1923, 159.  
238 Weulersse, Jacques. Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient. Paris, Gallimard, 1946. 120. 
 105 
cultivation practices that lacked the latest rational, scientific methods and, ultimately, 
produced relatively small harvests. This division of labor relied upon traditional customs that 
tied individuals to the land and enriched a select coterie of landlords. Rich and poor, 
powerful and weak, the portrait of Ottoman land tenure presented French readers with a 
black and white portrayal of power-relations. Luquet summed it up best when he 
characterized the plight of the rank and file farmer as the “serf of a great landlord he is, and 
serf he will remain, attached to the land by the ancestral tradition.”239 
Reconsidering Ottoman Land Tenure  
 In contrast to this depiction of timeless serfdom, rural administration had undergone a 
number of transformations under the Ottomans. The system that the French would adapt had 
been installed fairly recently during the second half of the nineteenth century. Several of the 
changes undertaken during this Ottoman era of Tanzimat reforms concerned efforts to 
modernize the administration of land between the 1840s and 1870s. As recent scholarship has 
shown, perceptions, especially French perceptions of Ottoman land tenure prove inadequate 
in terms of reflecting the changes that occurred during this time period. As Martha Mundy 
and Richard Saumarez Smith have asserted, “the nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms are 
not a failed attempt at Westernized legal modernization. Nor are they simply a by-product of 
the imposition of a world market. Rather, the reforms, transforming legal vocabularies from 
within Ottoman tradition, sought to respond to the competitive world system.”240 In this 
manner, the authors contend that comparing Ottoman reforms to European systems of 
privatized land tenure misconstrues the array of objectives that animated such reforms during 
this period. Chief among the goals of the Sublime Porte were the desire to boost state 
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revenue by registering lands within the empire,241 the aim of codifying divergent practices 
and groups within the system of land tenure,242 and the objective of incorporating local 
political leaders within the expanded bureaucracy to monitor the population.243 Ultimately, 
with regards to the goal of boosting revenue, Ottoman land reform had mixed success. As the 
scholarship of Roger Owen clarifies, the land tax that cultivators paid in the form of a tithe of 
agricultural produce formed the largest part of government revenue for Istanbul between the 
1860s and 1880s.244 This suggests that agriculture played an important part in government 
policy. For, such revenue was needed to fund the rising costs of maintaining the Ottoman 
military and re-supplying it with the latest weapons in its campaigns in the Crimea and the 
Balkans.245 Despite the increasing reliance on revenue from agriculture, the Ottoman state 
spent more money than it gathered from places like Akkar, as will be discussed later.  
 In addition to these reforms, the Ottomans reorganized municipal administration of 
the countryside as part of efforts of modernization. Historically, the empire had been 
organized around a system of vilayet provinces that were further subdivided into different 
sanjaks. Within this system, land tenure was governed by an array of Ottoman laws and 
codes and Islamic court jurisprudence.246 Among these practices was the reliance on oral 
testimony of land ownership, which, at times in places like Akkar, involved the use of force 
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to coerce such testimonies.247 In practice, however, the countryside fell under the discretion 
of local landlords who enjoyed sweeping control over inhabitants and were said to have 
negotiated treaties with foreign powers.248 To increase its authority in the countrysides, the 
Porte turned, ironically, to the French departmental system of municipal administration for 
inspiration.249 Having enjoyed success with a closely copied system in the Vilayet of the 
Danube, Midhat Pasha extended these reforms into the rest of the empire.  The Ottoman 
Vilayet Laws of 1864 and 1871 introduced a four-tier hierarchy that established a chain of 
command from the wali in each province to the mukhtar of every village.250 The Porte 
appointed the heads of the top three tiers, while the leader of the bottom two tiers were 
elected by their constituents from a list of approved candidates.251 In this way, the Ottomans 
imposed a system of hierarchy of areas as well as of agents to administer the empire.   
By installing this administrative hierarchy, the Ottoman reformers hoped to expand 
their own control and reduce the informal mechanisms that had limited their authority. As 
part of the Tanzimat reforms, land administration and tenure was designed to be a bulwark 
against three forces, both new and old, that threatened Istanbul. First, Ottoman administrators 
sought to further integrate the distant lands of the empire so as to counter the threat of ethnic 
nationalist revolt.252 As was the case with Greece and other areas of the Balkans and North 
Africa, this threat was a real possibility to further break up the empire. The second concern of 
the Ottomans was the threat of ambitious provincial leaders usurping the divine right of the 
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sovereign. The most famous example of this tendency was the case of one of the earliest 
Ottoman reformers, Muhamad Ali Pasha, who in the course of building a modern army in 
Egypt as well as other proto-state institutions to support it, eventually challenged the 
authority of the Porte in the region.253 The third concern, as mentioned previously, was the 
financial imperative to raise funds through land taxes amid the mounting costs of war.  With 
these goals in mind, the Ottoman reformers went about creating a modern bureaucracy to 
administer and oversee the vast swathes of land that remained—for the moment—within the 
empire.  
Even as revenue expanded for Istanbul through land reform, the costs of war 
exceeded revenue, forcing the state to borrow from European financiers and eventually 
created a cycle of debt and dependence.254 Far from French depictions of primordial relations 
of power in the countryside, the setbacks of Ottoman land reform stemmed from several 
circumstances. The first problem was the uneven application of the law in the various corners 
of the empire. As Mundy writes on land registration efforts, “the Ottoman reforms clearly 
aimed to unify in one person the holder of title and the taxpayer, but reforms in the system of 
tax collection often lagged far behind the mere introduction of title to land.”255 Such 
discrepancies between law and its implementation accounted for regional variation in 
Ottoman affairs. Second, in recruiting powerful local leaders into the new bureaucracy, the 
Porte unwittingly allowed these political bosses to temper its efforts to centralize authority 
throughout the empire. In the words of historian Roger Owen,  
Whatever pressure there might have been to introduce a proper system of registration, 
taxation or private rights of property, the actual result of policy was generally a 
bargain between the central government, local council and men of rural power which 
was clearly neither in the interests of efficient administration nor the most profitable 
development of the region’s agricultural resources.256  
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Third, beyond the difficulties of implementing the law, Ottoman land reform failed to invest 
new money in agricultural production beyond the growth of commercial agriculture in certain 
regions, most notably the tobacco industry in what became southern Lebanon. While the bulk 
of state resources went to the build-up of the military and bureaucracy, expenditures in public 
works and irrigation projects remained limited, stymieing the growth of agriculture.257 Such 
relative inactivity in the countryside reflected the failure of Istanbul to generate new sources 
of revenue; 258 and this general reliance on agriculture further compromised the imperial 
coffers when a series of bad harvests ravaged the countrysides in the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century.259 Given these mixed results in generating revenue from land reform, the 
Porte reluctantly turned to foreign creditors to finance its military campaigns, obtaining its 
first foreign loans in 1854 for the campaign in the Crimean War.260 
Within 20 years of this loan, the regime became embroiled in a cycle of excessive 
spending, shortfalls in revenue and expanding debt to the point that the Porte declared 
bankruptcy in 1875; and in doing so it joined a list of countries smarting from the world 
economic system that included Austria, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Russia, 
parts of the United States and all of Latin America.261 When unable to repay their debts, the 
Ottomans were forced to make a number of concessions to their creditors. Eventually, the 
Ottomans were forced to grant sweeping monopoly concessions to Whitehall and Paris and 
its other European creditors within the remaining territories of the empire.262 For instance, in 
the Levant, European creditors seized control of tobacco cultivation, as will be seen in 
chapter five. Internally, the municipal system crumbled from within under the pressure of 
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ambitious Ottoman officials within the new bureaucracy. In addition, the rising tide of ethnic 
nationalism threatened the hegemony of Istanbul across the empire.  Eventually, the system 
was suspended by the imposition of martial law under military commander Jamal Pasha as 
WWI encroached upon the Levant and discontent within the empire sparked dissent in the 
Arab world.  
The complex Ottoman system of land tenure that Paris would confront at the end of 
the war is simplified in the work of American University of Beirut economics professor Said 
Himadeh, published in the 1930s.263 This system comprised different forms of both private 
and communal property. First, the three types of private property included mulk , or freehold 
property that most resembles the western concept of private property; miri, or crown land 
deeded from the state to a particular individual that could be leased, mortgaged or sold; and 
wakf, a religious endowment bequeathed by an individual to a particular religious 
institution.264 In addition to these arrangements was collective land tenure, in which, 
describes Himadeh, “the land is apportioned among individuals of the village once every two 
or three years, and sometimes every seven years” during which cultivators farmed their 
allotted portions in the knowledge that they would eventually swap lots.265 Under this 
system, it was typical for every male inhabitant within a particular village to receive a share 
of the communal land under cultivation and upon his death, his share would be redistributed 
among his heirs.266 Previously, while mulk  tenure prevailed in Mt. Lebanon, collective tenure 
existed primarily in the plains east of Damascus and miri and wakf systems were most 
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common in the rest of the Levant.267 In effect, the work of Himadeh points to an aspect of 
land tenure generally overlooked in French Orientalist literature. Many, but not all, of the 
lords who ran the large estates in the Levant like Abboud Bey did not own the lands they 
controlled, but operated at the behest of the Porte, usually as tax collectors who made sure 
that the coffers sent to Istanbul were overflowing. Only upon the dissolution of the empire 
did the lords who controlled miri property assumed greater discretion over the territory that 
they controlled.268 Already, it is possible to discern the pressures on agriculture and land 
tenure that yielded a complex and precarious existence for farmers in stark contrast to the 
timeless caricatures painted by European Orientalists. Aside from the ravages of WW I, land 
tenure was subject to circumstances of death, debt, inheritance, re-allotment, administrative 
reform, not to mention variable harvests and a lack of technological investment.  
In a different way, many of these complexities served as a means to hedge against the 
precarious and shifting harvests of the land. Indeed, such constant fluctuations rendered the 
possibility of purchasing land almost impossible for the majority of cultivators.269 In this 
context, the shared system was designed to function as a safety net against the erratic 
productivity of lands that often lacked sufficient capital investment. Despite these insurance 
measures, land tenure was not without its problems. As scholar Albert Khuri writes in the 
1930s,   
The system as it stands is a combination of many evils, the worst being that no 
shareholders can be induced to fertilize, plant or make any permanent improvement 
on his holding, since he knows it will be his only temporarily, under such conditions, 
the land is undoubtedly impoverished to the detriment of the whole country.270  
 
Even though the shared cultivation hedged against low productivity, it failed to encourage 
farmers from investing in the land so that, overtime, harvest yields offered marginally 
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decreasing returns. This insecurity, along with the fear of farmers of arbitrary dismissal from 
the lands that they harvested, forced tenants to get the most out of the land during the short 
time in which they leased it, further exhausting the soil.271 It was under such multiple 
constraints and shifting insecurities that cultivators often fell into the debt of investors and 
the latifundia. “Another serious evil of the system,” Khuri adds, “is the difficulty with which 
the individual mahsa‘ land holder obtains credit except at usurious interest rates, since the 
land which he would give as security for a loan is usually not registered.”272 Such precarious 
and informal conditions proved fertile ground for exploitation.  
 This system of debt was also the main ingredient within the alternative to collective 
farming, the métayer system of sharecropping. Indebted cultivators kicked off their land had 
the option of leasing land from large landlords and notables, who often served as creditors to 
the poor and usually received 50% of their harvests after taxes had been paid.273 In this 
context, farming was not as profitable as the system of debt and forced labor proved. Due to 
this, land in the most remote corners of the empire was never properly surveyed and a precise 
cadaster of landholdings never existed.274 In addition, while the spiral of debt enriched 
landlords, the comparatively small harvests produced by demoralized cultivators robbed the 
Ottoman state of potential tax revenues. Instead of the persistence of primordial relations of 
status, power in the countryside was reproduced through the undefined and irregular terms of 
agricultural production that contributed to a reliance on debt. By WW I, unrest had reached 
such a nadir that under the pressure of famine—caused by naval blockades and trade 
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restrictions imposed by the Entente Powers—the majority of small landowners were forced 
to borrow money under usurious terms and then sold their lands to capitalists in Beirut, 
Tripoli and Aleppo for, in general, less than 10% of their value.275 In these ways, creditors 
profited from the uncertainties and changing circumstances in the region. This cycle of debt, 
combined with the rule of force, enriched latifundia at the expense of the already 
marginalized and increasingly impoverished poor. Moreover, contrary to the opinions 
circulating within French publications, Ottoman land reform efforts was less an attempt to 
privatize land than it was to establish deed holders responsible for paying taxes to Istanbul; 
and as a result, land reform did not displace local elites in the countrysides of the Levant.276 
The French would have to confront these circumstances upon the end of WW I.  
Land Reform under the French Mandate  
The course of action of taken by the high commission to redress these circumstances 
consisted of a five-part plan that would reform land tenure in Syria and Lebanon. The first 
part consisted of conducting a new cadastral survey of land holdings in the countryside. The 
second part involved the privatization of large estates as well as of communal lands. In 
addition, the third part called for the creation of new agricultural banks to lend money to 
cultivators, thereby ending the practice of usury. The fourth element of land reform was the 
amendment of Ottoman tax codes regarding agriculture. Finally, the fifth part of land reform 
was tied to the general amendments of municipal administration further described in chapters 
two and four. Combined, these strategies would accomplish the purported goal of the Quai 
d’Orsay.  In place of these informal practices that had governed land tenure, the high 
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commission would erect a new bureaucracy to realize its promise of “la terre aux paysans,” 
or land for the peasants.277 
1. Cadastral Survey 
The first element of French land reform was the effort to undertake a new cadastral 
survey of landholdings. This would be the first written record of landholding in the Levant in 
places like Akkar. While Ottoman officials had managed to conduct cadastral surveys in 
some parts of the empire, in others, especially remote, rugged and largely inaccessible places 
like Akkar, they relied upon oral testimonies of land holdings. Given the climate of illiteracy 
and exploitation, the more powerful and coercive landlords came to dominate the terrain. 
These village heads, in turn, became the nominal owners of the land. Such complexities help 
to explain why mandate officials wrote that the landlords of Akkar owned 80% of 
agricultural land in the region.278  In such circumstances, it was hoped that a more precise 
survey would provide legal protections for cultivators from the reported abuses of the 
indolent class of landlords.279 The first survey of La Régie du Cadastre was implemented in 
the Bekaa valley along the Lebanese and Syrian frontier.280  
2. Privatization of Land 
 The second strategy of French land reform was the privatization of land. The impetus 
for private property is laid out in the 1925 report of French Orientalist and agent of the 
French Mandate Edouard Achard. In the fourth part of his wide-ranging study, “Les 
Problèmes de L’Agriculture Syrienne,” Achard proposes a number of reforms including, “the 
individualization of collective property, the dismemberment of state owned property, the 
dismemberment of the big landholdings and the installation of small property owners on the 
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dismembered large estates.”281 The reason to break up the large estates, Achard insists, is that 
the current system offers no incentive for landowners to boost productivity and improve the 
conditions that guaranteed them the regular reimbursement of their loans to cultivators with 
interests in an environment where crop yields are irregular.282 The sharecropping system 
could be maintained with relatively low levels of capital investment and required nothing 
more than the intensive labor of the cultivators, themselves. Not only was private property 
the solution to the abuses of the landlords, it was also seen as the answer to yet another 
situation that French writers saw as the source of the plight of the poor. Next to these large 
estates, “the other problem is collective farming, which fails to stir individual efforts to 
expand production,” Achard contends, “since [any surplus] will have to be shared.”283 In 
addition, the assumed problems of agriculture are disclosed by Weulersse when he writes that 
“legally, private property does not exist outside of the cities; geographically it is not rooted in 
the soil and it remains unclear and without precise limits, varying according to circumstance 
and always under the force of arms.”284 That is, not only were farmers subject to the tyranny 
of the commons of sorts, but also forced to toil under the threat of the force of arms. In order 
to boost morale and terminate the alleged culture of intimidation among cultivators, Achard 
proposed giving farmers rights to individual plots of land that they could then cultivate, 
secure in the knowledge that the full harvest would belong to them. Of course, such reforms 
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3. The Agricultural Bank 
In addition, the third reform proposed by the French was the establishment of an 
agricultural bank to regulate loans to cultivators. Historically farmers borrowed agriculture 
credits from usurers who offered the extortionate rates. As Lebanese historian Massoud 
Daher explains in his thesis, at the time of the mandate, “loans were granted in the form of 
repurchase agreements. The rate of these loans was very high. Borrowers could rarely break 
free from their commitments and private property thus passed into the hands of usurers.”286 
The tonic to this injustice was conceived in 1919 Marseille congress in the form of the La 
Banque Agricole du Grand-Liban.287 As cultivators received loans at fixed rates that they 
could repay, they would be able to invest more money into agriculture and experiment with 
new forms of mechanized farming in order to boost their harvests. In this manner, it was 
hoped that the agriculture banks would cultivate the smallholding property owners as well as 
destroy the clout of loan sharks, absentee landlords, and opportunistic capitalists.288  
4. Tax Reform  
 Such prospects would be furthered through the fourth aspect of French land reform, 
the amendment of the Ottoman tax codes. Instead of a complete transition from Ottoman 
statues, French officials sought to modify the worst elements of land tenure policy. For 
Achard, this was an alteration of the tithe that cultivators in the annexed territories were 
forced to hand over to the Porte.  While all subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been subject 
to this tithe, exemptions were made for its collection within religious endowments and, 
crucially, within the autonomous sanjak of Mt. Lebanon. Instead of a fixed proportion of the 
annual harvest, Achard wanted to impose a variable amount that took into consideration the 
prospect of poor harvests; and the rate that he proposed would be an average of the tithes for 
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the four previous years.289 In addition, French administrators sought to end the uneven tax 
collection that had prevailed. Under the Ottomans, collection for the dîme, the 12.5% 
proportion of annual harvests sent to Istanbul, was subject to the machinations of the large 
landowners tasked with collecting it. In practice, Weulersse asserts, these landlords were able 
to exempt their estates from tax collection due to their influence in land administration.290 
The overarching idea behind reform of the Ottoman system was that if cultivators knew that 
there was a certain amount of taxes that they had to pay, they would then work to increase 
production above the taxed amount and keep a larger percentage of the harvest for 
themselves.  
5. Municipal Administration 
The fifth aspect of land reform concerned the system of municipal administration. 
While administrative reform was not a specific aspect of land reform, it incorporated land 
tenure within the new administrative bureaucracy by recruiting personnel to oversee the 
countryside. Like the tax codes, the high commission kept in place the existing framework—
already based on the French departmental system—but modified it in some respects. Under 
the muhafaza system decreed by Gouraud in 1920, there would emerge 5 principle muhafaza 
administrative zones, subdivided into a number of sanjaks, aqdya, nahiyat, and kariat. To 
supervise each administrative zone and subdivision, agents of the central government were 
selected either through direct appointment or election.  In the countryside, rural areas were 
re-organized under the Loi des Moukhtars of 1928, which decreed that every community with 
a population of at least 50 inhabitants be administered by a mukhtar and council of elders; 
and Décret No. 5 of 1930, which provided for the appointment of these officials by the 
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interior minister.291 Following the reorganization of the tax system in 1930, the mukhtar was 
tasked with personally collecting taxes from cultivators in addition to his other duties, which 
included assisting the judiciary in conducting arrests, raids and seizures and issuing notary 
certificates.292 In places like the villages of Akkar, the mukhtar was the senior-most official 
of the government within the countryside. Given his role in collecting taxes, it was hoped 
that these government agents, who nominally served without pay,293 would supplant the 
fraudulent practices that had reportedly dominated tax collection under the Ottomans.  
In these five ways, the French planned to restore the land to the peasants and bring 
about an end to the supposed patterns of abuse and exploitation of the poor at the hands of 
the greedy and nearly-omnipotent beys, landlords, aghas and sheikhs under the indifferent 
eyes of the Porte. From a different perspective, the French hoped to replace the assortment of 
informal practices and inefficient regulations with a more standardized and uniform system 
of administration. In the words of Albert Khuri commenting on the new land laws passed 
under the mandate in 1930,  
The new land code is based upon the Ottoman Land Code with its subsequent 
emendations and amplifications. It is not, properly speaking, like the majallah, a 
codification of Moslem laws. In form, it is similar to the Land Code of North Africa, 
i.e. Tunis, Algeria and Morocco. It resembles the Swiss civil code and like it, 
considers registration the point of departure for the establishment of real property 
rights.294 
 
With this system in place, the Quai d’Orsay sought to boost the productivity of lands that had 
allegedly stagnated under the control of a class of latifundia more interested in sowing 
misery than crops. In turn, the taxes imposed on these expanded harvests would help to 
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subsidize the costs of the new bureaucracy and their personnel. Such designs depended on 
the implementation and success of a new system of land tenure. 
Informal Policies of Land Reform 
Although the stated rationale of land reform under the French mandate was to return 
the land to the peasants, these reforms harbored the latent desire of Paris to break up the 
power of the large landowners and replace them with a more pliable class of cultivators who 
would fall in line with the dictates of the Quai d’Orsay. In other words, the French hoped to 
supplant existing relations of labor and power in order to create a regime that would follow 
its foreign policy. Certainly, certain facets of colonial rule relied upon the implantation of 
settlers to conquer the hinterlands and thereby spread the influence of the metropole, whether 
they were the Jewish agency acting on behalf of Whitehall in Palestine or the Boers of South 
Africa in service of the Dutch, or, closer to home, the Pieds-Noirs and colons in French 
Algeria. Within the Arab world, supposed “tribal” chieftains in Iraq and rural bosses in Egypt 
served a similar purpose in aiding the foreign mandates in exchange for near omnipotence in 
the countryside. In this way, land reform can be considered as more than a benevolent and 
sanitized reform, but also as part of a political struggle to bolster imperial control and weaken 
anti-imperial opposition. The unstated goals of land reform include a number of 
interconnected economic, political and social considerations.  
 From an economic perspective, land reform was part of an effort to introduce French 
capital into Lebanon.295 As the Marseilles conference and other studies of the Levant 
indicated, French investors were keen to tie the Levant to the global system of capitalism. 
The fixation with land reform, especially boosting the purported low productivity of 
agriculture, was that it offered a means to make agriculture attractive to French capitalists. If 
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creditors believed that investment in mechanized agriculture would boost harvest yields, then 
they would be more willing to offer the capital necessary for such reforms. The key to 
increasing productivity was the privatization of land, which would protect farmers from the 
threats that menaced agriculture. No longer subject to the rule of force of the landlords or the 
tyranny of the commons presented in Orientalist literature, cultivators would invest more of 
their energy into lands that belonged exclusively to them. Not only would agriculture serve 
as the foundation for capital investment, it could also serve as the tax base of the mandate 
and subsidize the expenditures of the Quai d’Orsay in the Levant. That is, the French sought 
to replicate in the Levant the global division of labor that saw the colony as the greenhouse 
for crops shipped to Europe. In this vein, French investors tried to introduce cash crops in a 
region largely dominated by subsistence farming. These included plans to introduce cotton 
plants, primarily in parts of Syria.296 In addition, French reports also mention half-hearted 
attempts to grow cotton in Tall Kerry in Akkar and at Andjar in the Bekaa Valley with 
satisfactory results in 1930; and efforts were made by the ministry of agriculture to import 
olive plants from Europe and grape varieties from the United States in order to boost the 
production of cash crops.297  
 With this in mind, the political considerations of land reform come to the surface. 
Namely, the French sought to create a political environment that would facilitate its foreign 
policy. Already implicit in the studies of Weulersse, Luquet and Achard is the conviction that 
the system of labor relations ought to be overturned, the villainous large landowners removed 
from their power and the unfortunate savage-like tenant farmers liberated through the 
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benevolence of Paris. If the high commission followed the recommendation of Achard to 
privatize these large estates for their cultivators, then it would be able to create a new class of 
small-scale proprietors who would support French policy. Indeed, one of the earliest reforms 
of the high commission was to annul the sale of lands in Mt. Lebanon that transpired during 
the war, which had been sold for 20% of its value.298 By building up this sector, the French 
hoped to rally on its side the majority of the labor force who had been employed in 
agriculture. Once the introduction of capitalism is considered as a tool of power, its potential 
to alter relations of power among individuals comes to light.  
 From a social perspective, the introduction of commercialized agriculture and private 
property were designed to break up the system of collective farming that had dominated the 
region for centuries. By supplanting this system, the French were also destroying the safety 
net that protected cultivators in times of bad harvests. Once deprived of this safety net and 
entirely responsible for their own harvests, cultivators could be disciplined into complying 
with French efforts to introduce cash crops like olives and cotton instead of grains and 
cereals. In effect, French land reform harbored the hope of reproducing the enclosure 
movement that had transformed the peasants of the commons of Western Europe into a 
disciplined work force that toiled for salaries on private property or in the newly built 
factories of the Industrial Revolution.299 Commercial agriculture would thrive once 
cultivators lacked any alternative to collective farming. Equally, French officials hoped that 
the cultivation of small-scale proprietors would bestow legitimacy on their efforts to re-
organize the economy and muffle any organized dissent to its policies. It is for such reasons 
that the obsession of Achard concerned the dissolution of communal property as much as the 
breakdown of the large estates.  
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To summarize, then, French land reform policies contained a number of trends. Its 
vision of the countryside reflected one trend, an ideological bent toward the complete 
transformation of social, economic and labor relations into a centralized system of hierarchy 
overseen by the new bureaucracy. This trend would bring about the breakup of large estates 
and the development of small-scale proprietors at the expense of the latifundia.  At the same 
time, land reform policy reflected a second trend, a more technocratic attempt to modify 
relations of power through economic means instead of political ones. The land survey, 
privatization of property and commercialization of agriculture would contribute toward the 
emancipation of the peasant from his purported medieval shackles as well as enrich French 
creditors. As will be seen, French reactions to the consequences of these policies revealed yet 
another trend, a reluctance to shift their expectations and policies amid changing 
circumstances. This latter trend can be seen in the spread of inequality that French 
administrators were slow to arrest.  
Constraints and Consequences  
Despite its hopes and goals, land reform did not liberate the cultivators and boost 
productivity, but succumbed to a number of shortcomings that the French were unable to 
overcome. First, French policy relied on indirect mechanisms of enforcement that failed to 
bring about the necessary structural changes. The second shortcoming involved the 
unrealistic expectations of the mandate to shift agricultural production and land tenure within 
a relatively short time span. This, in turn, contributed to a third constraint concerning the 
commission’s underestimation of the prevalence of communal property, which prevented the 
immediate imposition of private property. Furthermore, the fourth shortcoming concerned the 
misplaced hope that French reforms would boost productivity in an environment beset by 
irregular harvests. In contrast, the fifth shortcoming was born of external circumstances made 
worse by French policy. Combined, these trends help to explain the stagnation in agricultural 
 123 
production, the grievances of the population, and the expanding inequality that developed 
during the mandate. Eventually, these contradictions contributed to the growing instability in 
the region represented by Muhammad Abboud and his letter to Paris.  Instead of effecting a 
new order reminiscent of the communes of the Loire valley, land reform was underpinned by 
informal practices that generated political, economic and social inequalities. The formal 
effects of land reform involved the push toward private property, which concentrated land in 
the hands of a few. In terms of informal practices, the rule of law gave way to systematic 
abuse of power with these same men holding de jure authority. As such, a review of the 
formal and informal effects of the land tenure system overseen by the French high 
commission will reveal the reproduction of power through informal mechanisms.  
1. Means of Enforcement 
The first shortcoming of the administration concerned the indirect means of enforcing 
land reform. As historian James Whitaker argued, Achard and his colleagues were 
determined to use only indirect and legalistic methods to accomplish sweeping reforms.300 
Because such proposals risked alienating the lords in a landscape already beset by uprisings 
and rebellions, Paris refused to impose more drastic reforms in preference to alternative 
methods of enforcement. In practice, however, even these alternative methods like the 
establishment of agricultural banks, new irrigation project proposals and the mooted cadastral 
survey failed to generate their intended economic, political and social designs. For instance, 
while the first cadastral survey in Lebanon took place in the Bekaa region, it proved 
inadequate due to the complexity of laws, the absence of proper documents and a lack of 
skilled staff to carry out the survey.301 Given these complications, only about half of the 
cultivated/cultivable land in Syria and Lebanon was surveyed after twenty years of the 
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mandate by 1940.302 In this context, increasing the harvest would never occur unless the land 
was placed in the hands of the most productive sector of the population. Instead of 
redistributing property to the majority of cultivators, French proposals represented a more 
piecemeal approach to reform, under which agriculture remained in the hands of individuals 
with no incentive to boost the harvests. As a consolation, the high commission was content to 
fill its coffers with la dime and other taxes that had historically hampered investment.  
This hesitation to make more structural reforms is indicative of the political 
challenges that confronted the policies of Achard. As Lebanese historian Fawwaz Traboulsi 
writes, despite the initial objective of the mandate to cultivate a class of smallholding 
farmers, “political considerations ultimately prevailed in favor of attracting the loyalty of the 
inhabitants of the annexed territories by patronizing their landed notables. In Akkar, the 
Bekaa and the south, French governors backed leading landowners, who became the main 
beneficiaries from government aid and project of agricultural developments.”303 As resources 
earmarked to uplift the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the countryside shifted to 
the richest and most predatory elements, the social hierarchy that the French had hoped to 
dissolve became more entrenched. Or as anthropologist Michael Gilsenan writes, “that there 
was one law for the rich and another for the poor was at the heart of the matter and of 
practical experience. Personal domination had to be made good in a competitive universe in 
which ruse, stratagem and overt and covert violence and competition over property were 
crucial.”304 In these ways, the approach to land reform adopted by the high commission not 
only failed to deliver its intended effects, it helped strengthen the very elements that it had 
hoped to supplant.  
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2. Unrealistic Expectations 
 The reforms of Achard were related to a second shortcoming that the high 
commission never overcame. The system of private property that had developed in Europe 
was largely alien to most parts of the Levant. Beyond the metropole, the countrysides of the 
Levant differed from the climate and land tenure system that thrived in the Maghrib and 
West Africa where men like Achard had previously been in service.305 The idea that the 
French could transform land tenure within a decade of their arrival proved unfounded. As 
Whitaker explains, “the French were raised in the classical tradition, which expressed itself 
through Roman law embodied in prescriptive codes. As a result,” he adds, “the French 
administrators tended to legislate in the abstract and to let systems of expectations overrule 
facts.”306 Throughout the course of their rule, administrators held fast to the assumption that 
people throughout the territories would acquiesce to the decrees of foreigners. Moreover, 
there existed the presumption of uniform assimilation to these new protocols that would 
create a centralized authority from Paris to the far reaches of Alawite country.  Such 
expectations ran counter to the reality and history of a region long outside the orbit of formal 
Ottoman institutions. As Whitaker adds, “one could perhaps describe the desire for 
assimilation of colonized peoples through imposition of a bureaucratic uniformity as an 
attempt to apply the Jacobin ideal of brotherhood of man. Unfortunately, most of the 
inhabitants of the French Empire were possessed of no fraternal feelings toward France or 
each other.”307 In other words, a large portion of the problems that the French encountered 
came from an unwillingness to accept a reality beyond their own conceptions of the Orient 
and the colony. The administration still clung to the hope that they could serve as saviors to 
the peasants trapped in a timeless, medieval system of debt and exploitation. As Whitaker 
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contends, French preconceptions of agrarian bureaucracy were never modified by study of 
facts on the ground.308  
3. Complex System of Agriculture  
 This failure, in turn, prevented the French from acknowledging the complex system 
of land tenure that stood in the way of sweeping reforms. The difficulties of establishing the 
cadastral survey amid technical flaws and countless disputes over land ownership attest to 
these complications. In Akkar and the surrounding coastal plains, in general, land was 
controlled by local bosses or commercial investors and a large portion of the inhabitants there 
possessed no holdings at all.309 In Mt. Lebanon, however, private property was divided 
between the great notable families and religious endowments and in such circumstances, 
cultivators often owned a portion of the land they farmed.310 Even if it could have been 
imposed, the cadastral survey and privatization of property, therefore, would not have offered 
any benefit to the majority of landless cultivators as much as it would have profited residents 
of the mountain. Even where such conditions would have benefited the population in Mt. 
Lebanon, the fall of sericulture, variable rainfall and a series of poor harvests drove more and 
more cultivators to opt for emigration or relocation to Beirut; and as a result, the economy of 
the mountain shifted toward remittances and summer tourism.311  
On a different level, the preoccupations and biases of the French economists blinded 
them from accepting these complexities. As Whitaker writes, the establishment of a class of 
small-scale landed cultivators would struggle to thrive in a milieu that effectively profited 
from coercion and loan sharking. On Achard’s proposal of the replacement of large estates 
with private smallholdings, Whitaker contends that,  
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This obsession with the creation of individual peasant plots blinded him to the 
essentially communal nature of agriculture in a land where the interests of individual 
cultivator were carefully balanced against those of the social group within which he 
functioned. It also led him to ignore the essentially patrimonial relationship between 
landlord and tenant, although it must be said that during the mandate period, the 
element of exploitation in this bond was coming more to the fore in certain regions.312  
 
In effect, still beholden to the ideas and fantasies of the Levant produced during WW I, Paris 
and her agents were never able to accept the role that they played in further complicating the 
complexities of land tenure. Since land tenure was never as simple as they had imagined, the 
solutions required to overhaul this system were more nuanced than they could implement. As 
Mundy comments on the complexities of land tenure under the Ottomans, “such systems, far 
from representing the collectivist bent of a primordial tribalism, appear as responses to the 
block imposition of agriculture taxes and as strategies for the minimization of risk in 
agricultural production by equitable distribution and rotation of land.”313 In seeking to 
simplify these complexities into private property, the mandate administration further exposed 
cultivators to the shifting fortunes of agriculture.  
4. Variable Harvests  
 A fourth shortcoming within French policy was the presumption that harvest yields 
would increase through marginal returns year after year. Little consideration and effort was 
put into resolving the irregular patterns of rainfall and harvest as well as the dearth of funds 
available to invest in new irrigation systems. Instead, the high commission assumed that all 
fluctuations would disappear with the onset of mechanized labor and capital investment in 
agriculture. French officials assumed that their rule would be better than land tenure under 
the Ottomans. Upon France’s entry into Ottoman Syria in 1918, the region had been racked 
by widespread famine, which conservative estimates credit as causing the death of some 
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500,000 people in Greater Syria from starvation.314 Already, a number of factors impacting 
the harvest have arisen. The hoarding of farmers, disinterest of landlords, and the crippling 
rates of usurers all contributed to the demoralizing condition of agriculture. Even when these 
conditions were removed, harvest yields would not have grown exponentially due to the 
uneven climate and shortage of labor in the coastal plains.  
 Moreover, the proposed investment in agriculture that the Quai d’Orsay envisioned 
never materialized to boost productivity as money shifted into other areas of the country. As 
economic historian Carolyn Gates writes, “capital flowing into agriculture was comparatively 
small because investment was riskier and the rate of return was lower and slower than that 
available to investors in commercial and financial ventures.”315 That is to say that, in lieu of 
the countryside, investment went into the flourishing financial sector based in Beirut, largely 
run by French and European corporations and subsidiaries managed by Maronite Christians 
from the mountains. Part of what distinguished Abboud Bey and his son from their fellow 
landlords over time was their shrewd investment in this nascent financial sector with the 
profits they made in the countryside.316 As a result of capital flows to other areas of society, 
cultivators became even more impoverished under the mandate and left with fewer options 
for subsistence from the land.  
Even when investment was possible in the form of agricultural banks, little of it 
reached those most in need. A case in point was the agricultural banks conceived in the 1919 
Marseille Congress as a way to break up the large estates and progressively eliminate 
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collective property through the development of smallholding farms.317 Yet, as Himadeh 
recounts as early as 1935, the establishment of Le Banque Agricole du Grand-Liban failed to 
curb the loan sharking that only grew more rampant due to a number of factors.318 Because 
agricultural banks could not attract sufficient investment from the commercial sector, the 
credits they managed to give cultivators were often insufficient for the purchase of 
machinery, irrigation or drainage technology; did not liquidate older debts; incurred high 
interest rates while undervaluing the price of land; and often privileged those with political 
influence like the large landowners at the expense of small cultivators.319 These factors, 
combined with a high rate of defaults and bad loans made by the banks, as well as the fact 
that about one one-third of landless farmers in the Levant did not possess any land to offer as 
collateral, left cultivators under the thumb of predatory institutions.320  
5. External Circumstances  
In addition to these constraints, the export oriented economy of cash crops that 
French reformers expected never materialized. Instead, the conditions that laid the 
groundwork for commercialized agriculture stripped farmers of any protection from the 
ravages of the Great Depression. The effects of the worldwide recession are recounted in the 
work of American scholar and eventual president of the American University of Beirut, 
Norman Burns. In his study, he describes the effects of the depression on the tariff of Syria, 
the single monetary zone established by France for their separate mandates in Syria and 
Lebanon. First, the depression contributed to a drop in prices for commodities and therefore 
weakened the revenue that cultivators could collect from farming. In this regard, Burns 
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writes that, “the peasants had no incentive to plant their crops when they knew that the  
selling price would be less than the cost of production. So the agricultural output of the 
country decreased in spite of the fact that the real need for agricultural products was as great 
as before.”321 Despite the needs in agriculture, production dropped due to low prices and as a 
result, the export oriented market plummeted as well. Even though exports dropped, imports 
of manufactured goods into the single tariff expanded.  As Burns explains, “the 
disorganization of international prices enabled foreign manufacturers to flood the Syrian 
market and to force local factories to close their doors.” Unable to compete with the low 
prices of manufactured goods, artisans and factories had to downsize. The total effect of the 
great depression was characterized by low prices as well as widespread unemployment. This 
bleak reality is summed up when Burns writes that, “the situation in truth was like economic 
paralysis. Agricultural lands were idle although urban people were hungry for food. Factories 
were idle although the urban peasants needed manufactured wares. The potential resources of 
production were present, but there was little production and the consumers’ needs remained 
unsatisfied.” Although the French mandate was not responsible for the Great Depression, the 
high commission did fail to adjust its laissez-faire policy in such circumstances. Instead, the 
insistence on the shift toward an export-oriented economy only served to further expose the 
residents of the annexed territories to the fluctuations of global capitalism.  
Formal Effects of Land Reform  
Eventually, these contradictions contributed to the growing instability in the region 
represented by Muhammad Abboud and his letter to Paris.  Instead of instituting a new order 
reminiscent of the communes of the Loire valley, land reform was underpinned by informal 
practices that generated political, economic and social inequalities. From a political and 
economic perspective, land tenure consecrated the authority of a select few at the expense of 
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the majority of farmers. In Akkar, 3% of proprietors owned 73% of cultivable land.322 These 
landowners would become administrators within the new bureaucracy, effectively in charge 
of finance and the gendarmerie in towns and villages. Once in power, these officials made 
sure to deprive their constituencies of any development or infrastructure in order to ensure 
the population’s dependence on their personal patronage.323 The result of this arrangement 
was the impoverishment and underdevelopment of the north at the hands of these political 
bosses. As a 1939 summary of a petition from notable, predominately Muslim families in 
North Lebanon testifies, residents of the muhafaza, “reproach the Lebanese government for 
having often in this last period [since the reinstatement of the constitution in 1937], 
undermined the application of laws for personal goals, attacking all liberties (of press, 
assembly, association), constantly intervening in the affairs of justice and finally, for 
squandering public funds.” 324 The interference of delegates in the administration of the north 
bears witness to the expansion of personalized rule within the bureaucracy.  
This political hierarchy in Akkar was representative of the inequalities that became 
systematic within the country. While the majority of tax revenues for the new state came 
from the annexed territories, the overwhelming majority of these funds were allocated to 
projects in Mt. Lebanon.325 The political and economic hierarchy that privileged the beys 
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over the cultivators in Akkar would privilege Mt. Lebanon over the annexed territories, as 
well. As Muhammad Abboud goes on to detail in his letter,  “in effect, there are certain 
material and moral prerogatives made by certain Lebanese individuals to the detriment of 
others, and these numerous prerogatives and injustices create a fertile ground for the trumpets 
of detachment.”326 In effect, the delegate points to certain inequalities vis-à-vis the 
administration of the annexed territories and Mt. Lebanon and Beirut. The first inequality 
was that whereas the inhabitants of the annexed territories paid a direct tax on landed 
property in addition to the dreaded dime tax that had been a mainstay of the Ottoman tax 
regime, the residents of Mt. Lebanon paid no property taxes.327 The second grievance was 
that whereas residents of the annexed territories paid an excessive tax to change properties 
and transfer title deeds, the inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon paid no taxes for these services.328 
The third grievance was that whereas there were very few roads in the north and hardly any 
outside of Tripoli, Mt. Lebanon enjoyed asphalt-paved roads.329 In addition, perhaps the 
biggest grievance was that the nearly all of the high posts and most of the junior posts in the 
government belonged to residents of the mountain at the expense of members of the annexed 
territories.330 In these ways, it can be seen that by trying to fix politics to create a subordinate 
population, the French created a situation for the growth of economic inequality and social 
stratification. However much the delegate insisted that administrative reform was the panacea 
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to these systematic inequalities, the background of the messenger in this case discloses the 
conundrum at the heart of land tenure during the mandate. For the advocate of reform, the 
French educated lawyer and self-described delegate of the peoples of North Lebanon also 
belonged to the house of the chief lord and loan shark who profited from these same patterns 
of abuse and hierarchies. Similar to the indirect reforms proposed by Achard a decade earlier, 
the initiatives suggested by the delegate would, at best, have reproduced a system of 
predation rather than progressively eliminate it.  
In terms of economic trends, not only did fiscal policy further impoverish the poorest 
sector of the new country, it exacted additional costs from the population as well. Under the 
laissez-faire policy adopted under League of Nations charter, the trade deficit in Syria and 
Lebanon crashed as the Levant became flooded with imported European goods.331 With this 
shift in policy, the staples that people had historically acquired through trade within the 
Ottoman state of Greater Syria were now imports from Europe or from mandate territories 
controlled by Britain. The major source of government revenue became import and customs 
duties rather than a direct tax on incomes. In turn, this indirect tax further impoverished the 
majority since luxury imports were taxed at about the same rate as necessities.332 At the other 
end of the socio-economic spectrum, the latifundia enjoyed a comparatively light taxation, or 
as Burns recounts, “the greater burden of government revenue demands falls on the poor and 
middle class consumers of the cities. They are the class who consume the imports of foreign 
necessity goods, and they are the people who are forced to pay the tax which the wealthy 
succeed in escaping.”333 At the same time, these fiscal policies contributed to the erosion of 
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the craft industries in the big cities of the Levant.334 Equally important, the fall of agriculture, 
poor harvests in sericulture production and the fiscal policy of Paris prompted a few forward-
thinking landlords to diversify their portfolios away from traditional cultivation. While the 
switch meant that the lords were less exposed to the fall of agriculture, it also implied that 
cultivators in the lands that these families controlled were more vulnerable to malnutrition 
and starvation.  
 Informal Effects of Land Reform 
 
On the other hand, in terms of informal politics, the results of land reform included 
the spread of social and political inequalities, which in turn, kindled the forms of resistance 
to the mandate like the Tripoli protests in 1936. A summary of a 1936 speech by the youth 
wing of the Tripoli branch of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party branch makes plain that 
among the list of grievances of the people was the concentration of state resources within Mt. 
Lebanon at the expense of the annexed territories. “This separatist movement is not only a 
fanatical Islamic protest,” it reads, “but it also translates the very lively discontent of the 
population with regard to the Lebanese government, which seems until today to consider like 
strangers the inhabitants of the regions attached to Lebanon in 1919.”335 What such 
statements sought to emphasize is that the protests witnessed in Tripoli were not only the 
latest iteration of age-old sectarian hostilities and reprisals, but also a demonstration against 
the changing political developments that marginalized the poor, in particular, and the citizens 
of the annexed territories, in general. Such developments were not the product of a few bad 
apples within the bureaucracy, protestors emphasized, but a direct consequence of mandate 
policies. Relations in the colony were not designed to cultivate equal rights among citizens, 
but more closely resembled the hierarchy between creditors and debtors. Or as the youth 
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activists said, “the inhabitants of Tripoli and Akkar are discontented that their country has 
become a colony of the Lebanese republic and that the government concentrates its activity 
and its concerns within the previous sanjak of Mt. Lebanon.”336  
As the government neglected the annexed territories, power brokers were able to 
disregard the rule of law, continue the coercive practices that had underpinned land tenure 
and worse, systematically apply violence and intimidation to expand their personal spheres of 
influence. Abboud Bey, himself, was rumored to have killed a boy working in one of his 
fields in order to test his newly acquired firearm.337 Moreover, the beys regularly coerced 
cultivators into forced labor, tax offerings and other customary duties.338 Due to the 
contradictions of land reform, the status of Akkar was crystallized during the mandate as a 
vestige of backward, anti-modern tendencies.339 Yet, it was during the mandate that the 
power relations crystallized into the personalized rule of the lords connected to the 
government. Amid the clamor of protest and upheaval, the pressures of violence and 
impoverishment mentioned in the introduction further menaced the already vulnerable 
majority of cultivators lacking legal protection. In this way, the expansion of the bureaucracy 
contributed to more localized and personalized practices of domination.340  
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The failure to maintain order within the north was related to the failure of the high 
commission to cultivate a rural elite capable of administering the countryside that historically 
served as the dependencies of Tripoli. That is, the failure to administer space emerged from 
the failure to make inroads with the population and recruit reliable civil servants. The lack of 
popular support for the mandate can be seen in the increasing reliance on individuals of 
unsavory character. Very few men and women of influence in North Lebanon were keen to 
cooperate with the mandate system. In lieu of the formal legal authority reserved for the high 
commissioner and his appointees, local mandate agents in places like Akkar created for 
themselves informal situations that empowered and enriched themselves at the expense of the 
very constituencies that they were supposed to serve.  
THE END OF LAW AND ORDER 
 By the late 1950s, a wizened Abboud Bey, then in his 80s and still the patriarch of a 
family dynasty that would remain prominent in Akkar until the 1970s, would lament to one 
American diplomat the erosion of law and order in the country upon the end of the French 
mandate.341 In one way, his regret reveals the degree to which reforms initiated under the 
French mandate institutionalized what had historically been informal practices. The mandate 
would be seen as the halcyon of power for lords like Abboud Bey and his son Muhammad.  
The establishment of a new bureaucratic administration did not supplant existing practices of 
domination, but served to further entrench and localize them. Instead of generating a new 
relation of power within the production of agriculture, land reform impoverished the 
productive classes and made them more dependent on the most unproductive elements within 
the countryside. In this manner, the experiences of Akkar highlight that power was not 
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reproduced through the emergence of new technologies of power that supplanted traditional 
experiences or through practices that disciplined the population into modern subjects. Instead 
the reproduction of power was created within the contradictions of formal institutions 
underpinned by various informal arrangements and provisional alliances.   
Yet from another perspective, the remarks of Abboud Bey underscore the provisional 
nature of this power. Not only would the autonomy and personal rule that political bosses had 
enjoyed pass over time, but even during the mandate, land reform was underpinned by 
practices as variable as the harvest yields. This precariousness reflects the shifting networks 
and intrigues among French and Lebanese colonial officials that continued to unravel. The 
rural politics in which Muhammad Abboud emerged was a function of changing 
circumstances that his family had successfully navigated from the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, to the commercialization of agriculture, the privatization of property, the privileges 
of the new bureaucracy, the integration of Lebanese agriculture into the world market and the 
Great Depression. To maintain authority in these circumstances required new efforts to re-
appropriate the initiatives designed to systematically regulate relations of power. In these 
ways, new situations emerged that would, in effect, limit the capacity of the high commission 
to enhance its authority, but rely on a shifting coterie of intermediaries whose ambitions did 
not always align to those of Paris. This contradiction between the enormous apparatus and 
backroom dealing would limit the French and their efforts to reproduce their authority. The 
failure of land reform occurred within this context. Amid such circumstances, what happened 





IV. Their Silence ought not Signify Innocence, Our Silence ought 
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THE TOWN IS HEAVY WITH MINGLED BURDEN 
“One notices that certain persons who are used to profiting from the spirit of party 
and personal ambitions, who are constantly in touch with real authority and personality, 
succumb to intrigues and plots, while pretending to go back to an earlier state of affairs and 
playing with all power before the superior authorities.”342 So stated the front-page article of 
the March 8, 1940 edition of the daily political newspaper of Tripoli, al-Mustaqbal. The 
untitled article, written and signed by the newspaper’s publisher and editor-in-chief, French 
national Madame Elvire Lattouf, suggested certain improprieties among the political elite of 
Tripoli without explicitly naming these individuals or their crimes.343 More than anything 
else, the article signified that the period of unrest and impasse that confronted de Martel in 
1936 remained in 1940 despite the efforts of the mandate administration to enforce a 
blockade of sorts on the restive Old City. The so-called superior authorities that she 
mentioned dovetailed with the assumptions that underpinned the writings and thoughts of de 
Martel, the delegate Muhammad Abboud and the agents of the mandate, in general, who held 
the belief that the attempts to weaken the organized opposition in the north would empower 
the delegates of Paris to finally make inroads with the population so far removed from their 
political and spatial remit. In effect, the superior authorities that Mme. Lattouf complained 
was absent was nothing more than the colonial hierarchy and attitude of strict surveillance 
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that de Martel had promised to impose over the atmosphere of latent hostility. In lieu of the 
proper authorities, however, she lamented the emergence of a new political class within the 
north, adding that, “among these individuals, we wish to point out certain religious chiefs and 
so called leaders who have been the cause of all divisions and discord and whose regime has 
been one of misery and misfortune.”344  
This regime of misery and misfortune discussed in the pages that follow will 
exemplify the ways in which colonial territoriality was socially mediated as opposed to 
geographically imposed. In this context, the processes of elite formation that the Quai 
d’Orsay initiated to oversee this territory created an atmosphere of administrative and 
financial anarchy that the commission was unable to curb in any meaningful way. First, this 
chapter will explore different theories with regard to the processes of the formation of a 
colonial political, social and economic elite. Rather than a one-off event that consolidates 
colonial authority, elite formation precipitates new fields of contestation that have the 
potential to challenge and undermine imperial objectives. Second, the experiences of late 
mandate Tripoli and its surrounding dependencies will disclose the ambiguit ies of colonial 
institution building. Namely, in the hope of neutralizing indifferent and hostile elements 
within the population, the agents of the high commission unsuccessfully tried to recruit 
members of the elite families of the city into the newly established bureaucracy to oversee 
municipal affairs. Rather than bolster its authority, an analysis of recently de-classified 
materials shows that the new bureaucracy, in fact, undermined the authority of Paris. Instead, 
patronage networks and acts of sabotage altered colonial designs and further marginalized the 
high commission from the population to the extent that the chain of command that the French 
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had envisioned became upended with French mandate officials increasingly beholden to 
Lebanese bureaucrats and politicians. 
 The suggestion that commission’s policy failed to achieve its intended effect, 
however, does not imply that it failed to generate indirect effects for the people in the north. 
Among the aspects of the Lattouf article worth exploring are the ways in which the 
unforeseen dynamics that emerged during the mandate had a silencing effect on the entire 
population. Not only had corruption, petty politics and machine politics arrived at the gates 
of the Old City, it penetrated all facets of political life in ways that the high commission 
never accomplished. In this manner, Mme. Lattouf insisted that, “if we do not mention in 
detail their corruptions and atrocities, it ought not signify that they are innocent. Their vices 
and failings cannot be hidden, because they are established in facts and figures.”345 This 
intrigue, she argued, now affected the entire political class of the city, from officials loyal to 
the mandate to even nominal members of the opposition movement. It had created an 
atmosphere of endemic strife, which, although, it could not be made explicit, affected all 
facets of daily life in the city. This suggestion of widespread criminality raised questions 
about the French response to the 1936 general strike as well as the political make-up of the 
city. At the very least, it intimated that the mutual understanding in the alliance between 
French administrators and the Lebanese parliament of notables had somehow changed.  
At the same time, Mme. Lattouf hints that the high commission under de Martel and 
his successors had ushered in a new political divide between the majority of citizens and the 
political and social elites who claimed to represent them. The political divide in Tripoli no 
longer solely comprised the forces on either side of the picket lines as it had in 1936. Instead, 
it now constituted a whole coterie of unnamed Lebanese officials and politicians pitted 
against French nationals and agents loyal to mandate. The bleak reality that she had 
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presented was underpinned by the disappointment that the effort to weaken the organized 
opposition to the mandate had not reinforced the imperial order in the Levant. In effect, her 
article discloses unforeseen tensions in the alliance between the French officials, Lebanese 
notables and the executive office. In response to this silence that did not constitute innocence, 
Mme. Lattouf asserted that, “our silence cannot be considered cowardice because we have 
never been accustomed to it and because we have never ceased from defending the law and 
affirming that it is on our side.”346 In this sense, a new form of trouble had encroached upon 
Tripoli. Contrary the artillery and gunfire of the riots, or the strikes and demonstrations that 
preceded it, the unrest that now confronted the city resounded in utter silence.  
The contrasting void between them and us, their silence and ours, becomes central to 
understanding the transformation in power relations that the French mandate initiated in 
Tripoli before, during and after the 1936 riots. From the bureaucrats to the opposition leaders 
and everyday residents, this web of silence implicated all segments of the population. Indeed, 
this silence extended to the messenger of innocence and doom, herself, Mme. Lattouf, in 
ways that will become clear later. For now, it is worth mentioning that of the numerous 
named and anonymously written materials cited below, the untitled Lattouf article comprises 
one of only three texts published during the mandate that referenced the disquiet in the north. 
Whatever facts and figures Mme. Lattouf had in mind when she wrote her article no longer 
exist in great detail. Instead, the evidence collected in dribs and drabs and presented here 
reveals a few of the facets of the crisis. Although incomplete, these previously unreported 
phenomena shed light on the pressures and transformations that ultimately silenced the 
population into this web of presumed innocence and deceit, righteous indignation and 
cowardice. An analysis of these largely unpublished and anonymous materials will disclose 
that colonial statecraft not only changed the subject population, but also transformed the 
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ruling regimes tasked with carrying out the policies of the metropole. In the case of Lebanon, 
it will become clear how the position of the mandate administrators shifted as the fortunes of 
the north changed over time. Power did not coalesce to revolve around the new 
administrative centers set up to ensure the colonial gaze over the subject population. Instead, 
the contradictions of power and the diverse practices that constituted authority dwelled 
within different forms of silence that menaced the population. By the time of Mme. Lattouf’s 
publication in 1940, the capability of the high commission to effectively administer the north 
had waned due to the unforeseen consequences of the emergent shadow state. The silences 
and secrets that resounded within the ranks of the administration came from the tendency to 
blame others for these faults rather than to admit the contradictions of French policy. 
Ultimately, it can be seen that the efforts to centralize power through the construction 
of a modern bureaucracy had the opposite effect in that it contributed to the personalization 
of power into the hands of a select few who re-appropriated state institutions for private 
benefit. By unpacking different theories of elite formation, it will be possible to consider the 
ways in which the operation of power generates the opposite of its intended effects. On the 
one hand, Marxist political theorist Antonio Gramsci contends that the key to the elite 
maintaining authority in a political society dominated by structural inequality is the capacity 
to continually alter power relations by recruiting members of the opposition into the ruling 
regime and therefore weakening organized opposition.347 At the heart of his analysis, the 
ruling regime and the status quo remain unchanged despite the recruitment of formerly 
dissident elements. On the other hand, Jean-Francois Bayart contends that the establishment 
of the bureaucracy in colonial Africa planted the seeds of social stratification and neo-
patrimonialism.348 In this context, elite formation created unintended consequences and new 
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situations that the metropole did not envision.  The experience of Tripoli and its 
dependencies will indicate that elite formation did not strengthen the nascent ruling regime, 
but created new political fields of domination and contestation. In this case, the recruitment 
of the native population into the bureaucracy contributed to various forms of social, 
economic and political unrest that the commission was not able to overcome.  
With these issues under consideration, it can be seen that before World War II 
encroached upon the region, a series of crises had reached the gates of the Old City and 
would spread across the north. Formally, a select few in Beirut were able to manipulate the 
formal institutions of the government to pursue their personal interests and establish 
patronage networks within all levels of government. Informally, the protégés of the main 
political bosses exploited the absence of the rule of law to further criminal enterprise. As 
such, the reproduction of space did not follow imperial decree. Even as the city became 
incorporated into the mandate, the processes of transformation and re-appropriation of state 
resources impacted the high commission. The very institutional practices of municipal 
administration designed to underpin the new colonial order in the Levant, nonetheless, 
kindled unrest and weakened the mandate administration. Such complexities and ambiguities 
of colonial domination presaged the proliferation of informal patronage networks in the 
dying days of empire. In these ways, the administrative measures that Abboud suggested to 
muffle the trumpets of discontent and the blockade of sorts that de Martel assured would 
bring order became the regime of undisclosed misery and misfortune that Mme. Lattouf rued.   
YOU CAME AND BY YOUR ARRIVAL SAVED OUR CITY 
While elite formation was designed to alter power relations within the colony, the 
approach adopted here contends that it generated unintentional consequences that 
undermined the very systems of rule it should have supported. The onset of imperial rule was 
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subject to different forms of contestation and manipulation.349 This potential for the 
breakdown of discipline enables us to rethink the notions of legitimacy and hegemony in the 
age of imperialism The resort to direct as well as indirect rule discloses that colonial 
authority was never omnipotent, but subject to internal challenge and resistance. In the 
course of attempting to implement imperial designs, colonial rule affected both rulers and 
ruled. These transformations, then, shed light on the failure of effective administration and 
the proliferation of informal politics in colonial Lebanon. In these ways, the advent of 
institution building did not strengthen the nascent ruling regime and precipitate the 
submission of the subject population, but like the shadow state discussed earlier, helped to 
complicate and weaken effective rule. 
One perspective of elite formation comes from Antonio Gramsci. In the context of the 
Italian state unification, political life, he argued, did not involve transforming the population 
into some kind of imagined community or nationalist force, but relied upon quieting 
vociferous opposition to the emergent regime and winning over the leading members of the 
opposition. For Gramsci, this process was twofold: the first being the overwhelming force, 
harassment and surveillance of the police that quashed resistance. In contrast to this direct 
tactic was a non-violent means of coercion that he termed transformismo, the gradual and 
selective absorption of the leaders of the resistance into the ranks of the new ruling elite 
through access to patronage networks and jobs.350 For Gramsci, this non-coercive power of 
the state only extended to the leading intellectuals of the subject population and did not reach 
the majority who remained marginalized from access to the dominant political arenas. In his 
words, “the social stratum which could have organized the endemic southern discontent, 
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instead became an instrument of northern policy, a kind of auxiliary private police.”351 
Robbed of its leaders and would-be intellectuals, the majority would struggle to influence the 
ruling stratums of power and, eventually, became the subject of police crackdowns and 
media campaigns decrying their rebellious spirit and hostile attitude to industry and labor, 
more generally. Instead, this muted political opposition, what Grasmci remembered as an 
“anarchic turbulence” appeared before the nation as a mere “matter for the police and the 
courts,” dismissed without further political merit. In effect, state legitimacy for Gramsci 
constituted a one-off arrangement among a relatively exclusive class of people within the 
ruling faction, which did not involve the silenced majority of citizens. From this perspective, 
then, the advent of institution building underpinned the nascent ruling regime.  
As elites are recruited into the ruling establishment, Gramsci assumed that relations 
of power remain static between ruler and ruled. At the same time, he asserted  that the ruling 
class becomes even more extensive as a result of this suppression and marginalization of 
dissent. For Gramsci, transformismo represented “the formation of an ever more extensive 
ruling class” that never loses its control, but only expands it.352 As such, the ruling coalition 
that governs the state remains unaffected by the processes of transformation that impact the 
rest of the population. The would-be leaders of the resistance are simply added to the 
establishment as new auxiliary police force. Instead, the only drastic change to this set-up is 
the amount of force necessary to suppress the marginalized. As a result, elite formation 
dovetails with increasing levels of oppression from the time of Victor Emmanuel until the 
rise of Mussolini. However helpful this historical examination of the Italian unification 
campaign, the analysis of power relations adopted here departs from his in a number of ways.  
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By focusing on informal mechanisms in lieu of party politics, it becomes possible to 
notice the ways in which elite formation alters not only practices of resistance, but also 
structures of power. Elite formation does not occur in a vacuum and political actors bring 
into any system of domination a myriad of personal and collective interests with them. As 
Bayart writes, “the political systems whose dynamics are equivocal and reversible, do not 
have any value outside of their heterogeneous actualization from one actor to another and 
from one context to another, in the same way that a text is created by the way in which it is 
read.”353 It is this interplay between different actors with distinct motives that produces new 
fields of contestation within the dialectic of power and resistance. The capacity to create a 
new practice of power does not preclude the possibility that it cultivates alternative practices, 
as well. In this manner, Bayart goes on to write that, “an apparatus of control or domination 
or a line of dependence are not just what the government or imperialism want them to be, 
they are also what the actors, even if they are subordinate, make of them.”354 That is, the 
exercise of power is colored by the contexts in which it occurs. In the context of imperialism, 
power came to depend on the capacity of certain actors to re-appropriate state institutions.  
Such perspective should inform considerations of elite formation within the colony. 
Although elite formation was part of an effort to create new relations of power that would 
reproduce social stratification in the colony, it generated unintended consequences. In 
keeping with Bayart, “the major role of the government in molding social stratification does 
not, or at least, does not only reveal a cultural resurgence of ancient political forms, [as] it 
cannot be separated from the colonial episode.”355 From this perspective, it can be seen how 
the imperatives of indirect colonial rule gave way to the development of informal practices 
beside the formal institutions of government.  As a result, ‘corruption’ as it is called today, 
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was an organic part of the system of indirect rule,” insists Bayart.356 Such latent networks 
and alliances underpinned colonial rule at the same time that they generated unintended 
consequences that facilitated anti-colonial resistance. For Bayart, the practices that played a 
part in colonial governance included elections, the formation of political parties, the 
bureaucracy, chieftaincy and ideology.357 It can be seen that these different formal practices 
and informal networks not only held the capacity to weaken opposition to colonial rule, but 
also to undermine the policies of the metropole.  
In sum, then, elite formation in the period of colonialism was not a static fait 
accompli, but an evolving and shifting set of practices that expanded the field of contestation 
in the colony. Whereas the metropole envisioned direct and indirect rule as the ornaments of 
the empire, in practice, it created new challenges for colonial regimes to overcome. The 
proliferation of patronage networks, misuse of office and re-appropriation of government 
resources did not always benefit the metropole. As the subject population became more 
polarized between those with access to government resources and those without it, European 
imperialists became increasingly disconnected from the societies it had hoped to control 
through the bureaucracy.  
But before analyzing Lebanon, it is worth exploring the issue of how to examine 
largely latent processes of informal politics that rely upon various degrees and forms of 
silence. For, silence, like control, is never complete. It is always the outcome of practices of 
domination and resistance. As a result, power relations are at work in what is not said as 
much as in what is said. As Michael Taussig contends, silence, or the failure to mention acts 
of coercion, often serves as the missing or underappreciated element in colonial affairs.358 
Building upon the work of Taussig, Timothy Mitchell sees discourse and the often latent 
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nods to coercion within it as a necessary component of the framework that reproduces 
domination. 359 Rather than a complete absence of coercion, the reproduction of domination 
requires some narrative that has the potential to reveal a more complex glimpse of power 
relations. Letters must be read and sent to the archives, warnings issued, and indiscretions 
raised in order to then be suppressed. By imposing silence among its victims and witnesses, 
perpetrators of violence are able to put forth their own alternative version of events. In turn, 
this alternative version of events breaks a strict code of silence, and triggers whispers and 
rumors that contest official accounts. In this manner, Mitchell says, “the disappearance of the 
hidden act of terror gains its force as an absence that is continually made present.”360 In this 
way, the lack of direct evidence of violence becomes essential to understanding power-
relations within marginalized communities.  
In the case of Lebanon, silence served as a testament to this web of informal politics 
within the country. The resort to silence, as will be seen, was imposed to hide the ambiguities 
of domination and limitations of mandate rule, which reverberated during this period of 
unrest and political reform. An examination of municipal administration in Tripoli will reveal 
the contradictions of elite formation and its consequences for the inhabitants of the north. 
Whether manifested as feigned innocence or cowardice, intimidation or neglect, 
marginalization or deceit, silence is key to uncovering the shifting forces of power and 
resistance there.  
THE CLUE IS IN THE LAND 
In North Lebanon, among the costs of weakening the anti-colonial resistance in 
Tripoli were the erosion of French influence and the proliferation of informal arrangements 
and government malfeasance. When combined these two trends incubated disaster for the 
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majority of residents. The high commission became stuck in a series of unfolding crises 
intimated by Mme. Lattouf. The centralization of authority and expansion of the bureaucracy 
gave rise to a number of unforeseen—and unspoken—consequences that the French 
struggled to address. For, the reproduction of power in the annexed territories extended 
beyond the chain of command that the French had dictated. When the mixed results of 
French policy combined with the burgeoning informal arrangements that developed during 
the mandate, trouble began to knock on the gates of the Old City. But rather than answer this 
call, French officials ignored the reality that in transforming power-relations in Lebanon, 
their own authority also changed. To understand this predicament it will be necessary to 
review the formal practices of government, the informal arrangements that underpinned it as 
well as their consequences. Ultimately, this review will reveal that the establishment of the 
bureaucracy and attempt to form a new elite within it empowered informal politics in 
addition to social, political and economic unrest.  
By the late 1940s, Tripoli and its environs remained gripped by the latent hostility 
that de Martel described earlier in the decade. According to reports, as late as March 1939, 
tension had reached a point at which, for the third time in eight days, French soldiers nearly 
attacked residents, prompting inhabitants throughout the north to arm themselves with rifles 
and ammunition in preparation of further conflict in contravention of the ban on firearms.361 
Amid this turmoil, the desire for the attachment of Tripoli to Syria remained as prominent as 
ever. The leaders of the 1936 riots, freed after their arrests, continued to clamor for the area’s 
independence from the state of Lebanon.362 At the same time, the majority remained 
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discontented, even hostile toward the representatives, delegates and agents of the high 
commission. While the city’s population is difficult to surmise given the lack of an official 
census and the unreliability of existing data, different reports suggest that it had steadily 
increased to nearly 80,000 by 1943.363 As mentioned previously, this population comprised a 
predominately Sunni Muslim population and a sizable Christian minority. In general, the 
population within the wider region of North Lebanon would reach an estimated total of 
241,000.364 
Within this landscape, the high commission sought to extend its control in the 
annexed territories in two ways: formal institutions and, informal networks. The formal 
institutions of governance sought to expand control by recruiting members of the population 
into the ranks of the new bureaucracy. In contrast, informal institutions were designed to 
create ties between agents of the high commission and established and emerging elites within 
the colony. At the same time, embedded within the large bureaucracy was a desire to 
construct a social hierarchy that would reproduce French authority across all areas of 
political, social and economic life. In addition to administering the new jurisdictions set up 
by Paris, municipal administration also operated as a political project designed to cultivate 
and to promote individuals loyal to the regime. In practice, the leaders appointed by the 
mandate and the Lebanese government failed to deliver the promise of improved 
administration, undermining the solutions that de Martel and Abboud had mooted earlier. 
Instead, these mechanisms unleashed a series of consequences that, in different ways, curbed 
French control. In these ways, the bureaucracy contributed to the weakening of anti-mandate 
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opposition in addition to eroding the capability of Paris to address the needs of the 
population. The consequences of the proliferation of these informal networks that relied upon 
silence included untold suffering for the majority of residents.  
Formal Policy of Municipal Administration 
The formal laws of municipal administration were born of a political desire to 
encourage limited self-government within Lebanon under the new constitution of 1926, 
discussed further in the next chapter. Prior to the French mandate, the region had recently 
undergone a series of sweeping reforms in municipal administration. The system that the 
French would adapt had been installed during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Ironically, the basis of the new model adopted by the Ottomans was the French system of 
departmental administration. Upon the 1920 decree of statehood, the French sought to further 
centralize these Ottoman reforms. Leading this highly centralized bureaucracy was the 
president of the Lebanese republic, who enjoyed wide discretion on personnel appointments 
and government spending. The vision of the order that the French tried to establish under de 
Martel and his successors was not so much like the maze of small streets that dominated the 
old city of Tripoli, but a highly centralized system that would resemble a series of replicating 
cells extending ad nauseam across the landscape.  
The work of then visiting American University of Beirut scholar Walter Ritsher sheds 
insight into imperial designs. The mandate decreed a system of municipal hierarchy based on 
the French département system designed to concentrate authority within Beirut and overseen 
by French administrators. Prior to the establishment of Arrêté 1208 of March 10, 1922, there 
had existed over 500 towns and villages within the boundaries of the State of Greater 
Lebanon. Yet, the new law governing municipal affairs only recognized 120 of these 
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localities as part of the new system.365 In turn, the French reorganized these recognized 
territories within a five tier hierarchy that included 5 muhafazat, further divided into several 
subdivisions known as sanjak, qada, nahiya and karia. 366 Overseeing these subdivisions 
were the minister of the interior and, by extension, the president, who appointed the officials 
that supervised these areas. In charge of the first two areas was the muhafiz, followed by the 
kaimakam, moudir al-baladiyya and moukhtar, respectively.367 The larger qada, like Tripoli, 
were considered municipalities and functioned with a kaimakam serving as a sort of mayor as 
well as with a municipal council. 368 In addition to serving as a qada, Tripoli was also the 
administrative center for the muhafaza of North Lebanon. The other muhafazat included Mt. 
Lebanon, South Lebanon, the Bekaa and Beirut. Beirut, much like the prefecture of Paris, 
was governed as a separate entity. In this way, the national government controlled and 
supervised these territories by appointing the leaders of each subdivision. In turn, the interior 
minister selected each muhafiz that headed the five muhafazat as well as each kaimakam that 
headed the eighteen aqdya. 369 Ultimately, at the top of this system of municipal 
administration were the agents of the high commission since, according to Article 9.5 of 
Arrêté 1208, the French administrative counselors must approve all affairs within their 
municipality.370 As Ritsher concluded in 1932, “all of these officials exercise a constant and 
vigilant surveillance over the municipalities within their jurisdiction with powers even more 
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extensive than those of the prefects in France, thus brining municipal government well within 
the highly centralized system of national government.”371 
The overall system that Ritsher described envisions a hierarchy centered on Beirut 
and the politicians within the Grand Serail. All municipal affairs required the approval of the 
minister of the interior, who in turn, was appointed by the president of the republic. The 
intended chain of command was straight-forward. Power was supposed to flow from the 
French administrative counselors to the Lebanese president, interior minister, muhafiz, 
kaimakam, municipal council, and then the local branches of the civil service. For instance, 
among the remit of the interior minister were the municipal budget, municipal taxes, tariffs 
and tax revenue collection, special taxes and loans, conditions for the lease or rental of 
municipal property for periods, the acquisition of new property and public works projects, as 
well as price controls for staple commodities like bread, flour, meat, butter, milk, oil, 
vegetables, wood, charcoal and rice.372 This centralized design was then reproduced within 
each locality. For each qada was led by a kaimakam who also served as the president of the 
municipal council. Each kaimakam served a term of one year and was appointed by the 
minister of the interior from the members of the municipal council; and whereas the selection 
of the municipal council varied in each qada, members typically served for a term of four 
years and were renewed as a bloc.373 In these ways, the officials in charge of local 
administration were as beholden to the national bureaucracy as residents were beholden to 
the executives of their particular municipality, district or village. Ultimately, although the 
1926 Constitution established this system of municipal administration, as discussed in the 
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next chapter, in the lead up to the 1932 legislative elections, High Commissioner Auguste 
Henri Ponsot suspended the constitution and thus nullified these decrees in May 1932.374  
During the suspension of the constitution, the executive appointed by the Quai 
d’Orsay, Emile Eddé, assumed even greater authority. In this time, a number of 
municipalities and municipal councils were dissolved and suspended at his behest. In 
exchange for his sweeping powers, Eddé signed the Franco-Lebanese treaty in 1936. The 
treaty, modeled on the Franco-Syrian treaty, would have maintained French control in the 
Levant while making provisions for an ostensible local government. Crucially, however, it 
would have extended the French presence in Lebanon for another 25 years.375 It was such 
terms that instigated the 1936 riots. In the period between the completion of these 
negotiations and the ratification of the treaty, High Commissioner de Martel reinstated the 
suspended Lebanese constitution in January 1937 and a new president was elected, ostensibly 
with the purpose of convincing the national legislature to ratify the treaty.376 This period of 
political uncertainty served as the crucible in which the Tripoli municipality, already 
beleaguered by poor administration, degenerated into the regime of misery and misfortune 
recounted by Mm. Lattouf.  
Despite its consequences, the high commission envisioned municipal administration 
as an effort to create a new relation of power in the colony. The supervision and control of 
the national bureaucracy was intended to create a cadre of small-scale civil servants loyal to 
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within French circles and received the legion d’honneur in 1921. Despite his participation in national politics 
for well over a decade, the possibility of a Muslim candidate ascending to the highest office in 1932 alarmed 
Paris. After he refused to withdraw his candidacy for office, the high commissioner suspended parliament and 
national elections in May 1932. Afterwards, al-Jisr retired from public life. See Saliba, 2016, 125-142. Al-
Atiyah, Najla Wadih. The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis toward the State of Lebanon. PhD Thesis, 
Department of Politics, University of London (SOAS) 1973. 
375 Hourani, Albert. Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay. London: Oxford UP 1946. 200.  
376 Longrigg, 1968, 252.  
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the mandate. The new bureaucratic hierarchy would serve as the blueprint for efforts to 
create a social and political hierarchy dominated by the emerging class of lawyers and 
bankers from Mt. Lebanon like Eddé. Historically and culturally the region closest to France, 
Mt. Lebanon benefited disproportionately from the muhafaza system. Until 1926, for 
instance, residents there hardly paid any taxes as the French kept in place the distinct tax 
codes overseen by the Ottomans.377 In addition to its tax breaks, people from Eddé’s 
constituency in the mountain dominated posts in the civil service. Below this elite, it was 
expected that the leading notables of the annexed territories would fill the middling ranks of 
the bureaucracy. In these ways, the bureaucracy was designed to reinforce political, social 
and economic inequalities. 
Informal Policy of Mandate Administration 
From this point of view, the informal policy of municipal administration within 
French mandate in Lebanon becomes apparent. The establishment of the national 
bureaucracy was part of an effort to win over the leading inhabitants of the city who were 
initially hostile to the French mandate. A report to the high commissioner lays bare these 
ambitions. “For twelve years,” it reads “the Lebanese government has tried to appease the 
people of Tripoli by distributing jobs to the separatist leaders and their clients.”378 The 
underlying policy of municipal affairs involved the same patronage networks responsible for 
the growth of Mt. Lebanon and Beirut at the expense of the annexed territories. In this 
manner, the report goes on to say that, “for political and economic reasons, the Lebanese 
government has treated the annexed territories like conquered territory.”379 Within the system 
of hierarchy and political inequality that emerged from the mandate system, Tripoli and other 
                                              
377 C460 Situation Politique, HCF Notes au sujet de le ville de Tripoli- el Mina, undated probably  1939 . 
378 C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes on the Subject of the City of Tripoli-El Mina, undated, presumably 
1939, Pg 2. As mentioned earlier, this report likely prepares the visit of the high commissioner to Tripoli in 
1939. The twelve-year period mentioned likely references the period since the new constitution in 1926.  
379 ibid.  
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areas of the annexed territories became base concerns. This inequality assumed a spatial 
dimension. As money and influence became concentrated in Beirut, the rest of the country 
was increasingly marginalized from national policy. Once this money was given to the 
protest leaders, it was hoped that they would accept their status as conquered territory and 
leverage their influence to persuade other residents in the annexed territories to do the same. 
Thus, the report adds that, “outside of the money distributed to the separatist leaders, the 
Lebanese government has nothing to do with Tripoli.”380 The result of this policy was 
deliberate and official neglect. Or, in the words of one official describing the actions of Eddé, 
“the Lebanese leaders always pretended to be disinterested in Tripoli: since 1926 the 
presidents have only come to visit the second city of Lebanon twice. For the visit of 
President Eddé, he did not so much as pay a visit to Tripoli has he visited the Maronite 
Patriarch there and all the Christian regions there.”381 Although the high commission enabled 
a series Lebanese interlocutors and middlemen like President Eddé to dominate the 
bureaucracy, these officials, like the French soldiers before them, would have to confront the 
hostilities in the labyrinth of Tripoli.  
  On one level, the shortcomings of this secret policy to buy off the leaders of the 
opposition movement are best evinced when considering the actions of one of the organizers 
of the 1936 general strike, Abd al-Hamid al-Karami.382 Born around 1893 into one of the 
most prominent landowning families further distinguished for its service as qadi and mufti 
officials within the Ottoman Empire, al-Karami would witness and participate in the 
tumultuous transformations that the region brooked in the first half of the twentieth 
                                              
380 ibid. 
381 ibid.  
382 As in many instances, transliteration has proven complicated. Al-Karami was generally known among the 
French as Abdul Hamid Keramé or Kerame. His name has even been printed as  ‘abd al-Hamid Efendi al-
Karami in Reilly James, The Ottoman Cities of Lebanon, London I.B. Tauris, 2016, 120. From this wealth of 
options, I have preferred the more Arabized version and for the sake of consistency, have used this spelling 
within passages that I quote from the French archives.  
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century.383 Still a teenager, he continued his family’s tradition of public service when he 
succeed his father as the mufti of Tripoli in 1912 at the age of 19.384 The coronation of this 
ambitious young man into elite politics appeared complete when he was confirmed in 1918 
as the administrator of Tripoli by the Sharifan regime that had sought to establish a Greater 
Syrian state based in Damascus.385 From, there, however, al-Karami became one of the many 
déclassé who lost their lofty status with the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon. 
Even though al-Karami had retained his office in the initial months following the French 
occupation, he was then dismissed for his pro-Sharifan and anti-French political activities. 
By May 1919, a young al-Karami irritated the French when he organized a demonstration 
calling for an English mandate of the Levant during the passage of the King-Crane 
commission in the city.386 Angered that a seemingly ungrateful civil servant sought to 
sabotage the position of France, the high commission dismissed the former mufti from the 
post that he had occupied since he was a teenager. Since then, in the words of one unnamed 
official, “he has devoted a bitter hatred toward the French mandate and the state of Lebanon, 
provoking troubles in Tripoli.”387 
This bitter hatred blazed even as al-Karami came into contact with the regime. Like 
many individuals and families, al-Karami ran into financial troubles during the early years of 
the mandate and, with the fall of agriculture, he teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. Yet, 
unlike the majority, he received political and economic support from the mandate authorities. 
                                              
383 C460 DHCF No. 603 3 March 1939 au sujet de la fermeture des souks a Tripoli, copy of letter of conseiller 
administrative du Liban nord (du Paty de Clam) Report on Abd al-Hamid Karami. 1. The family’s status as 
latifundia is mentioned in Gulick, John. Tripoli: A Modern Arab City. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1967, 34. 
384C460 DHCF No. 603 3 March 1939 au sujet de la fermeture des souks a Tripoli, copy of letter of conseiller 
administrative du Liban nord (du Paty de Clam) Report on Abd al-Hamid Karami. In contrast, Saliba lists his 
age as 17 at the time (Saliba, 2016, 47). Although his exact birthday is unclear, the overall impression is that 
Abd al-Hamid was still a teenager when he assumed public office.   
385 C460 DHCF No. 603 3 March 1939 au sujet de la fermeture des souks à Tripoli, lettre du conseiller 
administrative du Liban nord (du Paty de Clam) Report on Abd al-Hamid Karami.  
386 C460 source, conseiller administrative de Tripoli information. du Paty de Clam 
387 C460 DHCF No. 603 3 March 1939 au sujet de la fermeture des souks a Tripoli, lettre du of conseiller 
administrative du Liban nord (du Paty de Clam) Report on Abd al-Hamid Karami. 1. 
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After his 1924 arrest for financing the rebellion in Jabal Druze in Syria, he was released, and 
quickly joined the ranks of the Great Arab revolt to take up arms against Paris.388 By 1931, 
French officials would note that, “when his creditors were going to seize his assets, the high 
commissioner [at the time Ponsot], intervened before the French banks to save him from 
bankruptcy in the hope of winning over al-Karami. In return, the former mufti thanked him 
by organizing with his brothers a riot that left one dead and 20 injured.”389 Years later, the 
same pattern would repeat itself whereby the olive branches of the regime were met with 
firearms and cannon balls. As will be discussed later, when the former mufti confronted legal 
troubles, the mandate intervened to help him escape the gallows. For their reward, al-Karami 
returned to public life in 1936 to help radicalize the 1936 general strike, which left 5 people 
dead and another 90 injured. Even then, once arrested, he was freed through an injunction 
from the Syrian government.390 The continued overtures to al-Karami attested to another 
political phenomena that the mandate struggled to address. Namely, many of the leading 
families of Tripoli and the north, in general, wanted nothing to do with the mandate regime 
and refused to cooperate with the bureaucracy since, according to the administrative 
counselor,  “the elders of the principal families consider it beneath their dignity to be a party 
to a simple municipal council.”391 In effect, the French administration failed to win over the 
power brokers within the city and the expansion of the bureaucracy only animated opposition 
to the mandate.  
In sum, the formal and informal policies with regard to the municipal administration 
of the annexed territories exacerbated the grievances and hostilities in the region. The French 
                                              
388 Rougier, Bernard. The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: North Lebanon from Al-Qaeda to ISIS, Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2015, 2.  
389 C460 DHCF Conseiller administrative de Tripoli information (presumably 1939) Written by du Paty de 
Clam. I believe that what animated the count’s frustration is that fact that for years, the informal policy of the 
high commission legally and financially supported al-Karami even as he continued his public resistance against 
the mandate.  
390 ibid. 
391 C460 Note sur les municipalities de Tripoli- el-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939. 1.  
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decreed that power was concentrated in the hands of a select few. The overtures to the 
majority of the population comprised either outright neglect or cash—supplied by the French 
or taken from the taxpayers—to a select few of the political opposition.  As we will see, this 
capacity to re-appropriate discretionary spending would have a dangerous and deadly effect 
in the region already teeming with latent hostility. But for now, it can be tentatively 
concluded that the overall mandate policies with regard to the annexed territories was 
unsuccessful in abating tensions. Not only were separatist leaders like al-Karami and his 
colleague Dr. Abd al-Latif Bissar intent on ignoring these overtures from the regime to 
advance their activism, their campaigns discouraged other residents from rallying around the 
mandate.392 For, as one administrator writes, “the separatist leaders have not been worried, 
they even organize attacks against the French troops with the people of Tripoli concluding 
then that the Lebanese government and French authorities are afraid of them, further stoking 
their demands.”393 Unable to rally any kind of support among the political elites or majority, 
the French mandate had reached an impasse. It was in this violent context that the 1936 riot 
was born.  
The Effects of Formal and Informal Mandate Policy 
The defiance of al-Karami was but one sign that mandate policy had worked better in 
theory than in practice. Not only did municipal administration fail to absorb dissident ranks 
within the dominant class that controlled the bureaucracy, it failed to establish the central 
chain of command from the most remote village to the high commission. Instead of 
achieving these overt and covert goals, municipal affairs cultivated a series of unintended 
consequences. The fallout from municipal administration can be thought of as four unspoken 
phenomena, that, when combined, generated a series of crises that menaced the inhabitants of 
                                              
392 C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes au sujet de le ville de Tripoli- el Mina, undated, presumably 1939, 
Pg 2 
393 ibid. The translation of this sentence is complicated. I have translated the French word attentats as attacks, 
although it also signifies shootings. It’s safe to say that both were present.  
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North Lebanon in the 1930s and 1940s. Tracing these developments as they were chronicled 
in reports to de Martel’s successor, M. Gabriel Puaux, will reveal the unforeseen mingled 
burdens that comprised what French officials described as La Situation à Tripoli. The 
situation comprised effects of both the formal policies of the mandate as well as its informal 
policies. Rather than present them separately, they are presented here so as to reflect the co-
mingled intricacies of municipal administration and colonial rule. The first crisis that resulted 
from municipal administration was a public health outbreak that the administration was 
unable to redress. The second crisis involved what one administrator described as the plague 
of over-centralization through which bureaucrats and politicians were able to expand their 
personal rule at the expense of the increasingly impoverished and insecure majority. The 
third crisis concerned the emergence of petty politics of personal vendettas, rivalries and 
competition to secure access to government privilege. The fourth facet of this crisis involved 
the criminal enterprise that the French high commission directly and indirectly bankrolled. 
Together, these trends reflect the reproduction of patronage networks through the 
government and disclose the unspoken legacy of colonialism whereby modern institutions of 
governance relied upon supposedly traditional practices as well as various forms of collusion 
and informal arrangements. As a result, the growth of the colonial bureaucracy did not 
strengthen the metropole, but limited its capacity to effectively rule the colony and influence 
the subjects within it. That is to say, the processes of elite formation did not bolster the 
colonial regime’s control over the colonial space as much as it generated new and unintended 
consequences that further marginalized the high commission from the population. 
1. Public Health  
The first sign of turmoil arrived in the form of the unspoken health crisis that the high 
commission struggled to address. Although the eradication of infections diseases after the 
Great War had been trumpeted as one of the main accomplishments of the French mandate in 
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various publications,394 residents of the muhafaza told a different story in their petitions to 
the high commission. On the one hand, the French claimed to have drastically reduced the 
spread of infectious diseases by improving upon the city’s infrastructure that had festered 
under the Ottomans.395 Following Lebanese historian and Tripoli resident Farouk Hoblus, the 
Ottomans had neglected to upgrade the city’s crumbling infrastructure beyond payments to 
security personnel because, in his words, “the Ottoman’s mission in the province was to 
collect its wealth and carry off as much of it as possible to Istanbul.”396 The chronic lack of 
investment devastated the population and forced families to fend for themselves, leaving 
them increasingly vulnerable to the effects of poor sanitation.397 On the eve of WWI, the city 
and its environs suffered from an archaic water delivery system that contributed to the spread 
                                              
394 C737 Rapport a la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban (1929). Also see La Syrie et Le 
Liban sous L’occupation et Le Mandat Français, 1919-1927. Nancy: Berger-Levrault; Weulersse, Jacques. 
Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient, Paris: Gallimard, 1946.  
395 The main improvement in water delivery the occurred during the French mandate was the 1935 installation 
of a piped water delivery system in parts of Tripoli discussed at length in Saliba, 2016, 207-210, and to a lesser 
extent in Gulick, John, Tripoli: A Modern Arab City, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1967, 33. Despite the purported 
success described in these two works, I have a more troubling impression of the water crisis not only in Tripoli, 
but in North Lebanon, in general. The description at the end of this chapter of near epidemic levels of water-
born diseases like Typhus and malaria in 1940, five years after the installation of pipes in Tripoli, should qualify 
our understanding of the predicament at hand. Even more harrowing is the suggestion below from the muhafiz 
of North Lebanon in 1960 that contaminated water systems still posed a threat to residents of the north. 
Therefore, I believe that the water crisis only ended during the 1960s during the period of administrative reform 
discussed in the last chapter. In particular, the geography of the north vulnerable to water-borne diseases as 
numerous rivers and waterways passed through the region toward the Mediterranean. For instance, four rivers 
passed through Akkar alone. Abu-Izzeddin, Dr. Halim Said, ed. “The North.” 5 December 1960.  Minister of 
Municipal Affairs Lecture. Lebanon and its Provinces. Khayat, Beirut, 1963, 39.  
396 Hoblus, Farouk. “Public Service and Tax Revenues in Ottoman Tripoli, 1516-1918. Syria and Bilad Al-Sham 
under Ottoman Rule. Eds. Peter Sluglett and Stephan Weber. Lieden: Brill, 2010, 134.  In the same essay, he 
goes on to explore the origins of the water crisis, saying that, “The watercourse between the Rash‘in and the 
city had been constructed during the Crusades and until 1917, water was brought into the city through exposed 
waterwheels and distributed to the various city quarters through cracked earthenware pipes that let in raw 
sewage in several places. It was delivered to the higher parts of the city through a special system which had to 
be repaired and maintained by the residents themselves.” (Hoblus, 2010,133) He estimates that, due to spread of 
this contaminated water, thousands in the region died. Even after the Tanzimat reforms, there was only a small 
increase in the budget allocated to Tripoli, the bulk of which went to the salaries of officials whose number 
increased in the dying days of the empire to maintain security. (Hoblus, 2010, 127). Beyond these payments, the 
Ottomans build the Serail in the Tall area in 1890 and in 1902 constructed the clock tower there, soon followed 
by a post office, school and municipal building. (Hoblus, 2010, 129). 
397 Hoblus, 2010, 129, 132. As an example on this chronic underinvestment, Hoblus adds that, until 1908 there 
were only two government doctors in Tripoli and el-Mina. (Hoblus, 2010, 133.) 
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of diseases like typhoid, typhus and malaria.398 As recounted in the dissertation of Lebanese 
historian and native son of Tripoli Nada Saliba, the main water supply into the city came 
from the Rash‘in River about 7km from Tripoli and passed through aqueducts and water 
pipes built during the crusades; overtime these pipes became broken, corroded and infected 
with microbes and other organisms.399 When city officials established a commission to 
investigate the water supply in 1922, it reported finding 60 dead pigs floating in the river, 
apparently for days; subsequent tests confirmed that E.coli, the main bacteria responsible for 
the spread of Typhus, germinated in the river.400 In documenting the harrowing crisis faced 
by residents during the late Ottoman period, Hoblus adds that, the “city’s drinking water 
supply was always polluted and this was the main reason for the poor state of public health 
and the spread of diseases and epidemics in the region, which took the lives of thousands of 
people.”401 
Among French circles, however, the cause of the spread of infectious disease had less 
to do with the finer details of public infrastructure that had been overlooked for decades if 
not centuries and more to do with the rather lax attitude of inhabitants toward their own 
health and wellbeing. According to annual report to the League of Nations for the year 1929, 
French officials lamented that, “hygiene services often come up against the ignorance or 
indifference of the population, and even of the municipalities and in other cases due to 
bureaucratic constraints (les rouages administratives). It is, for example, regrettable that 
cities like Tripoli, Saida, Baalbek are still using dirty water, while they are next to areas with 
                                              
398 According to the report of Tamimi and Bahjat, the most common infectious diseases in Tripoli were cholera, 
malaria (with around 15-20 daily deaths) and dysentery (with about 252 deaths a year). The two officials 
considered the main causes of infection to be the puddles of water that accumulated in the olive and citrus 
groves surrounding the city as well as the uncovered pipes that mixed with dirty water at the aqueducts of the 
citadel. Tamimi and Bahjat, Wilayet Syria, 1914 as cited in Saliba, 2016, 209. 
399 Saliba, 2016, 209.  
400 Al-Hawadith, As cited in Saliba, 2016, 209. By September 1922, laboratory tests confirmed that E.Coli, the 
bacteria responsible for spreading typhoid, was found in the River. At that time, there were 28 reported cases of 
the disease in the city. Saliba, 2016, 209. 
401 Hoblus, 2010, 133.  
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excellent water supplies,” the report insists.402 Due to these administrative constraints, the 
spread of infectious disease derived from the sick body politic rather than from Mother 
Nature or the agents of the mandate administration. Similar to land reform in the countryside, 
mandate officials saw the Ottoman Levant as an extension of the sick man of Europe. In this 
context, the ignorance of the population and bureaucratic gridlock were the main culprits of 
this blight. To cure it, the French administration resolved to introduce a new bureaucratic 
regiment to oversee affairs in the annexed territories.  
By 1935, some officials were certain that the flow of disease had largely stopped.403 
New investments in water delivery systems were built to curb the rot and there emerged the 
construction of new hospitals designed to treat residents, as well as the agents of the military 
police in the north. Despite these claims of success, the predicament facing residents was 
more complex. By 1939, word had reached the high commission that despite the build up of 
the bureaucracy, the flow of infection and poor sanitation remained unabated in the most 
remote areas of the country.404 The health crisis was a difficult issue for the government to 
                                              
402 C737 Rapport a la S.D.N. sur la Situation de La Syrie et du Liban (1929).  
403 In his 1931 publication, French writer Raymond O’Zoux contended that the French were successful in 
eradicating infectious diseases by 1931. See his study Les Etats du Levant sous Mandat Français. Paris: Laros, 
1931. Yet, the statistics he cites tell a different story. For instance, for the year 1927 he reported the following 
number of cases in the Levant: Typhoid (320) typhus (4) measles (499) and dysentery (181). (O’Zoux, 1931, 
204.) Despite the persistence of these diseases, the author asserts that, “with the exception of smallpox, which 
followed, in 1927-1928, tranchoma, an endemic disease in the French-mandated states, and malaria, which 
moreover disappeared, the health status of the Levant is satisfactory. If we take into account the total absence of 
hygiene among the inhabitants of the countryside and the Bedouins, and the delays in the declaration of 
contagious diseases by carelessness or fear, we can be sure that the public health of the Levant will be Excellent 
in a few years.” (O’Zoux, 1931, 204.)  In this regard, O’Zoux reifies the same narrative that the improvements 
in health occurred despite the ignorance and apathy of the population to their own living conditions. Despite his 
positive outlook, the numerous exceptions and qualifications that the author makes reveals the extent of the 
crisis. Considering that the Levant was a primarily agricultural region, the crisis in the countryside would have 
threatened the majority of the residents there. Given the descriptions of conditions in 1940, the author’s 
predictions appear overly-optimistic.   
404 C460 23 January 1939 DHCF au sujet des revendications des notables musulmanes de Liban.  The summary 
of residents’ complaints warns that, even before fighting commenced in the Eastern Mediterranean, “typhoid 
and malaria were rampant to nearly endemic levels in the most remote corners of the country.” In contrast to my 
grim depiction of public health in North Lebanon during the mandate, Saliba offers a different account in her 
dissertation, which focuses entirely on the regional capital. Her work emphasizes the campaign of Tripoli 
residents to replace the ceramic water pipes at the Saint Gilles citadel with a metal pipe network throughout the 
city (Saliba, 2016, 218) and the proliferation of health offices in the private homes of doctors and nurses 
throughout the 1950s. (Saliba, 2016, 253) The progressive atmosphere with which she characterizes Tripoli is 
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address as it involved dealing with a bureaucracy that was no longer beholden to the chain of 
command that the Quai d’Orsay had envisioned. Even French travel literature admonished its 
readers to get the proper vaccines before traveling to the Levant due to the high rate of 
infectious diseases there.405 In ways that will be seen, the toxic atmosphere in Tripoli owed 
as much to the antiquated water and irrigation systems as it did to the poor management of 
resources endemic within the mandate regime.   
2. Over-Centralization  
The principal effect of the bureaucracy imposed during the French mandate was the 
plague of over-centralization. While the constitution created a centralized apparatus modeled 
on the French département system, top officials misused, abused and overstepped their duties 
to extend their personal privileges and enrich their constituencies in Mt. Lebanon and Beirut.  
Among the chief beneficiaries of this system was the president of the republic. Already 
empowered by the formal directives of the constitution and the imposition of martial law, the 
president enjoyed discretionary powers over national and municipal budgets. At the other end 
of this system were the majority of families who lived and worked under the thumb of these 
new power brokers in the underdeveloped corners of the annexed territories. As a result, even 
though residents in the annexed territories bore the brunt of taxes as described in chapters 
two and three, Beirut and Mt. Lebanon were enriched at the expense of the annexed 
territories. The concentration of power in Beirut robbed local jurisdictions of authority to 
decide their own municipal affairs. As Ritsher chronicles, between 1922 and 1930, nearly 98 
municipal councils were dissolved and of these, 67 were dissolved for no cited cause.406 
Furthermore, during this time period, an additional 41 municipalities suppressed by the 
                                                                                                                                              
best summed up when she writes that by the 1930s, “Tripoli was morphing into a city of pleasure-seekers, of 
socialites and theatre lovers, of writers and authors, of coffee shop habitués.” (Saliba, 2016, 277) 
405 Jacquot, Paul, Lt. Colonel. L’état des Alaouites: Guide (Gouvernement de Lattaquie. 14 May 1930), Beirut: 
Imperie Catholique, 1931, 58. Among the diseases that the Lt. Colonel Jacquot mention are dengue fever, 
malaria, chicken pox and typhoid.  
406 C451 Ritscher, 1932, 37-39.  
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government, 10 due to budgetary concerns and the remaining 31 for no reason at all.407 In 
addition, such discrepancies are further documented in the 1930 national budget. In contrast 
to the 925,000 LS Pounds allocated to the capital, Tripoli received a mere 131,301 LS 
Pounds and el-Mina 63,710 LS Pounds.408 In comparison to Tripoli, spending in other 
administrative capitals was even more Spartan, as both Sidon and Zahleh had a total 
allocation of 20,000 LS Pounds, and Baalbek 11,5000 LS Pounds, respectively.409 If such 
authority were not enough, then it should be noted that after the high commissioner 
suspended the constitution and instituted a state of emergency in May 1932, the president 
received even more control with Legislative Decree 32 K of September 1932, which 
amended Arrêté 1208 so that the president could directly nominate municipal council 
members or present lists of suitable candidates to certain functions and posts.410 It was in this 
context of presidential decree that Tripoli held only one local election for its municipal 
council in the twenty-five years of the French mandate.411 
This pattern of abuse and intervention extended from the national government to the 
local government. Its local effects are laid bare in a 1939 report from the administrative 
counselor of North Lebanon, the witness and arguably instigator of the 1936 riots, Le Comte 
Charles Mercier du Paty de Clam. A noteworthy figure who we will meet again in the next 
chapter, the count came from the same conservative military background as Gouraud in Saint 
Cyr before earning distinction in World War I, and then served for nearly twenty years in the 
Levant in the high commission, during which he received a special mention from one of the 
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411 Karam, Jihad. Central-Local Government Relations in Lebanon as Reflected through a Case Study of the 
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earliest historians of the mandate in Stephen Longrigg, not to mention from Mme. Lattouf, 
who championed him as a representative of “the true visage of France: the nobility of 
sentiment, the righteousness of character and finally, and aid to the interest of those who are 
oppressed.”412  In his 1939 report, “Les Notes sur les municipalités de Tripoli- El-Mina,” one 
of the few texts describing political life in Tripoli and almost unique in having a signature, 
the administrator chronicles the extensive intervention and overreach of the national and 
local governments in the aftermath of the 1936 riots. In addition to this text, several 
anonymous materials further disclose the pressures brought to bear on the population.  
Several parts of the crisis stemmed from French initiatives that marginalized the 
population. As mentioned by the count, Tripoli was divided into two qada municipalities, 
one for the harbor around El Mina and the other for Tripoli proper, which included the Old 
City.413 Despite its history as the seat of an Ottoman court, sanjak  and vilayet, Tripoli now 
comprised two separate municipalities, the administrator explains that, “this division is 
necessary from a political point of view. It does not present serious inconveniences; from an 
administrative point of view, the two municipalities always agree on all important affairs.”414 
Such political perspectives animated several facets of daily life. For instance, their effects 
became manifest in the local municipal councils. While El-Mina was led by a municipal 
counselor, himself appointed by presidential decree, Tripoli was headed by a kaimakam who 
was supposed to be elected by a list of candidates approved by the interior ministry. Despite 
this procedure, du Paty de Clam explains that, in practice, election of the kaimakam has been 
suspended in preference for a direct appointment and while this arrangement was only 
                                              
412 C460 DHCF Secrétaire Générale, 9 February 1939 No. 2291, Lattouf letter to MAE  
ambassador M. Puaux de HC, 2.   An agent of the British mandate who we will meet later in chapter five, 
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a few of the many scores of names remembered with credit, often with affection, in the territory.” In one of his 
footnotes. Longrigg, Stephen. Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate. Beirut: Libraire du Liban. 1968. 
260, Footnote 1.  
413 C460 Notes Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina, du Paty, 31 March 1939.1.  
414 ibid. 
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supposed to be a temporary situation, he lamented that it was “one that has prolonged for 13 
years.”415 In these ways, residents had very little say in the direction of municipal affairs 
controlled by Beirut. Another anonymous report sums up the situation in the north when it 
asserts that, “the people of Tripoli are plagued by the excessive centralization of the 
Lebanese government that does not allow any means of actions to the municipalities.”416  
Furthermore, the recruitment into the civil service was just as cumbersome as the 
appointment of the municipal council members. Given the hostility of the residents to the 
regime and the discretion of the president to select appointees, most of the individuals that 
held posts in Tripoli came from outside of the region. As the administrator describes, “even 
the most minimal affairs are handled in Beirut by incompetent civil servants, who for the 
most part never come to Tripoli [and] ignore all of the needs of the population.”417 These 
supposed individuals who ignored the needs of the population were able to retain their 
positions as they were beholden to the president instead of the popular vote. Furthermore, 
adding a sectarian color to this hierarchy the majority of posts in the civil administration 
were filled by members from the same Christian community as the president.418 In 
accordance with the list of popular grievances expressed by Abboud and the organizers of the 
1936 strike in the last chapter, among residents of the annexed territories, the national 
government was seen as a means to tax the population without offering it substantive 
                                              
415 ibid.  
416C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes on the Subject of the City of Tripoli-El Mina, undated, presumably 
1939, 3. Excessive centralization would continue to reign not just in Tripoli, but in the country as a whole 
following independence from France. This pattern would appear in starker relief in books written during the 
1960s and 1970s. See Karam, Jihad; 1961; Saab, Taan Bahij, The Office of the Muhafez,  MA Thesis: 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1964; 
Bashir, Iskander. Civil Service Reform in Lebanon, Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1977; 
Culbertson, Robert. Program of Public Administration Reform in Lebanon, 1954. Gilsenan, Michael. Lords of 
the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996; Hudson, 
Michael. The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon. Boulder, Westview Press, 1985. Iskandar, 
Adnan. Bureaucracy in Lebanon, Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1964; Grassmuck, George and 
Salibi, Kamal, A Manuel of Lebanese Administration, Beirut: Catholic Press, 1955; Abu-Izzeddin, Dr. Halim 
Said, ed.. Lebanon and its Provinces. Khayat, Beirut, 1963.  
417 C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes on the Subject of the City of Tripoli-El Mina, undated, presumably 
1939, 3. 
418 C460 Situation Politique, HCF Notes au sujet de le ville de Tripoli- el Mina, undated probably  1939 . 
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representation in the national government and bureaucracy. Given the indifference of the 
leading families to the more menial government posts offered to them, it was little surprise, 
then, that the highest ranking agent of the national government in the region was little liked 
and respected. In the words of du Paty de Clam, “the civil servants sent by the government to 
North Lebanon are in general, chosen among the least intelligent and least honest: the current 
muhafiz is a former forester, who, in the course of his studies, never passed the third grade 
and is a dreadful idiot.”419 In this manner, civil service recruitment was seen to not only have 
excluded the majority from local government, but to have elevated those among the least 
qualified and ill-equipped within the colony.  
  In turn, this level of complete inadequacy extended to the heads of the local 
government in Tripoli and El-Mina. With regards to the president of the municipal council of 
el-Mina, Khaireddine Abd al-Wahab, the administrator describes this political appointee as 
the largest ship owner of El-Mina and owner of the most prominent docklands and piloting 
company.420 As one of the one of the few residents of Tripoli-El-Mina to collaborate with the 
mandate administration during WWI, Abd al-Wahhab appeared as “flexible from a political 
point of view, but,” the count decries, he “possesses a detrimental tendency to consider the 
municipality as an extension of his commercial enterprise.”421 In effect, Abd al-Wahab used 
his office to bolster the patterns of behavior that he had employed prior to the mandate, 
effectively leveraging public office to shield his indiscretions. For, once in power, he was 
able to expand his family fortune after he won a lucrative contract for his company to 
exclusively unload equipment from the pipeline of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in El-
                                              
419 C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes on the Subject of the City of Tripoli-El Mina, undated, presumably 
1939, 3. The figure in question was Husain al-Ahdab, who replaced al-Karami as mufti following his ouster 
from office. Saliba, 2016, 120.  
420 C460 Notes sur les chefs des services municiPuaux de Tripoli, 31 March 39. 1.  
421 ibid.  The internet claims that Abd al-Wahab enjoyed a long political career during and after the mandate, to 
the point that he would be able to purchase and build his own island off of the coast of Tripoli. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kheireddine_Abdul_Wahab. 
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Mina.422 Even worse than his detrimental corporate tendencies, it also transpired that, 
according to the count, he was heavily involved in the smuggling of tobacco, drugs and 
firearms.423 Later, it will be seen that in such illegal enterprise and racketeering, Abd al-
Wahab would have illustrious company.  
Yet, beneath the muhafiz and kaimakam, the same patterns of conflicts of interests, 
government over-reach and inadequate service penetrated the municipal councils in Tripoli 
and El-Mina. As mentioned previously, since the most prominent families dismissed service 
on the municipal council as beneath their lofty statuses, the members of the council came 
from the notable families of a second order, and as a result, explains du Paty de Clam, they 
are “for the most part individuals without influence, without instruction, whose sole 
preoccupation is to pull from the mandate the maximum profit for themselves, their friends, 
their clients and their protectors.” 424 Effectively deprived of any formal powers due to the 
concentration of authority in the hands of the president and interior minister, civil servants 
then devoted themselves to personal enrichment, nepotism and the cultivation of patron-
client networks. These unconcerned individuals were not beholden to the population, but 
relied upon the officials within the government who had appointed them. Such affairs were 
so rotten that du Paty de Clam laments that even election of the municipal councils would fail 
to make a real difference since all decisions were made at the cabinet level. In this manner, 
he adds that, “all decisions of the municipalities must be ratified, not by the local 
representative of the government who is the muhafiz, but by the minister of the interior 
himself. This leads to a complete bottleneck, the simplest affairs do not receive a solution 
                                              
422 Saliba, 2016, 180-181.  
423 C460 Notes sur les chefs des services municipuaux de Tripoli, 31 March 39. 1. According to Richard Pearse, 
who we will meet later, the climate of racketeering continued to exist upon his arrival in 1945, years after the 
1939 publication of the notes of du Paty de Clam. He writes that “meat and fish brought fortunes to gangs of 
racketeers, who sent out bands of thugs to beat up dealers, merchants, shepherds and fisherman who tried to 
undercut the high prices that they imposed.” Pearse, Richard, Three Years in the Levant, London, Macmillan 
and Company, 1949,161. 
424 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939. 1.  
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until after some delay, generally one of several weeks if not of several months.”425 As a result 
of this bottleneck around the executive office, local municipalities were at the mercy of the 
cabinet and civil servants were deprived of any real decision-making authority. In effect, all 
politics became national to the smallest degree.  
Civil Service Recruitment 
Even without the constant intervention of the national government, the local 
municipal councils were deadlocked by internal rivalries among council members. In this 
manner, the administrator bemoans that, “the members of the government get in each others 
way too often to impose their decisions on the municipality, unless it is about finding work 
for their parents or friends. When it is not possible to find a job for a protégé in the civil 
service, they oblige a municipality to create a job for him.”426 Since government interference 
restricted delegates and council members from running the affairs of the city, these officials 
sought to expand their remit by creating jobs for relatives and friends. In this way, the 
municipal system directly contributed to the proliferation of patronage networks at the 
expense of the poor and needy. As du Paty de Clam recounts, the posts created included the 
following:   
                                              
425 ibid. Du Paty de Clam went on to write that, Not only does the government nominate the municipal councils, 
but they do not allow these councils any real power and constantly intervene into the smallest details of local 
administration.” In a similar fashion, Adnan Iskandar contemplates the colonial legacy of centralization in 
Lebanon when he describes over-concentration as a colonial tactic that successive regimes kept in place to 
pursue their own interests. (Iskaner, Adnan, Bureaucracy in Lebanon, Beirut: American University of Beirut 
Press, 55) “Until very recently,” he goes on to say, “the muhafiz did not have enough power to grant a hunting 
license for citizens in his muhafaza.” (Iskandar, 1964, 58.) Thus, Iskandar employs the same language as the 
administrator, decrying the bottleneck that prohibits actions on the most routine and simple affairs. In another 
example, he adds that, “decision-making authority is usually concentrated at the top of the administrative 
hierarchy, thus causing a regrettable delay in the transaction of official business. Simple and routine decisions, 
which should normally be made at the low levels in the administration, require the review and approval of the 
minister, and some of them have to be resolved by the cabinet.” (Iskandar, 1964, 21-22) 
426 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939. 1.  A similar 
complaint about the municipal councils is found in a 1961 speech by the muhafiz of South Lebanon, Ghalib el-
Turk, in el-Turk, Ghalib, “The South.” 15 January 1961, Minister of Municipal Affairs Lecture. Lebanon and its 
Provinces. Ed. Abu-Izzeddin, Dr. Halim Said. Khayat, Beirut, 1963, 65. As he says, “municipal elections 
always produce partisan councils…acting from the beginning of their term, [they operate] in defiance of public 
interest and constructive work, and bickering with adversaries or combating their provocations and intrigues. 
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The post of archivist for the Tripoli municipality to the cousin of M. Ahdab, 
municipal president for 12,700 francs per year; a post of fire captain created in favor 
of the cousin of [former] prime minister M. Yafi…even though there are no fire 
fighters in Tripoli; the incumbent in this post, a former moukhtar dismissed for 
embezzlement [receives a salary of] 11,280 francs per year; the post of inspector of 
hygiene for 13,700 francs per year (a job paid for by the national budget but which 
ought to be shortly under the remit of the municipality) has just been created for the 
son-in-law of the deputy [member of parliament] Daher, who is nearly incompetent 
and knows absolutely nothing about hygiene and  who was just dismissed on grounds 
of incapacity from his position in the merchant marine service.427  
 
A supposed fire chief for a city without firefighters, a muhafiz promoted from the forest 
service, and a likely illiterate director of public health unfit for the merchant marines were 
among the individuals not only shielded from public scrutiny, but elevated socially, 
economically and politically within this system of excessive centralization. Amid such claims 
of malfeasance, the French were unable to make inroads among the population.  
Further galling was the culture of re-appropriating funds as deputies intervened into 
the national and municipal budgets. In this manner, du Paty de Clam reported that with 
regards to subsidies and grants that were not specifically enumerated in the national budget, 
the government, “then “suggests” to take them [the funds] from the municipalities under 
diverse pretexts.”428 Such informal suggestions enabled deputies to expand their power 
beyond the formal laws of the constitution. It was through such suggestion that, according to 
the counselor, “a ‘severance payment’ of 12,000 francs has just been allocated to an 
individual who left the service of the city of Tripoli 23 years ago.”429 In this manner, the 
                                              
427 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939. 3.  
428 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939, 3. Furthermore, in 
his study of Tripoli researched in the 1960s, John Gulick observes that similar complaints of over-
centralizations dominated the press; and that nepotism and bribery common. Gulick, 1967, 70-71. In this 
manner he writes that “the government is aloof, not subject to ordinary citizens’ influence, and is corrup ted by 
the bribes, nepotism and pressures of other groups or individuals who are trying to better themselves in or by 
means of it” (Gulick, 1967, 71). 
429 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939, 3. Empahsis in the 
original. Moreover, in his 1977 work, Iskander Bashir describes the degree to which patronage and profit had 
animated every rank within the civil service. (Bashir, Iskander. Civil Service Reform in Lebanon, Beirut: 
American University of Beirut Press, 1977. ) Following Bashir, the civil service inaugurated a culture of 
corruption, bribes and kickbacks within all grades of the bureaucracy. (Bashir, 1977,119)  He then adds that, 
“the profit motive is exemplified by the public comments of a former President o f the Republic, who was 
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sweeping powers granted to the president created an atmosphere of greed and political 
interference at every level of government. While the bureaucracy failed to achieve the goal of 
reproducing a uniform social hierarchy among the inhabitants of the region, it cultivated a 
culture of patronage and embezzlement at every level of government.  
The administrative counselor concludes his summary of personnel recruitment with 
another anecdote about the abuse that had taken place within Tripoli. Like the members of 
parliament who misappropriated funds with their mere “suggestions,” local employees 
sought to impose their own ideas on the system. Thus he reports that, 
One finds among the civil servants of the municipalities a certain number of persons 
of a doubtful morality: lately two municipal agents were dismissed for attempted 
robbery of the municipal coffers; and it was not at great effort that I was able to 
obtain this knowledge…a few months ago there was the termination of a supervisor 
who was the object of 20 indictments for bearing firearms, shootings, injuries and 
pederasty.430  
                                                                                                                                              
relating a story about congratulating a lady because her son was appointed to a civil service post. He said that 
her immediate response concerned not how much his salary would be but how much he would be able to make 
on the side. In addition, one often hears in private gatherings Lebanese citizens comment on certain honest 
officials, by saying ‘they are fools for not taking advantage of their public posts.’” ( Bashir, 1977, 12) 
430 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939, 3. Similar to the 
descriptions cited by du Paty de Clam, then ex-prime minister Sami al-Solh would indict the post-independence 
regime for their extreme interference within the local municipalities in his 1960 memoirs. al-Solh, Sami. 
Mudhakirrat. Beirut: 1960, 320. As mentioned in Kerr, Malcolm, “Political Decision-Making in a Confessional 
Democracy,” Politics in Lebanon, Ed. Leonard Binder, New York: Wiley, 1966, 204. According to al-Solh, 
each and every president under whom he served relied not upon his prime minister but on an unofficial ‘sultan’ 
who advised the president. “Every sultan had an entourage and a group of followers, relatives, in -laws, in-laws 
of in-laws, associates, middle men and hanger-on from every faction and class and every village and quarter. 
Whichever of us should come to power, to the crematorium of cabinet office, found himself obliged to pay 
homage to these sultans and their followers and the followers of the followers. It is they who govern and who 
direct, plan and execute policies, while we are only the instruments, which they set up before the eyes of the 
public to bear responsibility for their errors and misdeeds.” ( al-Solh, Sami, 1960, 216-217 as cited in Kerr, 
1966, 205) Beyond sour grapes of someone removed from office, the prime minister’s account reflects the 
degree to which informal politics proliferated after independence. The expansion of patronage within the 
bureaucracy, then, can be considered as part legacy of the French mandate.  
 
Within the patronage circles that al-Solh was forced to enter, he recounts one particular anecdote reminiscent of 
that of du Paty de Clam when he writes that, “it is well-known how quickly the balance of government—any 
government, can be lost. Most of the time it is some childish dispute that leads to a cabinet crisis. Thus[ in 
1952] there arose a quarrel between Mssrs. Maroun Kanaan and the late Rashad Azar, both deputies from 
Jezzine [in South Lebanon]. The former came to me repeatedly, insistently demanding the dismissal from office 
of the constable of the town of Kafr Hana, whom he accused of pinching a bottle of wine worth LL 8. Azar, 
meanwhile, demanded the head of the town clerk, accusing him of pinching LL12 from town funds.  
 
“Eight plus twelve makes 20. More than once I offered to pay the LL20 from my own pocket to put an end to 
the matter, and perhaps to avert a cabinet crisis’ for by counting the votes of our supporters we saw that two 
votes added to the opposition would be enough to turn the balance to our disadvantage. But Kanaan and Azar 
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Attempted robbery and murder, the illegal possession of firearms, and pederasty were among 
the alleged vices that government officials allowed to fester in the two Tripoli municipalities. 
Such acts contributed to what the advisor euphemistically ascribes as “characters of a 
doubtful morality” among the civil service. Yet, these were not the only effects that 
personnel recruitment carried. These dubious characters, in turn, demoralized their 
subordinates. Thus, he goes on to write that, “with this method of recruitment, the personnel 
of the municipal administration, who otherwise lack status, guarantees of promotion, 
pensions or even regular payment, possess insufficient productivity on the job.”431 Beyond 
individual culpability, the centralized system created by the French animated this ineffective, 
corrupt and criminal municipal mismanagement. As a result of the development of informal 
politics within the region, the influence of the high commission waned.  
Spending 
 It is little surprise, then, that the same mismanagement extended to other areas of the 
municipality. For instance, a review of government revenue disclosed that income collected 
was well below projected levels according to French sources.432 Although, Tripoli and other 
areas within the annexed territories were the most taxed in the country and contributed the 
bulk of national tax revenue, the allocation of these funds became political. As du Paty de 
                                                                                                                                              
took the affair seriously and refused my offer to pay the LL20. I considered dismissing both the constable and 
the clerk, together, but the two deputies rejected this solution. The fact was that each of them insisted on the 
dismissal of his enemy alone, as a means of exhibiting his own influence. In the end, I sent both deputies away 
without having succeeded in settling their dispute, and thus the opposition picked up two new members. Mssrs. 
Kanaan and Azar were not alone in pressing such disputes as this; indeed the majority of the deputies spent their 
time in creating difficulties for us on account of some gendarme or doorkeeper. The atmosphere of the chamber 
was not a healthy one.” In these ways, the fall of the national government originated from a dispute among rival 
protégés over the misuse of about 20 Lebanese lira or approximately $6 USD.  ( al-Solh, Sami, 1960, 216-217 
as cited in Kerr, 1966, 205) 
431 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939, 3. In accord with the 
count’s claim is the work of Adnan Iskandar. In his words, “the attitude of domination on the part of superiors 
and the docility and obedience on the part of the subordinates is also the result of the authoritarian nature of the 
Lebanese society in general. Not only the family, but the church and other social institutions in Lebanon are 
highly authoritarian. The ottoman and French heritage, which has exerted a dominant influence on the country, 
was also an authoritarian one.  (Iskander, 1964, 35) 
432 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 1939, 4.  
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Clam explains with regard to the division of revenue from the tax of flammable materials, 
“this division is done in a completely arbitrary way, not considering the needs of the 
municipalities, but the needs of the politicians of the moment. According to the need of such 
vote for such deputy, he can augment the share allocated to the municipalities in his district 
and decrease the portions allocated to others, etc.”433 In this manner, the allocation of tax 
revenue became another situation that members of parliament could re-appropriate. This 
system of centralization augmented the power of delegates to act according to their personal 
wishes. Thus, they were able to trump written directives through informal communiqués. As 
the administrative counselor writes, “it often happens that credits allocated by decree by the 
president of the republic are annulled by a simple letter from the minister of the interior, 
which then leaves the municipalities the task of paying for public works already begun.”434 
The re-appropriation of resources from the annexed territories toward the constituencies of 
parliament members further testified to the structural inequalities that proliferated under the 
mandate described in the previous chapter. This re-appropriation was even more detrimental 
considering that spending on personnel already absorbed from the Tripoli municipality more 
than 30% of its total budget, according to French sources.435 Such crippling re-allocation of 
resources would have further undermined the capacity of the local government to address the 
health crisis that festered in the north.  
Law and Order 
This atmosphere of demoralization, criminality and corruption within the civil service 
also affected the primary agents of law and order in the region. For the second largest city in 
the country, the administrator explains that, “one half of the police force of Tripoli are sent to 
the city as a punitive measure or because of the desire to clear out the [worst members of the] 
                                              
433 ibid.  
434 ibid.  
435 op. cit., 6.  
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police force of Beirut. The appointments are never done by the muhafiz, the central 
commissioner or the [French] chief of the Sûreté Générale, tasked with control of the local 
police.”436 Instead, legislators intervened to politicize the police force. Here again, political 
appointments further robbed the municipalities of discretion over its affairs. For the top brass 
of executives, the second city in the new country represented nothing more than a punitive 
measure for recalcitrant or ineffective officers of the law. In bypassing the normal chain of 
command that governed the police—the muhafiz, central commissioner or the French chief of 
the Sûreté Générale—deputies were able to politicize the most basic tasks of law and order. 
Thus the city functioned more like a prison than a settlement under the colonial gaze. Like in 
the municipal council, this level of intervention extended to every individual within the 
regime. As du Paty de Clam reports,  
The central commissioner is devoid of all powers, he cannot even appoint an agent 
from one police post to another within the city without the authorization of the 
director of the police. For having reminded his subordinates that they should arrive to 
their posts on time, the central commissioner was recently criticized by the director of 
the police who declared that he overstepped the boundaries of his authorities!437  
 
Devoid of any significant authority, real or imagined, even the capacity to remind 
subordinates of punctuality, the police were incapable of maintaining law and order. This 
lawless terrain proved fertile ground for the 1936 riots to persist for over three days. In 
addition, this governmental overreach explains how drug trafficking became rampant in the 
city. In the words of du Paty de Clam, “the police are powerless to repress the traffic of arms 
and drugs. If a police officer arrests the protégé of a notable, he immediately receives a 
sanction from the authorities in Beirut.”438 Unsurprisingly, this culture of lawlessness 
                                              
436 op. cit., 8.   
437 op. cit., 8. Emphasis in the original.  
438 op. cit.., 8. In a similar vein, English Sergeant Richard Pearse would recount in his memoirs of his tenure in 
the region, Three Years in the Levant, that the police were completely impotent in the face of crime, asserting 
that “Gendarmes and police had little to say in the rackets, and any meddlesomeness on their part was met by 
bands of thugs using force and firearms. In Syria, racketeers operated with some direction and a certain amount 
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affected the French high commission, as well. As the police budget came under the control of 
the Lebanese government, agents of the commission, too, were under the thumb of Beirut. 
The French chief of the Sûreté Générale in Tripoli, for instance, was unable to get a 
telephone installed in his own home for ten years.439 
Further demoralizing was the lack of funding available to the police, ironic 
considering that, within the national budgets of the period analyzed earlier, the interior 
ministry commanded the largest share of allocated funds and personnel. Despite their 
preponderant forces, the administrator describes how, “terrorized by political interventions, 
their [ the police’s] agents do not even have the most basic guarantees for themselves and 
their families. The [widow] of one officer murdered in the course of apprehending a bandit 
received a pension of only 8000 francs for her and her four children.”440 The sorry 
predicament of law enforcement in Tripoli is best summed up with another anecdote on the 
police commissioner in Tripoli, Christo Naufah, once among the best members of the police 
force before he was sanctioned for commanding punctuality. On him du Paty de Clam 
remarks that,  
He has long been one of the better Lebanese police offers, but having combated the 
action of certain notables involved in drug trafficking and arms smuggling, including 
the deputies Rached al-Muqaddem and Youssef Stephan, he has been threatened by 
administrative reprisals by the governments. This has discouraged him and since his 
performance has been nothing more than mediocre.441 
 
It was in such an environment that parliament members allegedly smuggled drugs and 
weapons and local officials like Abd al-Wahab then transported them to the civil servants 
                                                                                                                                              
of respect for the law, but at Tripoli things had gone beyond that stage.” (Pearse, Richard, Three Years in the 
Levant, London: Macmillan & Co., 162.) 
439 C460 Notes sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39, 9.  
440 ibid,.  
441 C460 Notes sur les chefs des services municipuaux de Tripoli, 31 March 39. Note on M. Christo Naufah. 
The name al-Muqaddem is also rendered as Moukkadem. In a similar vein to the administrator’s account, Sgt. 
Pearse would note the frequent collusion between growers, dealers and smugglers on the one hand, and 
government officials on the other. It comes as little surprise then, that top officials within the legislature were 
also involved in the trade. Pearse, 1946, 176. The expansion of hashish cultivation is a logical consequences of 
the fall of agriculture during the Great Depression. Because food and cash crop production were no longer 
profitable, landlords turned to the black market.  
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who acted as bagmen and brokers. It came as little surprise then that, in the words of du Paty 
de Clam, “the unhappy police officers allow the circulation of the most dangerous criminals 
without a worry.” 442  
Pubic Hygiene 
Such calamities were also evident within the state of public health due to government 
interference into the department of public hygiene and public welfare (l’hygiène publique 
and l’assistance publique, respectively). This malfeasance is made clear in the facts and 
figures that Madame Lattouf mentioned in her 1940 article. As the budget of 1938 for 
Tripoli–Ville revealed, the provisions for spending on public health was a total sum of 600 
francs for the entire population, or according to the math of du Paty de Clam, “only 0.17 
centimes per inhabitant!”443 To put this sum into perspective, he notes that an equal sum was 
allocated for firing canons on Bastille Day.444 Given this lack of spending, health facilities, 
despite the heroics of the doctors there, were decrepit, burdened with inadequate facilities 
and health instruments. This single government hospital in Tripoli served the entire 180,000 
residents in North Lebanon with 50 hospital beds, 10 of which were reserved for members of 
                                              
442 C460 Note Sur les municipalités de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39. 9. It seems that the same 
patterns of tacit approval and even facilitation of drug trafficking among the police continues into the modern 
day. As drug lord of the Bekaa Ali Shamas said in a 2017 BBC documentary, “The entire government is a 
broker. Ninety-percent of people in the authorities can be bribed,” before adding, that the police transport illegal 
cannabis in the tones.  BBC Pop Up: Lebanon, 2017. Viewed April 2017. The same patterns in 2017 were still 
in evidence in 1946. According to Pearse, “the rackets crystallised themselves into large rival interests; whilst 
many unaccountable activities gradually clarified themselves as the details of large-scale corruption on the part 
of the government officials came to light. Gendarmes and police had little to say in the rackets, and any 
meddlesomeness on their part was met by bands of thugs using force and firearms. In Syria, the racketeers 
operated with some direction and a certain respect for the law, but at Tripoli things had gone beyond that stage. 
(Pearse, 1946, 162). 
443 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39, 6. Emphasis in the 
original 
444 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39. 6. In addition, Saliba 
cites the Tripoli newspaper al-Shabab, connected to the political party of al-Karami, as reporting that the 
municipality was forced to pay for infrastructural developments undertaken by French companies. In addition, 
its expenditures included a lavish Bastille Day fireworks celebration in 1932. Such expenditures, she argues, 
contributed to the city’s debt. However, it can be argued that equally responsible were the re-appropriation of 
resources to the benefit of figures like al-Karami, as is discussed below. 
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the gendarmerie, police and prisoners.445 As the count describes, "there is no room for 
disinfection on the beds where [women] give birth, as the one room has scarlet fever. There 
is no equipment for radiology nor a bacteriological laboratory at this hospital. There is no 
heating, even in the room for operations. The bathrooms do not work because there is not 
enough money for plumbing.”446 The hospital languished without sufficient facilities and 
heating because regulations prohibited doctors from making any purchase without the 
approval of the health minister. Even a broken window could not be fixed without the 
authorization of the director of public hygiene.447 Yet, even this possibility was hampered by 
the absence of the minister from the region. As the administrative counselor describes, the 
health minister, Dr. Gargour, only visited the area on two occasions in the course of his four 
years in office, once for the mere purpose of going to the town of Zghourta to install there a 
                                              
445 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39, 9. The inadequate state 
of public health would continue long after the formal mandate had ended, according to the comments of Dr. 
Halim Said Abu-Izzeddin, the muhafiz of the North. (Abu-Izzeddin, Dr. Halim Said, ed. “The North.” 5 
December 1960.  Minister of Municipal Affairs Lecture. Lebanon and its Provinces. Khayat, Beirut, 1963, 19-
48). As he recounts in his December 1960 speech, “existing medical services are inadequate;” as there remained 
in North Lebanon a single government hospital, which had expanded from 50 beds to 120 beds ; outside of 
which there were dispensaries in each district to serve the estimated 447,662 residents of the muhafaza. (Abu-
Izzeddin, 1961, 43). Other areas of the annexed territories fared just as poorly. In South Lebanon, by 1960 there 
existed only a single hospital for the estimated 340,000 inhabitants there. As the muhafiz of the south, Ghalib 
el-Turk describes, the single hospital there “was on its way to dilapidation ten years after it was built. There are 
6 pharmacies in Sidon, 2 in Tyre, and 1 in Jezzine. There are no pharmacies in Nabatiyya, Marjayyoun, 
Hasbaya or Bint-Jebeil. I leave you to imagine a worried man taking his sick wife or son on the back of an 
animal over rough tracks, seeking the chief town of a district, any district, in the hope that he will find a 
practicing doctor.” (el-Turk, Ghalib, “The South.” 15 January 1961, Minister of Municipal Affairs Lecture, 
Lebanon and its Provinces. Ed. Abu-Izzeddin, Dr. Halim Said. Khayat, Beirut, 1963, 59.) In the Beka, districdt, 
the Muhafiz Nasri Salhab laments that, like the north and the south, there is only a single government hospital, 
with 175, only 78 of which are in use due to personnel shortage by 1960. (Salhab, Nasri. “Al Beka,” Minister of 
Municipal Affairs Lecture.  Lebanon and its Provinces. Ed. Abu-Izzeddin, Dr. Halim Said. Khayat, Beirut, 
1963 9). The uneven development across the country is described by the muhafiz of the south, who observes 
that while there are 148 doctors in Mt. Lebanon, and 854 in Beirut, there are only 52 in the sou th (el- Turk, 
1961, 58- 59). In comparison, there were only 42 in the south. (Salha, 1961, 9). No comparable statistics could 
be found for the north.  
446 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39, 9.  
447 C460 Note Sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39, 9. Robert Culbertson 
describes the prohibitive oversight of local municipalities from Beirut, which robbed of basic infrastructure. 
“Government institutions located outside Beirut appear to have no authority to effect routine administrative 
actions without referral to Beirut, which often involve no only their own ministry but the ministry of finance 
and sometimes the court of accounts as well. I visited one institution, which was very short of light bulbs, 
having three bulbs in one building. It had not been able to acquire the needed bulbs in several weeks because its 
requests had to run the procedural gamut in Beirut. Two institutions for human care had been unable to secure 
the repair of leaking roofs in periods of eight and eleven months, respectively, because their requests had 
become engulfed in the procedural maze in Beirut.” Culbertson, Robert. Program of Public Administration 
Reform in Lebanon, 1954, 9. 
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mission for the French Sisters of Mercy.448 Such calamitous affairs exposed the dead, the sick 
and the poor to starvation on the streets.449 At the same time, however, government neglect of 
public welfare meant that there was nothing to offer orphan children, those languishing in the 
slums or the sick suffering from tuberculosis, or syphilis.450 Equally vulnerable were the 
hundreds of mostly Muslim children forced to roam the streets, as the government was 
unable to offer them places in the few public schools that existed.451 In sum, du Paty de Clam 
concluded that municipal administration was a complete disaster that marginalized the most 
vulnerable segments of the population in North Lebanon. In his own words, “the city of 
Tripoli is administered, in fact, by the Lebanese government, which requires a ruling from 
Beirut over all local affairs. The government is completely disinterested in the needs of the 
city, allows the squander of the finances of the municipality and does not accept any control 
on the way it manages the resources allocated to the municipalities.”452 
Municipal Reforms 
Despite the administrative and financial anarchy that stemmed from this policy of 
centralization, the staff within the high commission still insisted that the problems in Tripoli 
were not political in nature.  Instead, officials held fast to the notion that the crisis there 
derived from a mere technocratic deficiency to be addressed through better adherence to 
protocol. There never existed an appreciation that the administrative chaos of municipal 
affairs had expanded beyond the control of the high commission. Thus, in a March 1939 
letter to the Quai d’Orsay, the newly installed high commissioner, Gabriel Puaux, insisted 
that the chaos in Tripoli would disappear with improved management. For he says that,  
                                              
448 C460 Note sur les municipalities de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39, 9.  
449 op. cit., 10. On this subject, the administrator has a more sanguine outlook than conflicting reports examined 
below. In his estimation, the establishment of private charities such as the French sisters of mercy, the Franco-
Lebanese Red cross and the Italian dispensaries, prevented this risk. This attitude conflict with reports below, 
including one written by du Paty de Clam after his visit with the president.  
450 ibid. 
451 ibid. 
452 op. cit., 7.  
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The problem of Tripoli is not one of a political order, but a purely administrative one. 
The hesitations of the central government, its complacency inspired by a simple sense 
of ingenuous [sectarian] camaraderie …in addition to the notorious poor standards of 
the muhafiz incapable of taking the necessary measures to improve the lot of the city, 
suffice to explain the discontent that has developed, for some time, among the 
population of Tripoli.”453 
 
By reproducing the narrative that the profound and systematic mismanagement in Tripoli 
carried no political significance, Puaux ignored the crisis knocking on the gates of the city. 
Instead, he argued a mere two weeks before the report of du Paty de Clam was date stamped 
that the solution to this crisis lay in the same system of political appointees that contributed 
to the crisis. In effect, Puaux repeated the same frame of thought that animated his 
predecessor, Damien de Martel, as well as the Sunni delegate from Akkar. Such insistence 
tacitly condoned the abuse and neglect within the civil service and worse, bankrolled the 
worst forms of abuse within the government. Similar to the piecemeal efforts of land reform 
discussed earlier, the scope of administrative reforms mooted within the high commission 
failed to address the systematic inequalities and hierarchies that multiplied during the 
mandate.454 This very plan ignored the informal mechanisms that were crucial to the 
operation of authority. Because of Paris’ desire to impose a social hierarchy in an area hostile 
to its rule, all areas of administration were under the thumb of the executive, who, as we will 
see, enjoyed sweeping informal discretion in addition to his formal authority. For the French 
to acknowledge this structural flaw would be to admit its own mistakes and limits.   
                                              
453 C460 HCF Cabinet Politique No. 269 au sujet de la situation a Tripoli 15 March 1939 signed by HCF Puaux  
(2). Puaux’s 2940 visit to the Jabal Druze can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgisuEb8Qu8 
454 A list of potential reforms can be found in the report of du Paty de Clam. C460 Note Sur les municipalities 
de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de clam, 31 March 39,  7. These included:  
1. Decentralization of power to the muhafiz.  
2. To elect the municipal councils. One does not see why the inhabitants of Tripoli are deprived of a right that is 
given to the inhabitants of smaller localities in the mountain. One could, easily, reserve in the government the 
appointment of a third of members elected by universal suffrage. 
3. Invite the Lebanese government to manage the least deplorable conditions in common taxes (gas and 
flammable materials) 
4. Move the money made in the municipality to the treasury in a way to support indispensable ministries, 
especially matters concerning public hygiene 
5. Well understood is the cessation of the more egregious conditions in the government, the dismissal of staff, 
the recovery of tax arrears and a revision in the contract of the electric company.  
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Another indication of the limited nature of reforms can be found within the notes of 
the administrative counselor. Among the reforms proposed by du Paty de Clam was a 
recommendation to reform the public utility services in the city, which had absorbed a large 
amount of its budget. Among the most corrupt services in the city, he describes the utility as 
a system with “too many lamps of an insufficient voltage, and the costs to the taxpayers 
include lighting the entrances and staircases of the houses of the richest landowners of the 
city,” which had cost the city 80,000 francs from its budget.455 In response to his inquiries of 
this abuse and the reason why the public was bankrolling electricity to the homes of the 
wealthiest citizens, most of whom were opposed to the mandate, he was told that head of La 
Société d’Électricité was a personal friend of President Emile Eddé.456 Unable to pay its 
outstanding bills, the electricity company cut off electricity to the city in 1940.457 Effectively 
bankrupt, the city had to incur loans to pay bills that were racked up by its wealthiest 
residents. In this manner, without altering the networks that allowed the rich to steal from the 
poor, administrative reform would fail to engender the kind of control that the high 
commission desired.  
 Meanwhile, at the very moment when the new high commissioner sought to persuade 
Paris that the situation in Tripoli was apolitical, his subordinate was warning him of the 
political repercussions of this mismanagement. In the words of the counselor, “administrative 
and financial anarchy rules in the municipalities of the city, [and] often contributes to and 
emboldens the protest movement.”458 That is to say, this administrative anarchy and 
proliferation of criminal and patronage networks within the civil service exacerbated political 
                                              
455C460 Note Sur les municipalités de Tripoli- El-Mina du Paty de Clam, 31 March 39, 6.  
456 ibid. In addition, according to 463 DHCF No. 2651D Beirut. 8 August 1939 Cabinet Politique, Experience 
d’emancipation, Pg. 13, electric lighting absorbed more than one third of municipal spending in Tripoli, as more 
than 50 lamps were installed at the home of notables at the expense of the public.  
457 Saliba, 2016, 188. Not only was the city without lights, the sewage company also disrupted its service due to 
unpaid bills.  
458 C460 DHCF No. 125  Conseiller Administrative du Liban Nord 31 March 1939. As  this document was 
unsigned, it is difficult to verify the author.  
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grievances. Far from gaining the consent of the governed, municipal administration only 
exacerbated tensions. Instead, the rotten state of affairs united the population against the 
government. For, the counselor goes on to say, “the people of Tripoli possess a certain civic 
pride or spirit contrary to what passes in other localities in Lebanon.”459 The anarchy that 
reigned in the region helped to cultivate an alternative political vision that sought to alter 
colonial designs in favor of re-creating the Ottoman State of Greater Syria. Not only did 
colonial rule fail to rally the population behind the metropole, it linked the population 
together in opposition to Paris. By failing to acknowledge the political causes and 
consequences of indirect colonial rule, the mandate regime risked exacerbating the latent 
hostility in the north.   
3. PETTY POLITICS 
In turn, the lack of an adequate response from the high commission facilitated the 
emergence of a new political phenomena in the north, the rise of what one municipal 
employee in Tripoli described as al-siyasiyyat al-sghira, or petty politics. The competition to 
squander public spending animated family grievances and personal vendettas among the 
ruling elite in Tripoli. This rancor was then reproduced in publications and public smear 
campaigns. Such small matters dominated political affairs and the press in the region in lieu 
of the rampant inequality and mismanagement of resources. This shallow level of political 
competition did not mobilize the majority or transform the population into a disciplined class 
of citizens or subjects. Instead, the elites within this web of patronage concerned themselves 
with how best to divide the spoils taken from taxpayers. In one corner were the notables 
associated with the Maronite leader President Emile Eddé, who established a patronage 
network around his supporters. In the other corner was everyone else, including the French 
                                              
459 ibid. 
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mandate officials nominally tasked with monitoring the behavior of the government. An 
account of these tendencies appears in the article next to the open letter of Mme. Lattouf in 
al-Mustaqbal, “Us versus Them: The Petty Politics of North Lebanon,” by Dr. Michel 
Boulous, an employee in the beleaguered Tripoli hospital mentioned earlier. This 
government over-reach and patrimonialism denigrated into personal attacks against all who 
criticized such affairs, including French nationals and agents. Thus, he writes that:  
I have also seen that some supposed leaders, led by an ordinary bishop, while 
searching for a way to attack the dignity of those whom they call their ‘political 
adversaries,’ founded a newspaper in order to criticize certain honorable civil servants 
and their colleagues who defend the law, the weak and the poor as well as to provoke 
resentment against this or that official, because he did not receive a seat on the first 
row at an official reception or because someone refused to nominate one of his 
parents who wished to serve as an aide or spy.460 
 
The rancor from the failure to obtain first row seats, or posts for relatives as spies and aids 
typified the behavior of the circles surrounding top officials in the bureaucracy. With his 
likely reference to the Maronite archbishop who had met and conferred with President Eddé 
during his sole official visit to North Lebanon, Dr. Boulos depicts this elite obsession with 
leveraging special access to the government to secure political and economic favors. In the 
case of the bishop, this ambition would fester into a personal vendetta with the administrative 
counselor, du Paty de Clam, and complaints to the high commission about this supposed lack 
of respect.461 In such ways, the colonial bureaucracy in Lebanon failed to regulate the 
behavior of the population as much as it cultivated cults of personality around select 
individuals.  
Beyond this select few, the mandate regime placed the majority of the population 
under the thumb of a select few who, in turn, menaced inhabitants. Here again, the letter of 
                                              
460 C451. HCF.  Translation of extracts from the Tripoli newspaper al-Mustaqbal No. 64. 8 March 1940. Them 
and Us: Petty Politics in North Lebanon by Dr. Michel Boulous.1.  
461 C451. DHCF No 4178. 29 February 1940. The name of the archbishop is unclear. My tentative reading of 
cursive script surmises the name to be Antoine Chlad. However, the name of the archbishop in 1936 listed in 
reports that I have seen names a certain J Kallas as the archbishop of the Greek Melchite Catholic church of 
Tripoli.  
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Dr. Boulos is instructive. As he goes on to write, “I have lately read of a poor (female) 
Parisian worker who got into a dispute with one of the campaigns [the internal notable 
disputes] because she had accused them of doing nothing for the soldiers.”462 This poor 
Parisian worker was likely none other than Mme. Lattouf, herself. Whatever the case, the 
privations of the soldiers mentioned by this woman reflected the enormous contradiction 
between the large quantities of money allocated to security in the national budget and the 
bleak reality of personnel. One imagines that given the constraints imposed on the director of 
public security without a phone to conduct his job, that this misappropriation of funds 
affected the gendarmerie, as well. As a punishment for raising such discrepancies, Dr. Boulos 
reports, “this poor worker was then made to send gifts to dozens of soldiers in secret and in 
doing so spent all of her money.  She supported the mockeries of this campaign without 
uttering a single word, thinking that, in doing so, she was accomplishing a sacred duty.”463 
Despite this noble pursuit of her sacred duty, the silence surrounding this political activity 
enabled those in power to further punish this Frenchwoman. As a result, the doctor says, “the 
police thought that she was a spy. She was arrested and interrogated; and after many efforts, 
she finished knowing the true situation. Everyone thanked and admired her.”464 Claims of 
false accusation, arrest, interrogation, public rebuke and private impoverishment; these were 
among the activities that pre-occupied those empowered by the city’s municipal 
administration. The smear campaigns against du Paty de Clam and the unnamed 
Frenchwoman illustrate the ways in which the shadow of internal rivalries among the clients, 
                                              
462 C451. HCF.  Translation of extracts  from the Tripoli newspaper al-Mustaqbal No. 64. 8 March 1940. “Them 
and Us: Petty Politics in North Lebanon” by Dr. Michel Boulous. 1. While the original Arabic article refers “al-
amilat al-barisiyat al-faqirat,” or two poor Female French workers, the French translation that I subsequently 
translated into English only mentions one worker. I presume these individuals to be Madame Lattouf and her 




protégés, profiteers and would-be profiteers of the executive penetrated across all levels of 
the colony. 
Such behavior that passed for political competition further marginalized the already 
disgruntled majority within the region and bolstered the anti-colonial resistance. As one 
French official noted, “poorly managed by a government that despises and often bullies them 
and that is hostile for confessional reasons, the people of Tripoli do not wait for any occasion 
to separate from Lebanon and provide a favorable terrain to foreign propaganda: Syrian, 
Turkish…and Italian.”465 In other words, the colonial regime provoked unrest and, ironically, 
helped to cultivate alternative political visions of the Levant. Dissent had grown so 
widespread that the threat of North Lebanon falling into foreign hands became a real 
possibility, as explored in the next chapter. Similarly, Dr. Boulos strikes a comparable tone 
when he concludes his editorial by prescribing a solution to the petty politics that menaced 
the region:  
The small souls cannot elevate themselves above these obsolete and petty politicians 
and cannot be placed next to the fighters of our noble and superior hearts. They are 
more worthy of pity than blame. We tell them: it would be better for you as well as 
for Lebanon, especially North Lebanon, to live in the unknown caves so that men 
forget your misdeeds and crimes; so that people take the necessary measures in view 
of safeguarding the dignity of Lebanon and the Lebanese.466 
 
Beyond an elite competition, these petty politics indicate the capacity of those in power to 
humiliate and intimidate others with their misdeeds and crimes. As the case of the two 
French workers demonstrated, those who spoke out against the malfeasance and crimes of the 
elite faced not only recriminations, but also secret harassment and persecution by 
government officials. As a result, those already marginalized within the north were further 
silenced by the actions of the powerful.  
                                              
465 C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes on the Subject of the City of Tripoli-El-Mina, undated, presumably 
1939, pg 3. 
466 op. cit., 2.  
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 Years later, the population would remain under the thumb of this atmosphere of 
calumny, slander and persecution, as English Sergeant Richard Pearse recounts of his time in 
Tripoli during his service in the Spears Diplomatic mission discussed in the next chapter.  467 
By 1945, he writes that the culture of petty politics distinguished Tripoli from other areas 
where he had served in the Levant. “Politically speaking, Tripoli was not a dull place,” the 
sergeant remembers. Amid the attempted murder of the prime minister days before his 
arrival, racketeering within the main industries of the city, the presence of gangs and 
smuggling outfits, and corpses lying in the street under the impotent gaze of law 
enforcement, Pearse devotes his largest description of Tripoli in his memoir to the “evil 
intent and viciousness” of thought and word that characterized the city’s media.468 During the 
mornings and evenings, the cafes of Tripoli were full of men from all walks of life who 
would assemble to meet the reporters and publishers of various texts, who, “for a handful of 
banknotes would publish slanderous and libelous attacks on gangsters and decent people 
alike.”469 In this sense, the attack on the Parisian woman falsely accused of espionage was 
the norm in Tripoli. By the 1940s, “the irresponsible gossip soared to the regions of pure 
fantasy,” the sergeant writes, as “the effendis, the souk-merchants, the easy-money boys and 
their hangers-on never let up. With studied deliberation and venomous tongues, they would 
smear political mud over various personalities they did not like, and relate fulsome details 
                                              
467 Pearse, Richard, Three Years in the Levant, London, Macmillan and Company, 1949. Of course he would 
never admit as much, but it is my contention that Pearse did not have an insidious intelligence role within the 
Spears mission. From his description of his posts along the Turkish-Syrian and Lebanese-Syrian borders in Idlib 
Province, Tripoli and Southern Lebanon, I have the impression that he was a low ranking officer who patrolled 
the smuggling routes along the frontiers between the territories of the French mandate and those of British 
mandate Palestine.  
468 Pearse, 1949, 161. The victim of this attempted political murder was non other than the former mufti 
himself, al-Karami. As Pearse writes, he “had been shot up in his car close to his home by the gunman of one of 
his rivals. The Prime Minister, Abdul Kerame, was pro-British, his assailant, a member of the Omary family, 
was pro-French. (Pearse, 1949, 161.)  
469 Pearse, 1949, 162. As he goes on to say in this sentence, “All the morning until lunch -time, and every 
evening at aperitif time, the cafes were full of men of all types, from those who counted their fo rtunes in the 
millions of pounds sterling to the shabby, needy reporter owners of weekly scandal-sheets, who for a handful of 
banknotes would publish slanderous and libelous attacks on gangsters and decent people alike. These reporter 
owners kept alive the reputations of that there own gossip had created about local personalities. (Pearse, 1949, 
162)  
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about private lives mingled with sensational revelations of anti-British activities.”470 This 
level of open intimidation and slander distinguished Tripoli from the regions in Syria where 
the sergeant was stationed previously. For, “anyone who disliked anyone else would bribe 
the owner of a weekly scandal-sheet, to attack him and since there was no law forbidding 
libel, there was no limit to the mud-slinging and slandering,” Pearse adds.471 The deliberate 
lies, humiliations and misinformation that passed for entertainment indicate the predatory 
landscape that developed during the course of the mandate. Since this cloud of intrigue and 
latent hostility colored the sergeant’s view of the city,  he retreated from Tripoli to the ski 
resorts in the nearby mountains, afraid that his company with this class of slanderers and 
racketeers would corrupt his reputation among the population. 
4. Racketeering, Crime and Corruption 
 This cloud of petty politics and recriminations gives rise to the fourth crisis that 
confronted Tripoli and already broached in earlier sections, the expansion of organized crime 
through public office. In practice, the inability of the government to co-opt the leading 
families of the region into the regime meant that enormous and wide-scale privileges were 
handed over to segments of the population who abused public office for personal benefit. 
With the backing of the French, Lebanese leaders like President Eddé were able to cultivate 
patronage networks. As one unsigned report goes on to say that, “for M. Eddé, the policy in 
Tripoli consists most of all in favoring his partisans, or instead, a small group among them 
(the Stephan brothers, Rached al-Muqaddem) who, unfortunately, are among the most 
deplorable and least intelligent of his friends.”472 These friends of the French-backed 
president were elevated into posts within the parliament. In addition to the wide-ranging 
powers that they enjoyed as delegates, they were able to expand their authority through the 
                                              
470 Pearse, 1946, 175. 
471 Pearse, 1946, 162. 
472 DHCF 23 February 1939 au sujet fermeture de le ville de Tripoli . 22 February 1939 au sujet de la visite de 
la president de la republique.   
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black market. Both families were among the chief weapons smugglers and drug cultivators 
and traffickers in the region. Like the Abboud family in neighboring Akkar, they came to 
epitomize within the high commission the spread of illicit activity from the national 
government in Beirut to the smallest villages of the countryside. Given that legislators 
received protection from prosecution, they had carte blanche to expand their criminal 
networks. 473    
The activities of these individuals like the members of the Stephan family are laid 
bare in a letter from our messenger of doom, Mme. Lattouf, delivered to the new high 
commissioner Gabriel Puaux in 1939. In place of the more confidential tone she would adopt 
a year later in 1940, her earlier letter frankly discusses the widespread organized crime in the 
region. In particular, she excoriates the influence of the delegate Youssef Stephan, the 
personal friend of Eddé, who operated well above the law given his post in the previous 
government as minister of the interior, a position of authority within the bureaucracy second 
only to that of the president. She alleges that he used these privileges granted from the 
executive to bolster his criminal enterprise, including the trafficking of drugs cultivated on 
his own lands and on the lands of his friends; and in addition to these indiscretions, he was 
said to have been involved in the death of a young girl whom he had seduced.474 Given the 
                                              
473 As a case in point, the French high commission worked aggressively to shield Rached al-Muqaddem from 
prosecution when British officials within the Spears diplomatic mission arrested him for trying to suborn some 
of their personnel into smuggling drugs from Turkey into Lebanon on his behalf. Historian Oren Barak writes 
that when the British handed al-Muqaddem over for prosecution in 1943, the French quickly tried and acquitted 
him of wrongdoing. When, in response, the Spears mission threatened to send its troops to arrest him, the 
French retorted that they would order their men to resist this approach with force of arms and arrest Britain’s 
man in North Lebanon, Camille Chamoun. See Barak, Oren, "Conflict and Peace in Lebanon," International 
Journal of Middle East Studies: 34 (2002), 629.  It is possible the fear that al-Muqaddem would implicate other 
officials within the government if arrested animated mandate officials to clear him of charges.  
474 C 460 DHCF Secrétaire Générale, 9 February 1939 No. 2291, Lattouf letter to MAE  
ambassador M. Puaux de HC. She goes on to write that the coterie surrounding Emile Eddé’s unionist faction 
were complicit in the cultivation of drugs on their property. So, in this regard, Stephan was not alone in 
trafficking drugs. In his memoir, Pearse writes that other unnamed government officials sponsored drug 
cultivation in the mountains outside of Tripoli in the town of Bisharah, a.k.a. Becharré, about 45 miles from 
Tripoli, during which more than 550 pouds of hashish seeds were distributed to cultivators in three nearby 
villages. He recounts “The two simple gardeners had planted sharish seeds, instead of vegetables, saying they 
had been told to do it by the sergeant of the local gendarmerie, who had promised them half of the proceeds 
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authority he wielded, he was able to commit crimes, halt police investigations and, much to 
the horror of Mme. Lattouf, he was able to “interfere in the one domain that should be most 
independent, the ministry of justice.”475 Linked to obstruction of justice, drug cultivation and 
distribution, rape and murder, the most powerful politician in the north was allegedly one of 
its biggest criminals. Not alone in these exploits, Stephan was one of several delegates in the 
president’s unionist party who allegedly cultivated narcotics in the region and obstructed 
justice to cover up their misdeeds.476 However widespread racketeering was, implicit in the 
tone of her letter is the notion that if only those in power were aware of these misdeeds, then 
they would take swift action to reform it. Thus she writes that: 
If Your Excellency were in direct contact with the Lebanese people without the twists 
of the politicians who often deform the true sense of our demonstrations, you would 
see our revolt against the tyranny of those who sacrifice the poor and unfortunate. 
Will the deputies continue to bamboozle (please excuse me M. L’ambassadeur, for 
this crude word, but it is the strict truth that I bring to you) French authority?477  
 
Despite the contempt with which she describes the Lebanese government, Mme. Lattouf still 
holds fast to the same ideology of centralized French authority expressed by Puaux. Thus, in 
the conclusion of her letter, she assures Puaux, “the Lebanese people want the justice of 
France, the peace of France, the law of France. The Lebanese people demand that France 
involves itself more and more within the interior affairs of Lebanon so that LIBERTY, 
                                                                                                                                              
from the sale of the grown plants and freedom from interference by the government and military authorities. 
Since the planting of the seeds had been sanctioned and even recommended by the sergeant, the simple 
gardeners saw nothing wrong in it. Evidence was abundant, and informants plentiful, though I do not know 
what induced them to come.” (Pearse, 1949, 173-5.) 
475 C 460 DHCF Secrétaire Générale, 9 February 1939 No. 2291, Lattouf letter to MAE  
ambassador M. Puaux de HC. 
476 ibid. As included in the authorized biography of Riad el-Solh written by Patrick Seale that included passages 
from the British archives, the British also suspected the president of involvement in drug trafficking. Amid the 
constitutional crisis discussed in the next chapter, General Edward Spears recorded him impressions of the 
president in response to the 11 November 1943 decision of the French to suspend the constitution and appoint 
Eddé. Thus Spears writes that, “he [Eddé] had always been a complete French stooge and when he last held 
presidential office was ‘exceptionally corrupt and under strong suspicion of trafficking in narcotics, though this 
was never definitely proved.’’’ Spears to Foreign Office, 11 November 1943, FO 226,241 as recounted in Seale, 
Patrick. The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad al-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010.  
477 C 460 DHCF Secrétaire Générale, 9 February 1939 No. 2291, Lattouf letter to MAE  
ambassador M. Puaux de HC., 2.  
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FRATERNITY and above all EQUALITY reigns on this land that should be solely and 
directly French.”478 Such assertions reflected the insistence among the French that the 
maelstrom in Tripoli was not of a political nature, but a technical matter of better adherence 
to the centralized system. In effect, there was little to separate the ideology of Mme. Lattouf 
from that of the high commissioner and Muhammad Abboud. As a result, such perspectives 
obscured the linkages that connected the mandate to figures like Stephan and the 
aforementioned Abboud Bey, Ahdab, Abd al-Wahab and Rached al-Muqaddem, all of whom 
benefited from the formal and informal support of the high commission. 
Amid the claims of  growing malfeasance and crime, spiraling inequality and 
organized armed resistance, the delegates of Paris still believed that the antidote to the 
Tripoli situation was not a reassessment of its policies but simple administrative reform. 
Underlying their position was the notion that the overall system of municipal administration 
was the most rational and superior system of organization. The eventual reforms adopted 
indicated a propensity to treat all problems as essentially non-political. First, the new high 
commissioner Gabriel Puaux made an official visit to Tripoli in February 1939.479 The 
purpose of this tour was “to show the population that France is not disinterested in the 
Muslims of Lebanon.”480 Having made his presence and interest known, the high 
commissioner issued the only reform to this crisis in North Lebanon that can be found to 
date. On November 23, 1939, he decreed a reshuffle of the Tripoli municipality, entrusting 
administrative management of the beleaguered city to a new post, a director (or al-moudir in 
                                              
478 ibid.  Emphasis in the original.  
479 C460, DSG No. 1054. 11 February 1939, pgs. 3-5. Though this paper is unsigned, from the recommendation, 
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Arabic) for a period of 6 months with the possibility of renewal.481 In superceding the normal 
chain of command that gave sweeping discretion to the president of the republic, the high 
commissioner hoped to restrict some of the more egregious examples of nepotism and neo-
patrimonialism within the civil administration in Tripoli that had demoralized workers and 
residents. Yet, such reforms only shifted the concentration of power from one strongman to 
another. In response, the president appointed none other than his relative Dr. Antoine Eddé to 
head the bankrupt municipality.482 Despite the executive’s role in recruiting some of the 
worst elements within the civil service, and neglecting the north in order to concentrate 
resources within his own constituency, the French gave carte blanche for informal politics to 
continue at the expense of the poor and marginalized. In this case, Dr. Eddé would hold this 
post for the next four years.483  
 Such informal networks even extended to the nominal opposition. The campaign to 
reunite Tripoli with Syria was hampered by similar personal ambitions, familial grievances 
and dubious characters. Yet, within some ranks of the high commission, the movement was 
dismissed as a fig leaf for elite families to jostle and maneuver with one another. For 
instance, Puaux, dismissed a popular nationalist figure like Riad el-Solh as a mere enemy of 
the former muhafiz of the north, Kheireddine Ahdab.484 In this case, Ahdab, the former 
forester-cum-muhafiz would join el-Solh in the ranks of the resistance once removed from 
office.485 Similarly, the high commission viewed as less than genuine the maneuverings of   
                                              
481 Karam, 1961, 60  
482 Karam, 1961, 61. In an interview with Dr. Antoine Eddé, the author of this master’s thesis noted that Dr. 
Eddé boasted “of the excessive amount of power [afforded him] for the improvement of municipal conditions in 
Tripoli,” including increasing public funds from 100,000 LS pounds to 200,000 LS pounds. Such claims are 
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483 Karam, 1961, 61. 
484 C460 DSG No. 863 4 February 1939. Au sujet de M. l’Haut Commissaire (de Puaux) a Tripoli. 3. 
485 C460 DSG information No. 383. 17 January 1939 au sujet des menaces séparatistes 
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Dr. Abd al-Latif al-Bissar, who after failing to win a seat in the 1934 parliamentary elections, 
helped to organize the 1936 general strike.486  
 At the same time, such shifts and machinations reflected the repositioning of political 
alliances that surmounted the formal protocols laid down by the French. It was none other 
than Youssef Stephan who secretly bridged the divide of petty politics and organized 
opposition by coming to the aid of the disgruntled former mufti of Tripoli, Abd al-Hamid al-
Karami.487 Even after he was rescued from the brink of bankruptcy by the high 
commissioner, al-Karami would run into more personal troubles in 1935 in one of the most 
infamous affairs during the mandate. While walking in the street, he confronted political 
rivals from the al-Muqqadem family, headed at the time by Rached al-Muqqadem, known 
among the high commission as one of the main smugglers in the country.488 In the course of 
their scuffle, al-Karami pulled out his own revolver and shot his two rivals from point blank 
range in broad day light, fatally wounding Abd al-Majid al-Muqaddem, at a time when 
carrying arms was illegal. Upon his arrest for murder, Youssef Stephan personally sent al-
Karami a blank check to pay his bail.489 Later, with his help and, according to one report, 
“the benevolence of certain French authorities,”490 al-Karami was acquitted on all charges. 
Having gotten away with murder, al-Karami then organized a riot to coincide with Eddé’s 
                                              
486 Saliba, 2016, 143.  As she explores, the question of whether the notables of Tripoli would support the 
elections seems to have undermined the nationalist movement. Instead of supporting Dr. Bissar’s candidacy, al-
Karami supported another notable in Amin al-Muqaddem. Ironically, this member of the notorious smuggling 
family was a police officer separated from the rest of the family, which opted to support Dr. Bissar’s candidacy.  
487 C460 DSG information No. 383. 17 January 1939 au sujet des menaces separatists. The deputy was also 
referred to as Sheik Josephe Stephane. Despite the enormous role this family played in the wings of Lebanese 
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488 C460 DHCF No. 603 3 March 1939 au sujet de la fermeture des souks a Tripoli, copy of letter of conseiller 
administrative du Liban nord (du Paty de Clam) Report on Abd al-Hamid Karami. 2 
489 C460 DSG No. 863 4 February 1939. Au sujet de M. le Haut l’Haut Commissaire (de Puaux) a Tripoli 
490 C460 DHCF No. 603 3 March 1939 au sujet de la fermeture des souks a Tripoli, copy of letter of conseiller 
administrative du Liban nord (du Paty de Clam) Report on Abd al-Hamid Karami. 2 
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visit to see the Maronite archbishop in Tripoli, which left one person dead and some ninety 
injured.491  
 However, as later events would indicate, the resort to violence and judicial 
interference were parts of a secret negotiation among the Lebanese elites. This capacity to 
flout law and order demonstrated the personal authority of certain political elites. While 
Stephan was able to show that he could intervene into the judiciary to help one seemingly get 
away with murder, al-Karami was able to show that he had the capacity to radicalize the 
resistance movement. Such informal authority enabled such individuals to maintain their 
social status amid their dealings with the mandate. At this time, it appeared as if the 
government and high commission had succeeded in their long-term goal of co-opting al-
Karami within their ranks.492 Between his exoneration and autumn of 1936, reports indicate 
that he “observed a strict neutrality” and remained uninvolved in the series of demonstrations 
and general strikes organized in the city that year.493 Such considerations changed with the 
announcement of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese, which would have consecrated the territorial 
integrity of the republic and foreclosed any possibility of reunion with Syria.494 His activities 
that November provoked deadly riots in Tripoli as well as in Beirut.495 With his lofty status, 
history of opposition and service within the anti-mandate Sharifan administration, al-Karami 
successfully channeled popular discontent in order to enhance the power he had lost at the 
commencement of the mandate. This resort to violence indicates the degree to which law and 
order had disappeared under the mandate.   
                                              
491 C460 Information, Source Conseiller Administrative. Presumably du Paty de Clam 
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495 ibid. Du Paty de Clam adds that, in “November 1936, he actively associated himself with the maneuvers that 
tended to frustrate the Lebanese treaty in order to avoid the consecration of the territorial integrity of Lebanon. 
The activities provoked riots in Tripoli and Beirut. Karami then became among the persons damaged and 
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goal of appeasement in mind.” 
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 Even after judicial interference contributed to the outbreak of violence against 
mandate agents, the high commission observed the same patterns of behavior in its quest to 
weaken opposition to the mandate. In particular, the delegates of Paris stood by as Stephan 
offered another olive branch to al-Karami. To appease him, Stephan did like so many other 
MP’s in creating a new post within the municipal administration. In 1938, he proposed the 
nomination of al-Karami’s brother, Mohamad—viewed by French sources as a near 
illiterate—and one time participant in the 1936 riots, as Director of the Water Services for 
Tripoli with a salary of 36,000 francs per year.496 His appointment sheds light on the causes 
of the water crisis in the north.  More than that, it exemplified the ways in which Stephan 
used the bureaucracy to create a role for himself as mediator between the Lebanese 
government and different factions of the resistance. While this new role enhanced his 
personal status and made himself indispensable to the mandate regime,497 it contained less 
positive consequences for residents in the north.  
For, the civil administration enabled those most disgruntled with the mandate to act 
against the regime through acts of sabotage. Like his brother almost twenty years earlier who 
had used his influence to organize protests against the French mandate in 1919, the younger 
al-Karami sought to undermine the government by neglecting his post. In this endeavor the 
French were fully aware. With regards to Mohamad al-Karami, du Paty de Clam reports to 
this superiors that he “knows absolutely nothing about administration or hydrological 
matters. Rather he spends most of his time creating anti-Lebanese and anti-French 
policies.”498 Despite his unsuitability to the role, this nationalist was given control of the city 
                                              
496 DHCF 23 February 1939 au sujet de la  fermeture de le ville de Tripoli in 22 February 1939 au sujet de la 
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containing the best water supply in the country, an area that de Martel had earmarked for a 
future military base in case of war due to its suitable water table. It was under his 
appointment that the water crisis across the north worsened.  
Still, the overtures to the al-Karami family continued. At a time when many residents 
did not have access to safe drinking water, Stephan used his authority to grant al-Karami a 
loan of 8,000 francs and a subsequent subsidy of 200,000 francs to supply water to his 
family’s lands in the village of Bkassefrine.499 To put these numbers into perspective, this 
subsidy granted to this single village of 40 homes in 1938 exceeded the municipal budget of 
Tripoli eight years earlier in 1930.500 The rampant abuse of public funds that had been a 
rallying call among the resistance continued with one of its most prominent organizers. 
Without playing psychologist, it is understandable that such salaries and credits for himself, 
his family and his village would have appealed to the former mufti who had been on the brink 
of bankruptcy.501 Not only would participation with the government fill his depleted coffers, 
it would go some way to re-establishing the status that he had lost upon his termination by 
the mandate in 1919.  
At this point, the resistance became the smoke screen to broker backroom deals 
among a select few. In the words of one official, “this policy followed by the Stephan family 
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is destined to assure them the support of the nationalists who they permit to pressure the 
Lebanese government.”502The capacity to divide the spoils of the taxpayers altered power-
relations. It was through the circumvention of formal practices—such as acquittal, immunity 
from prosecution, rescue from bankruptcy—that Stephan succeeded in rallying al-Karami. 
By re-appropriating the formal protocols of governance, the two were able to expand their 
power and influence in a way that the French could not.  
Not only did this policy exalt the Stephan family, it also created opportunities for 
other power brokers. This more creative strategy succeeded in seducing other leaders of the 
1936 strike. For instance, one of the prominent notables who stood beside al-Karami was 
Mustafa Khaled al-Muqaddem, the leader of the Tripoli branch of the anti-colonial Syrian 
Socialist Nationalist Party.503 His relative, Rached, would eventually receive a seat in the 
Lebanese parliament under the patronage of the president. The family used this lofty position 
to not only undercut rival notable families, but, as mentioned previously, to allegedly 
promote organized crime  complicit in weapons smuggling, intimidation of the police and the 
assault of al-Karami. Equally pliable was the other prominent notable of the 1936 strike, Dr. 
Bissar. His dealings are mentioned in passing in a 1939 press report. It surmises that: 
The press reports that the attitude with respect to the Muslim capital of North 
Lebanon lately does not express itself all the time and only goes so far as a timid 
desire to seduce the principal recalcitrant notables of the city…But the press forgot to 
add that an order of expropriation was annulled in Beirut to allow Dr. Bissar, another 
irredentiste of Tripoli, to construct an imposing building on a route to one of the 
principal roads in the projected urban plan, etc. etc.504  
 
The concessions like those granted to Dr. Bissar and others disclose the proliferation of 
informal networks within government institutions. The creation of new patronage networks 
through the re-appropriation of municipal funds became embedded within the elite cadre of 
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Lebanon. The leaders who crossed the picket lines of the resistance not only received 
financial rewards, they were promised key positions of influence within the new landscapes 
designed for Tripoli upon the ratification of the Franco-Lebanese treaty. From this 
perspective, it can be seen that the scope of malfeasance was only exceeded by the efforts to 
ignore and conceal it.  
For the French delegates, as well, the rise of informal networks precipitated a 
transformation in relations of power. By February 1939, President Eddé and his old friend, 
Stephan had become the protectors of al-Karami and persuaded another French official, M. 
Lafond, to back the former mufti once again.505 With these leaders in his pocket, the president 
saw no need to offer any political concession to the beleaguered majority. For instance, one 
administrator recounts the president as having urged him that, “it is not necessary to revive 
the spirit of separatism. It is not necessary to talk of autonomy, one could envision an 
extension of powers to the municipalities, but only after the treaty [the Franco-Lebanese 
treaty] is ratified and not before.”506 In effect, the plight of Tripoli had become a bargaining 
chip.507 It was through the informal mechanisms connecting the resistance leaders to the 
regime that the president was able to leverage his influence to dissuade the French from 
addressing the dire situation in Tripoli. Having benefited from the transformation of power-
relations, the executive could now surpass the intermediary role that the French had intended 
for his office in order to dictate terms to the Quai d’Orsay. In particular, President Eddé was 
eager to make further reforms in the restive north contingent upon the ratification of the 
Franco-Lebanese treaty. This, in turn, would have maintained the status quo and therefore 
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allowed him and his coterie to wield wide influence in local affairs. Eddé even 
unsuccessfully admonished the new high commissioner against making an official visit to the 
city out of fear that it would have undercut his authority.508 Such complaints about the 
president reflect the increasingly sectarian and exclusivist configuration of the executive 
branch that the French directly and indirectly supported.  
For Paris, among the costs of unsettling the anti-colonial resistance in Tripoli were 
the erosion of its influence and its increasing dependence on the dubious and criminal 
elements that undermined law and order. From the cabinet to the kaimakam, elected officials 
to appointees, government insiders to the opposition, the capacity to re-appropriate the 
formal institutions affected every level of society until it gradually transformed the political 
landscape. The large bureaucratic institutions that the French created had failed to safeguard 
their authority. Instead of reproducing a system of hierarchy, the bureaucracy initiated 
structural neglect in the annexed territories. The top-down blueprint that successive high 
commissioners envisioned was effectively supplanted by a number of alternative practices of 
power. These included existing practices that were strengthened by the mandate like the 
family structure, nepotism and racketeering. The transition from the relatively small civil 
service of the Ottomans to the behemoth imposed by the French magnified these practices. In 
addition to these institutions were the exercises of authority that directly emerged from the 
mandate such as the sweeping discretionary powers of the interior minister and president, 
interference into other branches of the government, and the capacity to appropriate public 
funds at will. These informal practices enabled the government of Eddé to marginalize the 
resistance to the mandate, which had been effective for nearly twenty years in the north. In 
doing so, he sought to guarantee the situation that empowered him with sweeping discretion 
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to concentrate resources within his constituency and make beggars of those who opposed this 
state of affairs. Until this status quo was consecrated with the ratification of the proposed 
Franco-Lebanese treaty that Eddé had himself negotiated in 1936,509 the inequality and 
despair in Tripoli would remain. Once exasperated from the plight and blight of the city, 
those seeking improved conditions would be under the thumb of his personalized rule. In 
these ways, the bureaucracy facilitated the personalization of power instead of the 
centralization of authority.  
Yet, however much power relations had shifted, only few were privy to the extent to 
which informal networks had transformed political society. The administration set up by the 
French proved the breeding ground for the plagues that knocked on the gates of the Old City. 
Informal politics had completely upended the power structure initiated by the French. 
Allegedly, drug barons became cabinet ministers, mayors drug traffickers, and the once 
proud mufti of Tripoli stared at the gallows, an outlaw and nearly bankrupt figure before a 
previous adversary intervened to help him seemingly get away with murder. The direct and 
indirect effects of municipal administration in the mandate reveal that French policy was 
more effective with the breakdown of a social order than with the creation of a new one 
beholden to Paris. Instead, the agents, administrators and politicians within the new system 
re-appropriated the blockade of sorts that surrounded Tripoli to enhance their own personal 
influence at the expense of the high commission’s authority.  
At the same time, those with the least suffered the most from these transformations. 
As a summary of a January 1939 petition of notables of North Lebanon revealed, the 
longstanding grievances of the population continued to be ignored. The inhabitants, it reads, 
“they reproach the Lebanese government for having often in this last period, undermined the 
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application of laws for personal goals, attacking all liberties—of press, assembly, 
association—constantly intervening in the affairs of justice and finally, for squandering 
public funds.”510 In these ways, the blockade of sorts that surrounded North Lebanon was not 
maintained by the strict surveillance that de Martel had ordered in 1936, but by transforming 
the bureaucracy so that epidemics worsened, the sick languished and the poor starved.  
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the concessions that enabled the water to flow to the lands of al-Karami, the 
appointment of his brother to head the water service, and the lucrative payouts to notables of 
their ilk represented the informal patronage networks that spread misery and misfortune 
during the mandate. Once in power, these leaders sought to sabotage the civil administration 
through neglect of their duties. Meanwhile, the government in Beirut stood by unconcerned 
as legislators and the executive sought to build their own constituencies at the expense of the 
annexed territories. In turn, those who craved an alternative to the new order overseen by the 
president were left to manage the despair that followed. The closest semblance of reform was 
the decision of the president to move the ministry of hygiene and health services into the 
interior ministry as part of a series of administrative reforms on November 22, 1939.511 In 
doing so, the president used one ministry to cover up the indiscretions of another. As a result, 
the institutional practices that contributed to the health crisis—such as misuse of the post of 
health director and director of the water utility, under-spending of public health and 
infrastructure, overspending to irrigate the lands of the al-Karami family, attacks on public 
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healthcare workers and the press, and obstruction of justice—would be lost to oblivion so 
that even now, it is difficult to discern the scale of the crisis in the north.   
From a different perspective, the breakdown of law and order came to characterize 
the erosion of French territorial control in the Levant. In attempting to use the large 
bureaucracy to oversee social, economic and political affairs in the country, the French failed 
to appreciate that its protocols were also subject to transformation. As a result of these 
transformations and their inability to respond to them, elite formation largely failed to expand 
French control over the population. Instead, the very processes of initiating reform in the 
colony also changed colonial institutions in unexpected ways. While these new developments 
effectively created more barriers between the residents of Tripoli and their claim for re-
unification with Syria, they also sowed divisions between the French administration, its local 
allies and the population. To rectify these unexpected consequences would have required the 
high commission to acknowledge and expose the very intrigues and alliances that it had 
facilitated. The experiences in the north demonstrate that the reproduction of space in the 
colonial setting was not a function of the imposition of formal institutions of government, but 
emerged through the capacity of informal networks to re-shape and re-appropriate colonial 
designs. In ways that will be seen in the next chapter, the administrative crisis that the French 
struggled to curb opened the door to foreign sponsored political activities as well as direct 
foreign intervention in Lebanon and Syria.  
But for now, it is worth considering the effects of informal politics on the population 
in the north. As the 1939 summary petition of notables adds, the inhabitants in Tripoli and 
across the muhafaza had complained of “the near inexistence of health and hygiene services, 
with typhoid and malaria rampant to nearly endemic levels in the most remote corners of the 
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country.”512 The spread of infection dovetailed the secret re-circulation of money and 
influence among the elite. In the words of one mandate agent, “nothing is done by the 
Lebanese public assistance to safeguard the indigents who die of hunger and for whom not a 
word is spoken. There does not exist any establishment to take in the terminally ill, or the 
children who roam the streets.”513 In response to the health crisis, the delegates of Paris failed 
to achieve any solution as the Lebanese government opted instead to allow silence to deepen 
the burdens of the population. As du Paty de Clam would later report on his meeting with the 
executive, “in the course of my interview with the president of the republic, I have tried on 
several occasions, to bring his attention to the extreme poverty of certain classes of the 
population, to the lamentable inadequacies in hygiene services and public assistance, to the 
fact that certain children cannot find a place in schools.”514 Although the blockade of sorts 
remained in place around the Old City, the high commission was in no better position to 
make inroads with the population, not as a result of cannon fire as had been the case in 1936, 
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villages, needs health assurances not available now, especially in the underdeveloped villages where technical 
organization is non-existent,” he says (Abu-Izzeddin, 1961, 43). In the same speech, the muhafiz goes on to 
suggest that the same methods of infection still existed in the region, as tainted water supplies still existed. 
Thus, he adds, “to prevent the dangers that may take place, it is essential to implement water supply schemes 
and impose effective hygiene control on all public services for the sake of the safety of citizens and their health. 
Thus, avoiding the spread of infection diseases.” (Abu-Izzeddin, 1961 43-44). The insinuation from this call for 
preventative care was that such protocols were not yet available. While no statistics are available, his discussion 
of the spread of infectious disease through the water mirrors the concerns raised within the high commission 
nearly twenty years earlier.  
513 C460, HCF La Situation Politique Notes on the Subject of the City of Tripoli-El-Mina, undated, presumably 
1939.  
514 C460 DHCF 23 February 1939 au sujet fermeture de le ville de Tripoli in 22 February 1939 au sujet de la 
visite de la président de la république. 3-4. Like with water supplies, hospitals and public health, the same 
problems of public education continued to exist until the 1960s. According to Dr. Abu-Izzeddin, public 
education remained completely inadequate. There were a total of two government secondary schools within the 
whole region, both of which were in Tripoli (Abu-Izzeddin, 1961, 42). Those who could pay were able to gain 
access to private education. Similarly, the muhafiz of the south comments on the poor state of education that left 
half of all children illiterate, ruing that “The total of all those are provided with an education in both private and 
government schools is 32,851 and so 35,000 are left without education, roaming in  fields and playing in alleys 
and lanes, and becoming victims of natural ignorance.” (el-Turk, 1961, 59) In other words, half of all school 
children lacked access to public education. The schools available tended to fail students in Lebanon.  Elizabeth 
Thompson provides an overall picture of public education in Lebanon when she writes that, “in general, state 
schools remained a ghetto for poor Muslims and poor villages of various sects.” (Thompson, 2000, 283) 
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but due to the very alliances that it had brokered. In response to the petitions of succor from 
death, disease and starvation, President Eddé, the administrative counselor rues, “has, on 
each occasion, turned the conversation to allow me to understand that these problems do not 





                                              
515 C460 DHCF 23 February 1939 au sujet fermeture de le ville de Tripoli in 22 February 1939 au sujet de la 
visite de la président de la république. 4.  
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V. Eventual Reform  
 206 
INTRODUCTION 
Vichy, Free French, British, Nazi, Iraqi, Egyptian and Syrian designs would each 
attempt to lay claim to the Levant during the transformative years of 1940 to 1946 following 
High Commissioner Gabriel Puaux’s decree of martial law in July 1939. These competing 
developments following the collapse of the third republic illustrate the theoretical 
considerations regarding the unbundling of territoriality. As territoriality is socially mediated 
rather than geographically imposed, it remains subject to competing practices of domination 
and resistance within a given location. A review of this theory will help to understand the 
rival strategies of domination and resistance that developed in Lebanon throughout the 
1940s. The informal practices that developed through the formal institutions of governance 
would assume an international dimension amid regional and imperial rivalries. It is possible 
to trace these unintended developments by examining the fallout from the electoral and 
legislative institutions that emerged from the 1926 constitution initiated by the Quai d’Orsay. 
Through a focus on the aftermath of the 1937 and 1943 legislative elections, it will be seen 
that far from strengthening the French mandate, these constitutional institutions not only 
facilitated the competing designs for Lebanon that weakened the already tenuous position of 
Paris and later Algiers, but also precipitated the informal alliances that drove France out of 
the Levant altogether.   
UNBUNDLING COLONIAL TERRITORIALITY 
As has been argued so far, colonial territoriality was not necessarily enforced through 
the onset of European practices of governance. Alternative worldviews did not always 
disappear with the arrival of Europe in the non-west. New relations of power did not 
necessarily become manifest with the establishment of colonial control. Instead, colonial 
governance involved the expansion of existing modes of political behavior, in the case of 
Lebanon, through bankrolling the very elements that sabotaged and misused political office. 
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To borrow a term from critical geo-politics, the upswing of the anti-colonial movement can 
be understood as the unbundling of territoriality, or the breakdown of the reach of the state. 
In signaling this potential for breakdown, the notion of the unbundling of territoriality 
underscores that the question of the reproduction of space is not so much about who controls 
where as much as it examines which processes are involved in power and resistance. With 
respect to colonialism, the metropole planted many of the seeds responsible for the erosion of 
its control, thereby contributing to the unbundling of colonial territoriality.  
In effect, the unbundling of territoriality highlights the asymmetry of state power, 
which, in turn, enables competing practices to develop and challenge state power. In the 
words of Agnew, “political power also strengthens or weakens geographically because the 
transmission of political power across space involves practices by others that lead to its 
transformation as it moves from one place to another. Political power therefore is exercised 
from sites that vary in their geographical reach.”516 The divergent practices that constitute 
state power possess varying degrees of effectiveness and reach as they interplay with 
particular historical, social and political circumstances. With this perspective in mind, the 
relations of power that underpin the production of space remain subject to change over time. 
This capacity to change makes possible the potential breakdown of order. Following Agnew, 
“because power is always manifested in its effects, however, rather than simply as a capacity 
or possession, power relations are better thought of in terms of territories of power and 
dispersed power networks in which individual persons, states and other actors…are 
                                              
516 Agnew, John, “Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries,” Millennium Journal of International 
Studies, 28: No 3 (1999), 501. In a different article, Agnew comments on the social and historical circumstances 
that underpin the production of space, writing that, “the critical theoretical issue, therefore, is the historical 
relationship between territorial states and the broader social and economic structures and geo-political order (or 
form of spatial practice) in which these states must operate, Agnew, John, “The Territorial Trap: The 
Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” Review of International Political Economy, 1:1 
(Spring 1994), 77).  
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embedded and located spatially relative to one another.”517 Due to these interrelated 
activities, the potential unbundling of territoriality does not imply the complete 
disappearance of state practices, but interplay of divergent practices.  
More specifically, John Ruggie depicts the practices that comprise the unbundling of 
territoriality. In his estimation, these include “various types of functional regimes, common 
markets, political communities and the like.”518 In addition to these predominately economic 
and political structures, informal politics ought to be considered as an institution that can 
reshape territoriality. As has been suggested in preceding chapters, informal mechanisms 
within the shadow state can undermine state power as much as they support it. To assume 
that territoriality becomes unbundled, however, is not to suggest that the state becomes 
irrelevant in the reproduction of space. For, as Ruggie goes on to write, “change has never 
been complete or all-encompassing.”519 Not only is territoriality socially mediated according 
to Ruggie and Agnew, it is historically constructed as well, and therefore, subject to the 
cultural, economic and political structures that challenge different iterations of state power. 
Following from this, the unbundling of territoriality resembles a kind of standoff in which 
different territorial practices compete against one another. That is, territorial control is not 
absolute. Since change is not complete and power not absolute, the breakdown of state order 
does not indicate the absolute absence of the state, but a shift and expansion in the political 
field. For colonial Lebanon, this shift would evolve into the movement for independence.  
Often in the Middle East, the challenge to the metropole owed as much to the native 
question as to the intrigues of rival empires. As historian Priya Satia contends, the region 
became subject to the machinations of covert empire, the informal network of spies, covert 
                                              
517 Agnew, 1999, 502. He goes on to write that, “But, the relative importance of territories and dispersed 
networks changes historically as a result of the changing geographical conditions under which political practices 
take place” (Agnew, 1999, 502).  
518 Ruggie, 1993, 165.  
519 Ruggie, 1993, 167.  
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affairs and colonial administration officials.520 Covert imperialism, she describes, was “a new 
imperial strategy…a version of indirect rule in which professional agents operated in a 
hidden realm of colonial government bureaucracy.”521 In this sense, the practices of 
“enforced informality”522 that Satia portrays constitute an extension of the forms of indirect 
rule examined earlier in chapter two. Under this system, the formal institutions of the 
mandate functioned as a facade for an array of colonial objectives.523 Far from having a 
panoptic vision, the maneuverings of covert empire were diffuse and often contradictory 
between the metropole and its various field offices. In keeping with Hannah Arendt, Satia 
contends that, “ultimately, the policy of covert empire had to be incoherent; the ‘very 
essence’ of the symbolic system created by the bureaucracy and spy is, Arendt explains, [an] 
‘aimless process,’ an end only abetted by an atmosphere of horizonless fear.”524 This 
incoherence of colonial administration becomes essential to understanding the breakdown of 
imperialism.  In ways that will become clear, the overlap of diplomacy, administration and 
intelligence facilitated the shadow state in the colony and the movement toward 
independence in the Levant. In the case of Lebanon, the unbundling of territoriality would 
take the form of informal politics, espionage, and foreign claims to the territory. 
To summarize, territoriality is not fixed, but contains many of the elements that 
contribute to its undoing. In this sense, the unbundling of territoriality does not constitute the 
complete absence of state power as much as it represents the existence of alternative 
practices of power that challenge the reach of the state. This unbundling takes the form of 
various political, economic and social practices. Such processes are evident in the twilight of 
                                              
520 Satia, Priya, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the 
Middle East, Oxford: Oxford UP: 2008, 268.  
521 Satia, 2008, 264. 
522 Satia, 2008, 264. 
523 According to Satia, Mark Sykes, the negotiator of Whitehall who helped to carve up the former Ottoman 
Empire, referred to the mooted independent Arab empire as a façade, as mentioned in Satia, 2008, 268.  
524 Satia, 2008, 278. 
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empire. As events in Lebanon will indicate, the colonial infrastructure built by the French 
directly facilitated the anti-colonial movement that contravened the reach of France in the 
Levant. Already, a number of the factors that helped to curtail French control have been 
mentioned. Formally, these included policies related to land reform, economic policies and 
municipal administration. In addition, informal social practices such as racketeering and 
patron-client relations drained the Quai d’Orsay of francs. Added to these elements below 
will be another internal factor, the constitutional regime instituted at the behest of France as 
well as external factors, namely British imperial designs. The informal politics that animated 
the electoral process and facilitated the ouster of France from Lebanon can be considered as 
an example of the unbundling of territoriality.  
OPPRESSION INTO ANARCHY 
 Although the unforeseen consequences of the mandate have already been presented 
with regards to public space, land reform, economic restructuring and municipal 
administration in the preceding chapters, the coup de grâce to the Quai d’Orsay involved 
foreign-funded plans to transform the most principal institution, the 1926 constitution that 
laid the groundwork for the executive office and legislature. Designed to entrench influence 
when the high commission faced unrest during the 1925 Druze revolt in parts of Lebanon and 
Syria,525 the constitution set the stage for the administrative crisis that the French struggled to 
overcome by the time of Puaux’s decree. The pages that follow offer an examination and 
review of two national legislative elections that took place in Lebanon during the French 
mandate. Recently declassified documents shed new light on the 1937 legislative elections, 
the second in the country since the establishment of the constitution in 1926 as the imposition 
of martial law in 1932 halted scheduled elections in that year. In addition, the events 
                                              
525 See Watenpaugh for an analysis of the Syrian conflicts that prompted the Quai d’Orsay to shift toward a 
more indirect policy of rule. Watenpaugh, Keith David. Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, 
Nationalism, Colonialism and the Arab Middle Class. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006, 211-234.  
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surrounding the 1943 national elections are reviewed. Though separated by the developments 
of the World War II, when compared in this fashion, the upheaval that has generally 
characterized accounts of the 1943 election appears as a logical outcome and continuation of 
the formal and informal practices evident by the 1930s. While the fallout of this period has 
already been broached in respect to the administrative anarchy in Tripoli and North Lebanon, 
it is worth exploring its implications at a national level. It will be seen that rather than 
strengthen the rule of the Quai d’Orsay, the constitutional regime empowered an array of 
informal practices that increasingly undermined formal French rule in the Levant to the point 
that French rule had fallen apart, forcing the termination of the mandate in the wake of the 
1943 elections.  
Formal Goals of the Constitutional Regime  
At the heart of the French mandate was the contradiction between its formal policies 
and informal goals. The French presence in the Levant was transformed with the 
establishment of the 1926 constitution, which ended the 8-year period of martial law that had 
begun in 1918. The architect of the 1926 constitution was High Commissioner Henry de 
Jouvenel, who had the distinction of serving as the first civilian and non-military high 
commissioner. His appointment followed the harsh crackdown of the Great Arab revolt by 
his predecessors, General Maurice Sarrail and General Maxime Weygand. A journalist, 
publisher and statesmen prior to his arrival in Beirut, de Jouvenel was a scion of the old 
aristocratic Famille Jouvenel des Ursins and a regular denizen of the elite political and 
intellectual social circles of Paris in the third republic.526 He received his appointment to the 
                                              
526 Quite the character, de Jouvenel was born Bertrand Henry Léon Robert de Jouvenel des Ursins and enjoyed a 
well- publicized social life. He was the editor of the daily Le Matin newspaper, brother of the renowned 
journalist Robert de Jouvenel and later a senator in France. It was rumored that his second wife, the former 
actress and mime turned writer Sidonie-Garielle Colette had an affair with her stepson Betrand de Jouvenel, the 
child from the first marriage of de Jouvenel on the eve of his appointment to Beirut in 1924. Whatever the 
veracity of the senator’s involvement in a love triangle with his own son, the narrative surrounding the de 
Jouvenel family disclose the large degree of insularity within the social stratum that came to rule France during 
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Levant following the electoral victory of the leftist Cartel des Gauches alliance of socialist 
and radicals in the 1924 French national elections, which remained in power until July 1926. 
Despite his short tenure of seven months from December 1925 until June 1926, de Jouvenel 
left a large institutional imprint on the country by appointing the drafting commission for 
what would become the 1926 constitution.527 Boycotted by Sunni and Shi‘a leaders in 
Lebanon, the constitution nonetheless passed its committee and was adopted on May 23, 
1926.528  
 The 1926 constitution resembled that of the third French Republic in that it featured a 
president, prime minister and bicameral legislature with a senate and chamber of deputies.529 
Whereas members of the chamber of deputies were elected to serve 3-year terms of office, 
the president appointed seven of the sixteen senators to their six-year terms.530 In turn, the 
legislature was headed by the speaker of the house and had the task of electing the president 
to a term of three years.531 Once elected, the president invited a legislator to head the 
government as prime minister and selected a cabinet from the two assemblies. In these ways, 
the political framework of the country resembled that of the third republic. The constitution 
represented a move to a more indirect form of rule through which the Quai d’Orsay hoped to 
win over elements of the population that had taken sides with the recalcitrant Druze revolt.  
Yet, the constitution portended for the Levant the rampant instability that 
characterized France during the interwar years. During the tenure of President Gaston 
                                                                                                                                              
the interwar years. Concern with the peoples and places within the Levantine colonies did not figure 
prominently within internal disputes.  
527 Traboulsi, 2007, 89. While de Jouvenel was nominally in office from late December 1925 to June 1926, 
Patrick Seale attests that de Jouvenel remained in office for eight months, presumably until the appointment of 
his successor. (Seale, 2010, 745). Whatever the number, his duration was short following a turnover of the 
government in France. 
528 Traboulsi, 2007, 89. Among other provisions, the constitution prepared a new name for the country, shifting 
from the State of Greater Lebanon to the Lebanese Republic. The boycott against the constitution followed the 
unfulfilled agreement of de Jouvenel. Although the former senator had negotiated with the Syrian Prime 
Minister to return Tripoli and Akkar to Syria, Paris reneged on the agreement in April 1926.  
529 Baaklini, Abdo. Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972. Durham: Duke UP, 1976, 62 
530 Baaklini, 1976, 63.  
531 Baaklini, 1976, 64.  
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Doumergue, for instance, there existed no less than 15 cabinets between 1924 and 1931, 
including those responsible for the arrival and ouster of de Jouvenel in the Levant.532 Under 
his successor, President Paul Doumber, the pattern continued, with 3 prime ministers holding 
office in 11 months, before Doumber’s violent murder cut short his time in office in 1932.533 
Still further, the reign of his successor, President Albert Lebrun witnessed the rise and fall of 
another 17 prime ministers and 10 foreign ministers between 1932 and 1940.534 Despite de 
Jouvenel’s civilian vision for the Levant, the volatile instability that gripped the metropole 
would eventually reach the colonies. 
Less than a year after its imposition, the high commission quickly found it necessary 
to amend the constitution under High Commissioner August Henri Ponsot. Because the 
constitution constrained French influence by privileging a strong legislature over a weak 
executive in much the same ways that had allowed French parliaments to instigate the 
resignation of the cabinet, Ponsot persuaded the legislature to push through a number of 
amendments under the threat of arrest and dissolution of the assembly in 1927.535 These 
amendments included: 1) the abolishment of the senate in favor of an expansion of the 
chamber of deputies in which 2/3 of members were elected and 1/3 appointed by the 
president 2) the capacity of the president to choose his cabinet from the house of delegates 3) 
the right of the president to dissolve the legislature 4) an increase in the president’s discretion 
over the budget 5) an increase in the president’s scope to introduce and approve 
legislation.536 As if this power were not enough, the French passed through further 
amendments to the constitution in 1929 so that 1) the president’s cabinet could come from 
                                              
532 White, 2011, 16. Despite this high executive turnover, White sees a certain relative stability within the 
foreign ministry, as indicated in the relatively long tenures of the high commissioners for the Levant. Between 
1919 and 1940, for instance, there were only 7 high commissioners for Lebanon and Syria.  
533 White, 2011, 29, Note 29.  
534 White, 2011, 29, Note 29.  
535 Baaklini, 1976, 66. The pitfalls of the weak executive are also described in Mufarrij, 1935, 348.  
536 Baaklini, 1976, 66-67; Mufarrij, 193, 349.  
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outside of the parliament, 2) the executive could dissolve parliament and 3) presidential term 
limits were extended from 3 years to 6 years.537 In these ways, the Quai d’Orsay hoped to 
maintain control through its influence over the increasingly powerful president.  
It was in this context of constitutional reform that France’s man in the Levant, Emile 
Eddé, came to power. Mentioned in previous sections in relation to his alliances with the 
likes of Abd al-Wahab, the Stephan brothers, and the al-Muqaddem family in the north, the 
rise to power of Eddé reflected the expanding French influence in the Levant during the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Born in the Maronite stronghold of Jubayl to a dragoman 
father employed in the French consulate of Damascus, he went on to study law at the French 
Jesuit founded Université du Saint Josèphe before marrying into one of the most prominent 
Maronite families of Beirut.538 Considered the favorite politician of Maronite Patriarch Elias 
Huwayik, he became France’s man in Lebanon from as early as 1922.539 This particular 
Maronite community was instrumental in orchestrating politics during the mandate and filled 
the ranks of the 1926 constitutional drafting committee. The most prominent member of the 
drafting committee was the banker Michel Chiha, who worked beside commissioner Petro 
Trad, Shibl Dammas and Umar Da‘uq.540 As a result of their involvement, the office of the 
president was usually reserved for a Christian, typically a Maronite. Still, Paris faced 
unexpected circumstances that challenged the status quo emanating from Tripoli. When one 
of the city’s most respected residents, delegate in the house of assembly Shaykh 
Muhmammad al-Jisr opted to contest for the presidency during the 1932 legislative elections, 
the high commission confronted the very real possibility that the sweeping powers that it had 
earmarked for its man in Lebanon could be possessed by someone not beholden to the Quai 
                                              
537 Baaklini, 1976, 68.  
538 Traboulsi, 2007, 93.  
539 Traboulsi, 2007, 93. Jubayl is also transliterated as Jubeil.  
540 Traboulsi, 2007, 89. 
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d’Orsay.541  In response to this threat, Ponsot, as indicated in the last chapter, chose to 
suspend the constitution.542  
A Martial Spirit  
Ponsot’s resort to martial law highlighted the informal goals of the high commission. 
Namely, the high commission sought to use the formal institutions of the mandate to 
transform power relations in the colonies into a system of centralized hierarchy similar to 
military control. Not only did martial law endure during the first eight years of French rule 
between 1918 and 1926, Paris would revert to this tactic during times of unrest, as was the 
case twice in the 1930s between 1932-1937 and 1939-1943 during WWII. While the interwar 
years are generally thought of as a peaceful time conjuring images of Bohemian nightlife in 
Berlin, the colonies suffered from a series of armed conflicts during this time, from the 
twilight of the ravages of WWI, to the Druze Revolt of 1925-1927, the Great Arab revolt in 
Palestine in 1936 and the Iraqi uprising of 1941, all of which involved combatants from Syria 
and Lebanon. This propensity for conflict underpinned the high commission’s use of force, 
as was the case when de Martel ordered a strict surveillance on Tripoli following the events 
of the 1936 riots chronicled in chapter two.  
Such martial objectives are made plain in a 1939 report, “Rapport sur la situation 
politique et administrative au Liban” by M. Paul Gassouin.543 While his exact role within the 
high commission is unclear, the details of this report indicate that Gassouin spent twenty 
years of service in the Levant from the days of Colonel de Piépape in 1919, and the candor of 
this letter suggest that he not only came from the same conservative military background as 
                                              
541 A leading notable in Tripoli, Shaykh Muhammad al- Jisr had been close to General Gouraud and his 
successor as high commissioner, General Maxime Weygand, while serving in the assembly that eventually 
became the House of Delegates following the 1926 constitution. He was even presented with the Legion 
d’Honneur in 1921.   See Saliba. 2016 and Atiyah , 1973 for a detailed review of the 1932 crisis. 
542 Ziada, Nicola, Syria and Lebanon, Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1968, 62. 
543 C463 HCF Secrétaire générale No. 1536 13 July1939, rapport sur la situation politique et administrative au 
Liban par M. Gassouin  
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de Piépape, Gouraud and du Paty de Clam, but served in a high position within the Political 
Bureau of the High Commission, a post senior to the administrative counselor but junior to 
the high commissioner and deputy high commissioner. Whatever the case, it is clear that 
Gassouin was a seasoned political insider within the mandate regime by the time that he 
authored this report and the dossier cited in chapter one, “Notes sur la reforme éventuelle de 
la constitution du Liban et sur les principes de collaboration Franco-Libanais après la mise 
en vigueur du traité.”544 In documenting the political landscape in Lebanon, the Gassouin 
report discloses the system of thought that underpinned mandate rule, and more ominously, 
foreshadows the informal developments that would develop in the next decade.  
 First, in his report, Gassouin champions the martial spirit that animated the early 
years of French rule in the Levant after WWI. “The first high commissioners, Gouraud, 
Weygand, Sarrail,” he asserts, “limited the damages by allocating to Lebanon a suitable 
economic administration and maintaining a strict control through the interference of its 
[French] advisors. Therefore, a martial spirit (l’esprit militaire) reigned with its probity, 
rigidity and common sense, qualities of which we were most in need.”545 In other words, the 
upper echelons sought to rule the inhabitants of the Levant as if they were the infantry corps 
of an army. Following the imagery of Gassouin, the high commissioners comported 
themselves as generals and used the French advisors as a junior officer corps to oversee the 
politicians within the government. It comes as little surprise then, that many of the high 
commissioners were, in fact, generals. Moreover, some of the French advisors like du Paty de 
Clam and Commandant Zinovy Pechkoff, described later in this chapter, served as actual 
junior officers in the French military prior to working in the Levant in the 1920s. Moreover, 
                                              
544 C463 HCF Note sur la reforme eventuelle de la constitution du Liban et sur les principes de collaboration 
Franco-Libanais après la mise en vigueur du traite by M. Gassouin 
545 C463 HCF Secrétaire générale No. 1536 13 July1939, rapport sur la situation politique et administrative au 
Liban by M. Gassouin, 1.  
 217 
this military spirit was made evident during the period of martial law imposed between 1918 
to 1926, 1932 to 1937, and 1939 to 1943.  
However, this underlying military spirit of the mandate, Gassouin rues, changed with 
the appointment of de Jouvenel. Among the handful of documents reviewed in this study to 
critically assess the shortcomings of French policy, the Gassouin report decries what the 
author describes as “the dogmas and mystiques of internal French politics.”546 By this he 
refers to the ideological views that animated the establishment of the 1926 constitution. Or in 
his words, “this regime and this constitution were imposed on the country by M. de Jouvenel 
and M. Souchier in order to appease the Socialists of France.”547 In this sense, this radical 
faction represented by de Jouvenel and the coalition government that appointed him 
contravened the conservative, military logic that had previously underpinned mandate rule. 
In effect, the reforms of de Jouvenel established an untenable dichotomy.  In ways that will 
be seen later, because the constitutional regime facilitated informal politics within the 
country, the civilian rule of the parliament contravened the military logic that once ruled. In 
practice, these duel systems of thought eroded French influence. Or, in the poignant words of 
Gassouin, “they [the people of Lebanon] know perfectly well from the experiences of these 
past few years that the parliament cannot reform itself, and that when the people rise up they 
are met with French bayonets that appear to bring oppression into anarchy rather than order 
into liberty.”548 With a nod to events in Tripoli and Akkar as well as in south Lebanon, the 
dichotomy of mingled oppression and anarchy highlights the ways in which mandate policy 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s was born of contradictory rationales that failed to coalesce in 
practice.549  
                                              
546 op. cit., 1.  
547 op. cit., 4.  
548 op. cit., 4.  
549  In the vein of this contradiction, Gassouin goes on to write that, “this little country, lacking the capability of 
defending its borders or even of guaranteeing order within them, a country without any international 
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The contradictions at the heart of mandate rule also affected the metropole. As Martin 
Thomas writes with respect to Paris’ policy in mandate Syria, “the essential dichotomy of 
mandate governance lay between a theoretical long-term commitment to cultivate indigenous 
government and a short-term recourse to authoritarian, quasi-colonial expedients.”550 For 
instance, the type of contradictions that Thomas mentions is evidenced in the reaction of the 
legislature to the 1936 Franco-Lebanese treaty negotiated between de Martel and Eddé. In the 
case of the ratification of the treaty, adherents to the same underlying martial spirit described 
by Gassouin trumped the faction agitating for civilian rule. With military interests in mind, 
the French national assembly refused to ratify the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese 
treaties.551 Instrumental in this decision was the war council within the cabinet, among whom 
served General Maxime Weygand, the former high commissioner of Lebanon whose harsh 
policies contributed to the 1925 Druze revolt against the mandate.552 In their outlook, the war 
council followed long-standing military considerations in viewing the eastern Mediterranean 
as a potential base for allied forces against a potential war with Germany and Italy.553 In 
addition, the war council had hoped that the Levant could open a new front in a war in the 
Balkans and assist Britain in defending the Suez Canal in case of war.554 Such contingency 
plans informed French foreign policy. It was with the purpose of maintaining the Levant 
under French control that the war council ceded the state of Alexandretta to Turkey on the 
                                                                                                                                              
responsibility, was saddled with a republican regime, a constitution grotesque for its size and with an executive 
responsible to a parliament elected by universal suffrage!...The Lebanese people remained at times 
flabbergasted, unable to believe that this Courteline comedy could last. Then they reasoned and said to 
themselves, what does it matter so long as France and its control is always there! So it must be, so it will be” 
(op. cit., 1).  
550 Thomas, Martin. “French Intelligence-Gathering in the Syrian Mandate, 1920-40,” Middle Eastern Studies, 
38:1 (2002), 1-2. He would describe the predicament of the high commission with,  “high commission staff 
were consistently forced to re-evaluate the difficult political choices before them. The rule of law was fragile, 
military manpower in short supply and French prerogative only fitfully acknowledged by tribal shaykhs in the 
Syrian interior.”  (Thomas, 20002, 2) 
551 Zamir, 2015, 59; Saliba 2016, 164; Thomas, Martin, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial 
Disorder after 1914, Berkeley: U California P, 2008, 278.  
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premise that Ankara would join the allies in a war against Germany.555As a result of France’s 
wartime calculations and fears, the scenario took place whereby the country failed to ratify 
the treaty that its own representatives had negotiated. Such discord not only reflected the 
competing forces within the metropole, but the conflicts and crises to come in the colonies. 
Effects of the Constitutional Regime  
Already, the effects of the constitutional regime have been mentioned in earlier 
chapters in relation to the actions and indiscretions of the politicians who came to power 
following the 1926 and 1937 elections such as Abboud Bey and his son Muhammad, Rached 
al-Muqaddem, Youssef Stephan, and President Emile Eddé, all of whom were said to have 
links to criminal enterprise and activities. Without recapitulating the turmoil described in 
previous chapters, it is worth focusing on a few diplomatic cables sent by high commission 
officials like the Gassouin report. More than other documents cited so far, this handful of 
reports written in the aftermath of the 1937 elections provide a critical perspective on the 
contradictions of French policy, especially the ways in which the underlying military logic of 
the conservative faction within the Quai d’Orsay and French military contravened the 
overtures to civilian autonomy and indirect rule within the colonies. Far from resolving the 
strife that had precipitated the drafting of the constitution, this contradiction constrained the 
high commission from effectively addressing the spread of informal politics in the 
legislature. First, the constitutional regime generated patrimonialism within the parliament, 
what Gassouin referred to as the era of politics and the golden age of demagogues.556 Second, 
the regime contributed to the administrative malfeasance within the civil service. Third, it led 
to the marginalization of the poor to the profit of a select few. In these ways, despite the goal 
of enforcing a military spirit among the inhabitants, the high commission facilitated the rise 
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of informal politics, bringing what Gassouin described as oppression into an atmosphere of 
anarchy rather than order into liberty. 
1. Pitfall of Elections  
More than a blueprint of the underlying logic of mandate rule, the Gassouin text 
provides a cumulative and critical analysis of the effects of mandate rule during the two 
decades of the French presence in the Levant. The tone that opens the text sets the stage for 
the sobering admissions that follow in much the same way that du Paty de Clam confesses 
his repeated inabilities to convince President Eddé to address the crises in the north. “I 
confess M. L’ambassadeur,” it opens, “that I sent your predecessors notes and studies that 
were unfortunately perfectly useless because my efforts were always undermined by two 
terrible setbacks: interior French politics and the absence of a sincere organ to express public 
opinion in Lebanon.”557 While the first setback mentioned by Gassouin concerns the rival 
conservative and liberal factions within the French legislature, the second pitfalls takes into 
consideration the breakdown in the chain of command between the delegates of Paris and the 
inhabitants of the country.  
Among the chief causes for this breakdown was the rampant malfeasance within the 
parliament and executive branches. On this subject, Gassouin declares that these institutions 
developed too quickly in sharp contrast to their more organic growth in the republic. In this 
manner he writes that,  
In less than ten years, all of the institutions that took more than fifty years to develop 
in France have deepened the clashes here and are almost equal to the rank of public 
institutions. There is nothing surprising about this since, from the beginning, the 
corruption that took place at the roots of the tree spread to every branch.558  
 
By offering parliamentarians and ministers lucrative salaries, the high commission helped to 
bankroll abuse of power. In this context, elections did not signify one-man one-vote as much 
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as it inaugurated vote buying. Or, per the report, “the legislative elections that were at the 
root of the government, were in this country a public marketplace from the very first day in 
which illiterate and unconcerned voters sold themselves to the highest bidders.”559 That is, in 
relatively poor regions suffering from large degrees of illiteracy and further hampered by 
French economic and land tenure policies, elections were seen to have degenerated into a 
racket. It was in such circumstances that a reputed loan shark like Abboud Bey could thrive 
in office to the point that he could bequeath his seat in the assembly to his son.  
Despite the administrative reforms adopted by successive high commissioners, the 
fraudulent atmosphere of elections only worsened. Or, in the words of Gassouin, “this 
cynicism and degradation has increased with each new election and are so well entrenched in 
the government’s mores that the election of the current parliament gives rise to official 
scandals present in everyone’s memories that are sufficient to indict the entire regime.”560 
Whatever the crimes that Gassouin had in mind, among the claims reviewed in earlier 
chapters of crimes and scandals reportedly committed by legislators who came to office 
following the 1937 elections included usury, obstruction of justice, fraud, embezzlement, 
weapons smuggling, drug cultivation and trafficking, rape and murder. In this sense, then, the 
Gassouin report corroborates the unreported claims of widespread criminality made by Mme. 
Lattouf, du Paty de Clam, Dr. Boulos and others. On the other hand, it indicates that not only 
was such abuse rampant in the north, but prevalent throughout the whole country.561 This 
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damning indictment of the whole government represented the pitfalls of the constitutional 
regime. Amid the systematic criminal behavior, it is plausible that the official scandals still 
present in everyone’s mind referred to the embezzlement of resources within the Société 
d’Electricité, through which lamps were installed at the homes of leading notables at the 
expense of the public.562   
 From a different perspective, however, the graft among the legislature was a function 
of the high commission’s amendments to the original 1926 constitution. Since the Quai 
d’Orsay strengthened the executive office at the expense of the legislature, delegates sought 
to expand their weakened remit through patron client relations. Following Gassouin, “the 
majority of deputies, for their part, whether they belong to the opposition or not, do not 
concern themselves with their portfolios or salaries, but allocate government posts to their 
clients and protégés.”563 Similar to the al-Karami family, then, those who joined the ranks of 
the government sabotaged their positions by using them for personal interests, often at the 
expense of the treasury. Moreover, their brief terms of office seemed to have encouraged 
legislators to privilege short-term personal interests for fear that they would lose their 
prominent positions in the next elections. In this vein, the report goes on to lament that,  
It is natural that the majority of candidates who conduct such a market consider their 
office as merely a fund to exploit and shamelessly profit from it by any means at their 
disposal. It is natural, then, that in this case the president of the republic, in order to 
assure re-election, ceases from being an independent arbiter of parties when he 
confides power in his own group, places his friends in all of the government posts and 
never hesitates to create for them new and useless expenses that are onerous for the 
budget. It is also natural in this case that the ministers are anxious to withdraw from 
their portfolios the maximum benefit because they know that knew that their power is 
of a short duration.564 
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As criminal and corrupt as legislative affairs were during the 1920s and 1930s, later events 
will show that the practices inaugurated during this time set the stage for an even larger 
controversies during the constitutional crisis.  
2. The Army of Bureaucrats  
 At the same time, the patron-client relations that legislators cultivated also implicated 
the civil service. Already the effects of the constitutional regime have been depicted in 
relation to the northern municipalities in Akkar and Tripoli. Yet, as Gassouin writes, “the 
Lebanese have always suffered from the plague of bureaucracy and this is natural within a 
poor country with a very dense population where the civil servant assumes power without 
great responsibility and tirelessly ensures his own lifestyle.”565 This lifestyle often came at 
the expense of the taxpayer. As another author writes of  “the pathological government 
(gouvernement maladif) of title and vanity” that absorbs the majority of the national coffers 
to the point that 80% of the national budget was reserved for personnel salaries of civil 
servants.566 This level of spending occurred as delegates used their office to secure jobs 
within the government for their clientele in order to expand the prestige and power that 
French constitutional amendments had curbed. Excess spending festered to the point that 
around the 1937 legislative elections, one official complained that “a veritable regime of 
terror [reigned], served by the army of bureaucrats: those suspected of sympathy or even 
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half-hearted support for the opposition were replaced by the electoral agents of the 
government, who went on to possess an even more pompous distribution of resources.”567 
This expanding cycle of profligate spending occurred at a time when the majority of residents 
grew further impoverished due to the fall of agriculture and the Great Depression.  
“What do the majority of Lebanese think about this situation,” Gassouin poses to 
High Commissioner Puaux.568 In answering this question, he discloses the degree to which 
the population became divided between those with access to the formal structures of 
governance and the majority without it.  On the one hand, Gassouin affirms, “if you were to 
interrogate the profiteers of this current regime, from the first to the last echelon and all those 
who have the ambition to become one along with their parents and protégés, they would tell 
you that everything is fine in Lebanon and that it [this situation] is the talk of ambitious rivals 
or of the disaffected enemies of France and Lebanon.”569 In this sense, the constitutional 
regime cultivated several networks of patronage that profited a minority of individuals 
content with the status quo. It was this class of profiteers and would-be profiteers who 
dominated the media with their petty politics, as discussed previously, to the extent that the 
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agents of Paris were unable to discern public opinion.570 Beneath this brouhaha, however, 
another reality appeared before the mandate. “If, on the contrary, you were to listen to the 
working people or to certain classes, professionals or communities,” Gassouin informs the 
high commissioner, “then you would hear with the force of their despair that administrative 
anarchy and corruption have reached an unbearable and unprecedented level in this country 
today and, that before the indifference of France, one does not know from which side 
salvation will come.”571 This force of despair resembles the desperate complaints of 
municipal administration in the north. The plague of bureaucracy festered through the 
contradiction of mandate policies at a time when residents suffered from the prevalence of 
water-borne diseases in the country.  
3. Marginalization of the Poor 
 The force of despair mentioned in the Gassouin report reflects the ways in which the 
colonial regime marginalized the majority of residents. Rather than assimilate the population 
into a uniform martial spirit, the mandate helped to divide the inhabitants of the country 
between, in the words of Gassouin, “on one side, a minority of profiteers and, on the other, 
the majority of Lebanese people.”572 The stalemate that emerged from the administration 
worsened through the petty politics, patron client relations, and racketeering that Paris 
bankrolled. In this manner, Gassouin goes on to add that,  
One the one hand, a scheming minority that is actively organized with its newspapers 
and men for the struggle to have all of the top government posts, which would make 
the exploitation of the country its very own affair; and, on the other, the great 
majority, absorbed with their everyday affairs, without a connection, without an organ 
of expression and discouraged by the apparent or tacit support that France gives to 
their exploiters.573 
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His account corroborates the description of petty politics discussed in the last chapter and 
their negative effects for the disenfranchised. Such perspectives disclosed the economic, 
political, social and cultural divides that emerged from French policy. The apparent and tacit 
support mentioned by the author represented the contradictions of mandate rule that 
contributed to such unrest.  
The Indifference of France  
 Not only was this stalemate detrimental to the beleaguered residents, there also 
existed an appreciation that the political situation described by Gassouin threatened the 
mandate. In this manner, the report warns that, “the truth is that a parliamentary regime is 
necessary but the current system and constitution cannot be maintained for long without 
generating the most serious political and economic disruptions in the life of Lebanon.”574 In 
this sense, the Gassouin report offers an indictment of the entire political infrastructure in 
Lebanon as well as the conflicted French policy that underpinned it. More so than other 
reports, the Gassouin piece offers the impression that the political infrastructure that France 
decreed to Lebanon was doomed to failure. “To ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty without 
changes,” Gassouin admonishes, “would be a crime against the peaceful and loyal friend of 
France who has not done anything to deserve it.”575 
 Ultimately, the eventual reform that Gassouin called for to prevent the serious 
political and economic disruptions in Lebanon never materialized. Instead, the precarious 
position of Paris worsened amid the surrender of the republic, the rise and fall of the Vichy 
government in the Levant, the emergence of the Spears mission and British influence, and, 
last but not least, the 1943 constitutional crisis. Mere weeks following the time stamp of the 
Gassouin report, Hitler marched troops into Poland and Europe was at war. In the next two 
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years, the Levant fell under the control of the Vichy-led government linked to Nazi Germany, 
the nominal authority of the Free French forces under General Charles de Gaulle and his 
representative in the Levant Georges Catroux as well as the influence of the British 
diplomatic mission.576  
The Lead Up to 1943 Elections 
As seen from the vantage of events in the south, the warning issued by Gassouin 
proved correct. The informal arrangements empowered by the electoral process developed to 
the point that a host of actors could employ them to oust France from the Levant amid the 
turmoil of World War II. Following the ouster of the Vichy forces in July 1941, the high 
commission would share and, ultimately, lose its prominent position in Lebanon and Syria to 
the diplomatic mission set up by the British under the command of Major General Sir 
Edward Louis Spears. A businessman, army officer, intelligence agent, peer, veteran of WWI 
and personal friend of Winston Churchill, General Spears would play a similarly multi-
faceted role in the Levant.577 As Israeli historian of the French mandate Meir Zamir describes 
it,  
The Spears mission, which competed with the French high commission, comprised by 
1944 more than a hundred political and intelligence officers stationed throughout 
Syria and Lebanon. The mission dealt with civilian, economic and political issues, 
becoming an effective tool for Spears to undermine France’s position and mobilize 
Lebanon and Syrian nationalists against it. It had a large budget, used partly for 
subversion and propaganda warfare, and many of its political officers were in fact 
intelligence agents.578  
 
In this sense, the Spears mission represented the covert empire that had spanned across the 
Arab world. Between 1941 and 1945, the Spears mission would seek to expand Whitehall’s 
influence at the expense of the Free French. The overall tone of Spear’s intentions remains 
debatable. For Zamir, this strategy was part of the centuries old imperial logic. In his words, 
                                              
576 For a review of WWII in the Levant, see, Ziada, 1968, Zamir, 2015, Seale, 2010, Pearse, 1949.  
577 Zamir, 2015, 30-31.  
578 Zamir, 2015, 31.  
 228 
“although he [Spears] presented himself as a champion of Syrian and Lebanese 
independence, he was, like many other British officials in the region, an imperialist who saw 
France’s defeat as an opportunity for Britain to take over in the Levant.”579 Whatever the 
case, the Spears mission proved essential in funding informal politics during the 1943 
election.  
The recent scholarship of Zamir, collected at the same French diplomatic archives 
where this study was partly researched, discloses the covert workings and goals of the Spears 
mission.580 From this new perspective, then, Spears, himself, was not a rogue agent acting in 
contravention of Whitehall and his long-standing friend and ally, Winston Churchill, but an 
operative in a clandestine political network designed to ensure and enhance Britain’s 
prominent position within the Middle East from the Persian Gulf to North Africa. For the 
Spears mission, the key to expanding London’s position was to co-opt the leading figures in 
Syria and Lebanon, especially those who had been marginalized by France’s support for the 
Maronite community headed by Eddé. That is, the mission sought to tap into the rampant 
informal politics within the country so as to transform the formal institutions of governance. 
Notable within this network of asset conversion was Colonel Stephen Longrigg, the political 
officer stationed at the Baghdad office of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, who used the pretext 
of negotiating the construction of a pipeline terminal in Tripoli as a cover for his role in 
sounding out potential allies of London.581 Later, Longrigg would use his association with 
mandate officials and Lebanese politicians to compose one of the earliest English language 
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histories of the mandate, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate.582 Slightly less 
prominent but no less prolific with his memoirs was Sergeant Richard Pearse, whose run-ins 
with the petty politics of North Lebanon were examined in the previous chapter.583  
Among the local allies of the Spears mission, the most important figure was Riad el-
Solh.584 The maneuverings of el-Solh are documented in the last work of the late British 
journalist Patrick Seale, based on his special access to the family’s private papers and 
additional research of the British diplomatic cables in London.585 Like al-Karami, el-Solh 
was the son of an Ottoman administrator and was groomed from his childhood for a career in 
public service. His father Rida served for 28 years as an Ottoman official and eventually 
reached the rank of Mutessarif of the Sanjak of Preveza in Albania.586 As his father 
approached retirement, the younger el-Solh went to govern the family’s ancestral hometown 
of Sidon when he was a mere 24 years old; but the upheavals of war cut short his ambitions, 
prompting his resignation in 1919.587 Eventually, while his father retired to the family’s 
home in Beirut, the young statesman spent the mandate years in Syria and Europe as a 
founding member and negotiator for the pan-Arab Syrian Nationalist Bloc. Following 
historian of the National Bloc Keith David Watenpaugh, its members included the old social 
classes and prominent families of Aleppo and Damascus who sought to regain some of the 
social, political and economic status that they had lost upon the dissolution of the Ottoman 
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Empire.588 Joining the young el-Solh in the National Bloc were his father-in-law Saad Allah 
al-Jabiri of Aleppo and Jamil Mardam Bey of Damascus. Long viewed as an adversary of 
Paris, el-Solh used his contacts in the Levant to help organize the Conference of the Coasts in 
1936 in which delegations from different areas within the annexed territories pledged to 
unify their constituencies with Syria.589 In addition, el-Solh was one of the negotiators of the 
Franco-Syrian treaty, which helped to foment the 1936 series of uprisings in Tripoli. In 
effect, the failure of the French legislature to ratify the treaty and the bloodshed that it 
generated in the colony tarnished his personal reputation. Upon the commencement of 
hostilities in Europe, he returned to Beirut and became both observer and participant in the 
shifting fortunes of the Levant. As a result of these political shifts, el-Solh made inroads with 
the British by March 1941, months before the Syrian-Lebanese campaign began. Through 
Spears’ assistant, Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, he helped the British intelligence office to secretly 
communicate with other Syrian nationalists.590  
The Secret Alliance  
The intrigues of the Spears mission proved well-founded Gassouin’s fear that the 
republican infrastructure in Lebanon invited the enemies of France to broker foreign 
influence and informal arrangements.591 With these backdoor channels in place, el-Solh was 
the point man in Lebanon to facilitate the covert plan brokered by British intelligence 
officials and assets to unify Syria, Lebanon, mandate Palestine and Iraq into an Iraqi-led 
Hashemite federation under the aegis of Whitehall.592 For London, the revival of the old 
Ottoman province of Greater Syria would resolve the questions over Palestine and Iraq in 
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addition to regulate its control of oil and the Suez Canal.593 The memos of understanding 
fastidiously documented, translated and analyzed by Zamir reveal that the Spears mission 
sought to leverage its influence to elect these nationalist leaders in Lebanon and Syria; and in 
exchange, they would use their executive power to oust the French from the Levant and 
move their countries closer to London.594 Negotiated by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, 
the plan called for Britain to secretly fund (or as some might argue bribe) the campaigns of 
these nationalist figures like el-Solh, his father-in-law al-Jabiri, in addition to his colleagues 
in the National Bloc Shukri al-Quwatli and Jamil Mardam Bey.595 In effect, the plan of the 
secret alliance attempted to transform the executive and legislative infrastructure to no longer 
exalt French influence, but to weaken the Free French. First, when acting high commissioner 
and representative of the Free French General Georges Catroux stalled on his initial calls for 
general elections in Syria and Lebanon, these seasoned activists seized on the opportunity to 
pressure the high commission. In their aid, Spears convinced Catroux to hold elections in 
order to uphold his earlier promises of granting a fig leaf of independence to Syria and 
Lebanon.596 Ultimately, Catroux announced elections for August 1943 in Syria and 
September 1943 in Lebanon. Whatever the intentions of Catroux, the elections gestured a 
move toward independence and prompted a number of longtime adversaries of the mandate 
to contest for office, including Riad el-Solh. Although he resided in Beirut, had been 
schooled in Istanbul and later Paris, and married into a prominent family from Aleppo, el-
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Solh sought a seat in the town of Sidon, the administrative center of the muhafaza of South 
Lebanon, a region known among locals as the Jabal Amil.597  
History of the Jabal Amil 
Historically, the villages that constituted the Jabal Amil dwelled within the 
mountains, hills and valleys interior of the Mediterranean. Upon Gouraud’s 1920 decree, this 
area was split between the muhafazat of Mt. Lebanon and Southern Lebanon. 598 The 
administrative center of the south was Sidon, a coastal town along the Mediterranean 
inhabited since the Phoenicians, which had functioned as a dependency of Acre during the 
Ottoman Empire.599 A predominately agricultural area, the south served as tobacco country 
and had a long history of supplying its produce to Egypt.600 In this sense, the south possessed 
traits similar to Akkar in that it had a landless majority of cultivators, a small minority of 
landowners, and an economy—to borrow the words of Weulersse—that was nourished by 
debt. Economically, the area depended on trade with nearby territories within the Ottoman 
Empire, especially Mt. Lebanon and the Syrian interior.601 Witness and participant in the 
upheavals of the time, the south brooked the ravages of famine, WWI, the impoverishment of 
the Great Depression as well as the Druze revolt against Paris and subsequent protests against 
the mandate. Its fortunes remained bleak during the mandate and became like other areas of 
the annexed territories, an economic, social and political backwater. At the same time, due to 
                                              
597 The Jabal Amil goes by many names including Djabal Amil, Djabal Amal, Djabal Amel, Jabal Amel and 
Jabal Amel.  
598 C1533 30 June 1920 HCF Projet d’organisation du Jabal Amel: Manouevres politique a entreprendre pour 
obtenir un derivatif a la situation actuelle; Chalabi, Tamara, The Shi‘is of Jabal Amil and the New Lebanon: 
Community and Nation State, 2006, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 12.  
599 Reilly, 2016, 52. Historically, Sidon was a key commercial center connecting trade between Europe and the 
Syrian and Palestinian hinterlands. Despite this history, Sidon was generally ignored by the Ottomans and 
overlooked in favor of other coastal cities like Beirut and Haifa, which expanded from small towns during the 
nineteenth centuries into proper cities.  
600 Chalabi, 2006, 18.  
601 Chalabi, 2006, 26. Under the Ottomans, the economy declined following a series of economic concessions 
that the Sublime Porte granted to its European creditors during the period of Tanzimat reforms mentioned in 
chapter two. To service its debts, the Porte gave a tobacco concession to French companies known as the 
Tobacco Regie. Chalabi, 2006, 18. 
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its location at the crossroads of Lebanon, Syria and British mandate Palestine, the south 
became the center of smuggling networks that transported weapons, narcotics and people.602 
Despite the economic pressures in the region and its history of popular resistance against the 
mandate, many of the leading notable landlords in the area were on friendly terms with the 
high commission. By the earlier 1940s, South Lebanon had an estimated population of 
198,000.603 
Colonial Designs of the Jabal Amil  
The delegates of Paris considered the south as the home of Shi‘a Muslim population, 
individuals regularly described in French reports in the basest terms for their “well-known 
feeble degree of evolution” and “docility.”604 Whatever the biases and aspersions of the 
French, the south suffered from the same chronic neglect and marginalization as areas of the 
annexed territories. French officials depicted the landscape using the same stock characters 
that colored accounts of land tenure in Alawite country. As one 1920 report claims,  
In the Jabal Amil, the principal Shiite center in Syria, three elements completely 
different and born of diametrically opposed sentiments are stitched together without 
entirely clashing against one another; because the notable that constitutes the first of 
these elements exercises in the region where he possesses his goods a veritable 
suzerain in which the peasant, the second element, is a serf and the clergy, the third 
element, is the devote servant.605  
 
Whatever its veracity, the representation of the timeless feudal relations of power between 
the notables, serfs and clergy discloses the systems of thought prevalent among mandate 
officials. With this worldview in mind, the Quai d’Orsay sought to make inroads among the 
                                              
602 See Pearse, 1947. Also See C 2423, which contains a hefty file of the Dendache family, one of the principal 
smugglers in the areas between the south, the Bekaa and Mt. Lebanon. C2423 DHCF Services Spécieux Poste 
de la Bekaa No 527 SSB 30 September 1932. Notes sur les Dendaches.  
603 MAE Rapport a la Societe des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1942 as mentioned in 
Hourani, Albert, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1946, 85. As stated elsewhere, 
population statistics in Lebanon are extremely unreliable Nonetheless, I have included them to give the reader a 
sketch of the region.  
604 The quotes come from C459 DHCF No. 3619, 4 October 1940, au sujet du Caimacam du Chouf, 2 and 
C1533 30 June 1920 HCF Projet d’organisation du Jabal Amel: Manœuvres politique a entreprendre pour 
obtenir un dérivatif a la situation actuelle, 2 respectively.  
605 C1533 30 June 1920 HCF Projet d’organisation du Jabal Amel: Manœuvres politique à entreprendre pour 
obtenir un dérivatif a la situation actuelle, 2 respectively. 
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population by affording the clergy limited autonomy and inviting the powerful landlords into 
the parliament.606  
Thus, distinguishing the south from other areas in the country was the unique 
composition of its notables. “In the Orient more so than in the West,” one official explains, 
“there exists two types of nobility: one of money and one of birth. In its feudality of the Jabal 
Amil, the two types form but one in that we have seen that the notables are at the same time 
the most important landlords.”607 Whereas mandate officials complained that they could not 
attract support from notables in the north who possessed social capital and political 
prominence, they could rely upon individuals of social and political pull in the south. 
Ultimately, the results of this strategy resemble the atmosphere of latent hostility seen in 
Tripoli.  Around the same time as the protests in Tripoli, residents of the south demonstrated 
against the unequal development policies of the government that had generated poverty and 
in response, these protests precipitated violent and fatal clashes between protestors and 
French forces throughout 1936.608 In this sense, the political chasm between the elites and the 
majority that opened in the north following the defection of al-Karami and Dr. Bissar into the 
ranks of the Lebanese government had already existed in the Jabal Amil.609 
                                              
606 The 1920 report “Projet d’organisation du Jabal Amel: Manouevres politique a entreprendre pour obtenir un 
derivatif a la situation actuelle” goes some way to explaining the French plans for the south. In order to prevent 
the “docile Shiites” from rallying around calls for Syrian unification from Damascus, the author suggested the 
creation of a form of limited autonomy for the religious clergy. In time, this institution would become the Shia 
Jaafari religious courts. The courts became the first institution to recognize the Shia as a religious minority, a 
designation that the Ottomans never offered this community. The emergence of the Shia courts should not 
overshadow the colonial designs of the court, namely, to bolster France’s prominent position in  the region. Two 
recent studies of the Jaafari courts in the south are Weiss, Max. In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, 
and the Making of Modern Lebanon, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010 and Sayed, Linda, Sectarian 
Homes: The Making of Shi‘i Familes and Citizens under the French Mandate, 1918-1943, PhD Thesis: 
Columbia University, 2013. 
607 “Projet d’organisation du Jabal Amel: Manouvres politique à entreprendre pour obtenir un dérivatif a la 
situation actuelle  
608 See C459 DSG No. 4073 27 October 1936 on the strike of the souks in Sidon, C459 HCF No. 2877 15 
September 1936 on the plebescite by residents of the South and the Bekaa for annexation to Syria, HCF No. 
3481 7 November 1936 on strikes in Bint Jbeil. 
609 The divide between the elite support for the mandate and popular discontent is made plain in a petition sent 
to the high commission by the notables of the Jabal Amil (C459 HCF 10 October 1936 Notables of Jabal Amil). 
On the one hand a total of 385 signatories pledged their support for the mandate, declaring that, “We the 
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The Tobacco Strikes 
This political chasm became manifest during the strikes against the tobacco 
concessions in 1936. As part of a settlement of the debts it incurred to fund the Tanzimat 
reforms, the Ottomans allowed its European creditors monopoly concessions in certain 
industries; in particular, tobacco cultivation and selling in the Jabal Amil came under the 
control of the tobacco régie in 1883.610 To renew the contract, the Quai d’Orsay granted a 
concession for the cultivation and trade of tobacco to the Régie co-intéresse Libano-Syrienne 
des tabacs et des tombacs in 1934.611 By this point, the régie was headquartered in the 
southern town of Nabatiyeh and operated as a private franchise holding company, and, in 
practice, as the reserve of the lords and their clients who authorized cultivation licenses to 
farmers.612 Like in Tripoli and Akkar, popular resentment against the systematic 
marginalization and impoverishment of the south kindled protests by cultivators against the 
terms of the renewal of the régie. Again, similar to Tripoli, a figure, who had once profited 
from the mandate regime led the strikes against it in the form of Adel Osseiran.613 Born into a 
Shi‘a landowning family in Sidon, and educated at the American University of Beirut, 
Osseiran was initially on good, even friendly terms with the French, in large part due to his 
uncle Najib Osseiran’s participation in the house of deputies as a delegate for the south.614 He 
had initially backed the French during the tobacco strikes and supported his personal friend, 
the French administrative counselor Commandant Zinovy Pechkoff, who was said to have 
                                                                                                                                              
citizens of the Jabal Amil, from all communities and confessions, have the honor of presenting to Your 
Excellency our attachment to dear Lebanon within its current borders.” The pledge of support resembles the 
letter made by Muhammad Abboud to Paris in 1936. For, on the other hand, general strikes, protests and deadly 
demonstrations developed in the south in opposition to the mandate. (See the Report of 26 October 1936) 
Protests erupted in Bint Jubayl and Sidon against the announcement of the signing of the Franco-Lebanese 
treaty.  
610 Traboulsi, 2007, 165. 
611 Traboulsi, 2007, 96.  
612 Traboulsi, 2007, 165. The régie would last from 1935 until 1973. 
613 There are several iterations of his name, the most common being a.k.a. Adil Usayran, ‘Adil ‘Usayran, ‘Adil 
Usayran, Adil ‘Usayran, etc. The internet says that Osseiran is the father-in-law of the Iraqi politician Ahmad 
Chalabi, and grandfather of the author whose work has been cited, Tamara Chalabi.  
614 Chalabi, 2006, 137; Seale, 2010, 492.  
 236 
run the south like a personal fiefdom.615 However, like in Tripoli, the French resort to 
violence during fatal clashes with protestors—this time in the village of Bint Jubeil—
radicalized the population, including Osseiran.616 Before a crowd in the town of Nabatiyeh, 
he declared, “we will swallow these 40-million Frenchmen,” for which he was arrested, tried 
and celebrated as a champion of the downtrodden.617 In these ways, political tensions 
mirrored the internal clashes among families in the region. Additional protests arose  
following the announcement of the Franco-Lebanese treaty in the southern towns of Sidon, 
Tyre, Nabatiyeh and Bint Jubeil in 1936.618 Far from bolstering popular support for the 
regime, these tensions reflected the widening chasm between the majority of inhabitants and 
the agents and supporters of the high commission.  
The 1943 Election 
 By 1943, these divisions had widened through the tumultuous years of the WWII. In 
fact, the call for elections further animated political energies in the south. In particular, el-
Solh sought to leverage electoral laws to put in place the secret alliance that he had brokered 
with the Spears mission. Under the constitution, each muhafaza served as a single electoral 
district. As a result, elections usually favored candidates from the powerful families that 
                                              
615 Seale, 2010, 492. A figure we will meet again later in this chapter, Pechkoff was the adopted son of Russian 
writer Maxime Gorky, the penname of Alexei Peshvok or Pechkoff. Born Yeshua Zalman Sverdlov to a family 
of Russian Jewish engravers, he came into contact with the most famous resident of the town of provincial city 
of Nizhny Novgorod when he was 19 in 1902. To fulfill his dream as an actor, the young Pechkoff moved to 
work in the Moscow Art Theater through the recommendation of his benefactor Gorky. At a time when Jews 
were banned from living in Moscow, the two skirted prohibitions with Gorky adopting Pechkoff. Following his 
decision, his biological father disowned him. After abandoning the theater, he went on to travel the world, 
living in Canada, the United States, Sweden, Italy and England. While residing in France during the outbreak of 
the WWI, he signed up for the French Foreign Legion, commencing a career as an army officer.  See 
Levkovsky, Alexander, “Brothers: A reflection on destinies of two historical figures,” Times of Israel, 17 
September 2013, 23 June 2017, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/brothers-areflection-on-destinies-of-two-
historical-figures/ 
616 Seale, 2010, 492.  
617 Chalabi, 2006, 138; Seale, 2010, 492. Another account of the incidents appears in C411 DCHF 21 April 
1936, DHCF 2 April 1936. In April 1936, a general strike emerged in the southern Lebanese towns of Sidon, 
Nabatiya, Bint Jubeil and Jabal Amil in reaction to the arrest and killing of unarmed civilians protesting ag ainst 
tobacco concessions to French monopolies and peaked with protestors calling for the attachment of South 
Lebanon to Syria. (C411 DCHF 21 April 1936, DHCF 2 April 1936. 
618 Traboulsi, 2007, 101.  
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wielded the most clout.619 Because the parliament allocated seats according to religious 
affiliation, these politicians often headed party lists that included their colleagues from other 
religious sects.620 To ensure his victory in the south, el-Solh would have to unseat the 
incumbent Khalid Chehab of the town of Hasbaya who had been one of France’s closest 
Muslim supporters in establishing the mandate.621 With this ambition in mind, el-Solh 
negotiated to appear on the same electoral list as Osseiran and Ahmad al-As‘ad. Like 
Osseiran, al-As‘ad belonged to a leading Shi‘a landowning family in the south and inherited 
his father’s seat in the assembly.622 Despite his family’s loyalty to Paris, the capitulation of 
the Vichy forces under General Dentz convinced al-As‘ad to shift his allegiance away from 
the waning power of France; and further aiding the joint-campaign of this trio were funds 
supplied to el-Solh by the British secret intelligence services in addition to, according to 
French intelligence, more financial backing from Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanese 
businessman Henri Pharaoun.623 Moreover, el-Solh received a lifeline from Eddé. Although 
the high commission, represented in the south by then administrative counselor Pruneaud, 
sought to keep British-leaning nationalists like Osseiran and el-Solh out of parliament, Eddé 
intervened on their behalf to minimize French interference in the elections; and in return 
Eddé expected el-Solh to support his candidacy for president over his rival Bishara al-
Khouri.624 Ultimately, the campaign and funding proved so successful that Osseiran, al-As‘ad 
                                              
619 Hudson, Michael. The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon. Boulder, Westview Press, 1985, 148 
620 Hudson, 1985, 148.  
621 Seale, 2010, 491, 494. Seale’s account of the 1943 elections relies heavily on Ahmad Beydoun’s “Riad el-
Solh et les élections législatives de 1943” in Gerard Khoury’s Selim Takla 1895-1945: une contribution a 
l’indépendance du Liban, Paris: Karthala, 2004. Despite my every effort to obtain this book, I was not able to 
find it in the course of my research. 
622 Seale, 2010, 493-494. Interestingly, Ahmad’s uncle Kamil al-As‘ad, who was close to the Young Turks, 
denounced Riad el-Solh’s father Rida for his participation with Arab nationalist forces, prompting the exile of 
father and son from their home in Beirut during WWI. (Seale, 2010, 493).  
623 Zamir, 2015, 83-85. The name of Pharaoun is also transliterated as Pharoun. One of the richest men in 
Lebanon, he was also the brother-in-law of Bishara al-Khouri.  
624 Unfortunately, the first name of Pruneaud is unknown. Eddé convinced him to remain neutral for fear that 
French machinations would push el-Solh into the arms of the British.  
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and el-Solh won seats in parliament.625 Elsewhere in the country, veteran legislators like 
Sabri Hamadi in the Bekaa, Kamal Jumblatt in Mt. Lebanon won seats besides (perceived) 
anti-French candidates like Riad’s cousin Sami el-Solh in Beirut, and the former mufti, 
himself, al-Karami in the north.626 
The National Pact  
 Once again, the development of the formal institutions of governance would bolster 
informal politics in Lebanon. For the 1943 election precipitated the unwritten national pact 
between el-Solh and the rival of Eddé for the presidency, Bishara al-Khouri in Cairo on 
September 19, 1943. Like el-Solh, al-Khouri was the son of an Ottoman administrator and 
left the family’s home in Mt. Lebanon to enter college, where he studied and later practiced 
law. An Arabic journalist and publisher in Cairo, al-Khouri entered politics in 1922 serving 
as secretary-general in the precursor to the chamber of deputies.627 Among his other 
activities, al-Khouri represented al-Karami during his trial for murder in the al-Muqaddem 
affair.628 Outside of the public domain, al-Khouri married into the prominent banking family 
of Henri Pharaoun, the deputy of the Bekaa, who headed a subsidiary of the French 
conglomerate the Société du Port de Beyrouth with al-Khouri’s cousin, Michel Chiha.629 For 
his part, Chiha was also involved in politics, representing his constituency of Beirut and 
serving in the drafting committee for what would become the 1926 constitution.630 With 
                                              
625 From Seale, 2010, 496-7, we learn that out of the 37,661 eligible male voters in the south, 24,393 or roughly 
65% went to the polls. The votes went to the following figures:  
1. Osseiran with 20,011 votes 
2. Rashid Baydun with 191,483 votes 
3. al-As‘ad with 19,424 votes 
4. el-Solh with 19,406 votes 
626 Seale, 2010, 497.  
627 Trouboulsi, 2007, 94. Britt, George, “Lebanon’s Popular Revolution,” Middle East Journal, No. 7: (Winter 
1953), 5. His name is also spelled as Bisharah al-Khoury. An American, Britt was stationed in the Levant 
during WWII as a member of the Office of War Information as later returned during the 1950s to witness the 
fall of the al-Khouri regime. In this regard, he was as much a chronicler of unfolding events as a historian.  
628 Saliba, 2016, 147.  
629 Traboulsi, 2007, 94.  
630 Traboulsi, 2007, 94.  
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these political and economic connections, Chiha and Pharaoun became two of the richest 
men in the country. Such business interests underpinned al-Khouri’s secret negotiations with 
el-Solh.  
While the exact minutes of the meeting remain undisclosed, the outcomes are well-
known and recounted. First, the two men agreed that if al-Khouri were elected president by 
the chamber of delegates in the new legislature, he would appoint el-Solh his prime minister, 
in contravention of the earlier dealings between el-Solh and Eddé.631 Upon election, they 
would move to oust France from Lebanon by amending the parts of the constitution that tied 
the two countries together. Second, the two agreed on the international relations of the post-
independent state, opting to move toward independence from France, but retaining an Arab 
identity and close ties with its neighbors in the Arab world.632 Third, the two men agreed to 
formalize the sectarian division of offices that had been common practice, but legally 
disputable. In practice, this meant that the office of the president was reserved for a Christian, 
the prime minister for a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the house of delegates for a Shi‘a 
Muslim. The assembly would retain a Christian majority according to a 6:5 ratio of Christian 
to Muslim seats.633 The compromise reached between these two lawyers would come to be 
known as the national pact.  
As ever, animating this formal infrastructure was a series of informal politics, 
alliances and ambitions. Among the financial considerations were 1) the desire to control the 
revenue reserved for French monopoly companies of the common interests, 2) the wish to 
end trading constraints within the weak and closed franc monetary zone, and 3) the hope of 
                                              
631 Seale, 2010, 504.  
632 Bashir, Iskandar. Planned Administrative change in Lebanon. Beirut: American U of Beirut P, 1966, 24.  
633 For more details on the sectarian divisions of the assembly see Atiyah, 1973 and Traboulsi, 2007. In the 
words of Traboulsi, “ a great deal of the later history of Lebanon and of its conflicts would be articulated around 
the way those two texts [the written constitution and the unwritten National Pact] were read, interpreted and 
assigned priority.” (Traboulsi, 2007, 111). I do not dwell on the ramifications of the National Pact because, as 
subsequent events will show, it is doubtful that Riad el-Solh intended for this to be a long-standing text. Instead, 
like his earlier promise to elect Emile Eddé, the agreement with al-Khouri is better understood as a temporary 
compromise to further other alliances and personal ambitions.  
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establishing new links between Lebanese banks and money from Britain and the Gulf 
states.634 In addition to these financial incentives, el-Solh was committed to the secret 
alliance that had been agreed upon with his colleagues in Syria and the Spears mission. The 
move to oust France from the Levant would prepare for the expanded Hashemite federation. 
Beyond the small coterie of bankers and lawyers, el-Solh sought to garner popular support 
for this agreement by promising that, if elected, he would funnel money from the common 
interests to popular street gangs in Beirut in exchange for their support during the election. In 
this manner, the market for votes that Gassouin condemned came to include in 1943 the 
largely Maronite Phalange Libanais led by Pierre Gemayel and the predominately Sunni al-
Najjada headed by Jamil Makkawi.635 In these ways, the legislative elections facilitated 
informal arrangements, which, as subsequent events will show, helped to foster instability.  
The Constitutional Crisis  
 The plan brokered by the two men became manifest in September when Bishara al-
Khouri took office as president and el-Solh as his Prime minister.636 Also prominent in the 
                                              
634 Traboulsi, 2007, 105. The late political scientist Malcolm Kerr would write on the financial and political 
incentives animating the national pact that, “the first major duty of the new regime was to take control of the 
‘common interests’ together with Syrian customs and excise, the Beirut port, post, telegram, Sûrete Générale 
local levies of the French army, etc., which had been run by the high commission. Most of these departments 
employed large numbers of people, produced large revenues or performed sensitive functions. On all counts, 
gaining control over them meant a great opportunity for national leaders to expand their prestige, powers of 
patronage and the size of their clienteles. No sooner had the National Pact confirmed the principle of divide the 
cake than independence set before its authors a second, even larger cake, in the form of the common interests, 
as if Providence were signifying its blessings on the system.” See Kerr, Malcolm, “Political Decision -Making in 
a Confessional Democracy,” Politics in Lebanon, Ed. Leonard Binder, New York: Wiley, 1966, 189.  
635 Seale, 2010, 508. According to French intelligence, el-Solh gave Pierre Gemayel 50,000 SL-pounds to 
mobilize the Phalange around the national pact with the promise of another 1-million SL-pounds once the 
government took control of the common interests. Carton 81 DSG 14 November 1943 Inventaire 2 as reported 
in Seale, 2010, 528.   
636 Al-Khouri was elected president 21 September 1943 and Riad appointed his prime minister the next day. 
Seale, 2010, 509. It was first reported that al-Khouri represented the compromise candidate since France 
supported its man Emile Eddé for office and Spears Chamoun, instead. In addition, it was reported that 
Chamoun would succeed al-Khouri as president. Britt, 1953, 5. In contrast, Seale asserts that Spears and el-Solh 
took advantage of the rumored support for Chamoun to pressure the Free French to support al-Khouri. Seale, 
2010, 509.  In addition, according to Zamir, Spears boasted to British diplomat Richard Casey following the 
appointment of el-Solh, “The appointment of el-Solh ministry means that everything has ended infinitely more 
satisfactorily than I ever dared hope for. I have felt all along as if I were building a house of cards and that each 
additional card was likely to bring down the whole structure. Yet, until the last t ier was in position nothing had 
been achieved.” Zamir, 2015, 95.  
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new government were Osseiran, Takla, the Druze leader of Mt. Lebanon Emir Chekib Arslan 
and future president Camille Chamoun.637 By this time, the anti-French faction in Lebanon 
mirrored the government in Syria, headed by President Quwatli, al-Jabiri as prime minister 
and Mardam Bey as foreign minister. In one of his first speeches before the assembly that 
October, el-Solh declared in what became known as the Charter of Independence his 
intentions of nationalizing the French concessions and repealing the constitutional 
amendments that enshrined French influence.638 Thus, el-Solh continued the resistance 
strategy of re-appropriating the formal institutions of the mandate to undermine French rule. 
The events following the speech are well chronicled.  
On November 8, 1943, el-Solh made good on his promise as the new parliament 
expunged or amended every article of the constitution that recognized ties to France with 
immediate effect.639 In essence, the new government sought to use the French created 
constitution for a purpose that Paris had never intended. Rather than bolster French rule, the 
constitution would engender the ouster of Paris from the Levant. In effect, the legislature 
brought about the serious political and economic disruptions that Gassouin had warned of 
four years earlier in 1939. The declarations had caught the high-commission off-guard, with 
General-Delegate Catroux stationed in Algiers with de Gaulle.640 In his place, acting high-
commissioner Jean Hellu followed the model of his predecessor High Commissioner Ponsot 
during the challenge of al-Jisr in 1932. Three days after the passage of the constitutional 
amendments, Hellu suspended the constitution under another decree of martial law, ordered 
the arrest of the government and invited Emile Eddé to once again form a new government 
                                              
637 Seale, 2010, 512, 522. At the time, Osseiran served as minister of the economy, trade and industry; Arslan as 
minister of defense, agriculture, health and social services; Chamoun as interior minister; Takla as foreign 
minister.  
638 Ziada, 1968, 74; Seale, 2010, 513.  
639 Seale, 2010, 522.  
640 Ziada, 1968, 74; Zamir, 2015, 92. The Free French were tied up in Algiers due to disputes between de Gaulle 
and his general Giraud.   
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on November 11, 1943.641 In doing so, Hellu believed that the tactics of Ponsot would secure 
France’s position in the Levant, even though it can be argued that Ponsot’s actions 
contributed to the 1936 outbreak of violence. In the meantime, Hellu employed another 
souvenir from the 1930s when he insisted that the provisions of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese 
treaty remained valid, even though Paris had never ratified the accord.642 Ultimately, such 
contradictions presaged further difficulties for the regime.  
 This political standoff lasted for 11 days. During this time, clashes with French forces 
upholding martial law and the night curfew turned violent. The forces of the Phalange and al-
Najjada helped to enforce a national general strike with their forces, numbering 35,000 and 
10,000, respectively.643 On the night of November 11, 1943, protestors in Beirut and the 
Bekaa launched a riot in defiance of the curfew, vandalizing French vehicles, overturning 
tramcars, alighting French institutions and throwing stones, which, in turn, precipitated 
French reprisals.644As had been the case in Tripoli and Bint Jubeil previously, the violent 
response of French forces to unrest had the unintended consequence of radicalizing the 
population into acts of armed resistance. Lebanese historian at the American University of 
Beirut Nicola Ziada would recount of the opposition to martial law that,  
The outburst of the people was romantic, sentimental and emotional, but certainly not 
artificial. The hatred they had harbored for the French, the mistrust that France had 
succeeded in planting in the souls of the Lebanese, and the fear of losing their hard-
earned independence, united a people that had for some time been politically, socially 
and culturally torn asunder. In Beirut, as in many other places in the country, old and 
young, men and women, went out to do something the help guard their 
independence.645  
                                              
641 Britt, 1953, 6. In his work, Zamir describes Hellu as “weak and naïve,” figure, with little knowledge of the 
Levant despite his former role as Vichy ambassador to Turkey in Ankara (Zamir, 2015, 92). Despite Zamir’s 
characterization,  I see the debacle of the constitutional crisis not so much as the mishandling of a single 
individual, but as the continuation of a series of protocols and policies exercised by several individuals within 
the Quai d’Orsay. The resort to martial law imposed by Hellu followed the footsteps of Ponsot, de Martel and 
even Gassouin, all of whom were confident that a military spirit would suffice to govern the country despite the 
obvious shortcomings.  
642 Ziada, 1968, 74-76.  
643 Seale, 2010, 528.  
644 Seale, 2010, 527  
645 Ziada, 1968, 76.  
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The fight for independence that Ziada describes also took place outside of the capital. In 
Tripoli, French Bren-gun tanks opened fire at close range on a crowd of protestors 
demonstrating against the suspension of the constitution, wounding 11 individuals, including 
seven children, and killing three people.646 In Sidon, clashes were even more deadly. There, 
French troops opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators protesting at a local school, most of 
whom were children, wounding about 60 individuals and killing 4, including a seven-year 
old girl.647 In response, crowds gathered at the gates of the British hospital hoping to take 
refuge within the compound. In turn, French forces under the direction of the administrative 
counselor Pruneaud besieged the protestors at the hospital.648 In retaliation for these 
incidents, the notables of Sidon, who used to be largely cozy with Paris, drew up plans to 
blow up the French marine barracks stationed in the town as well as the house of the French 
counselor.649 The popular outcry against Hellu’s decree grew so widespread that Eddé had 
trouble in recruiting politicians to form a new government.650  
 Elsewhere in the south, the government of al-Khouri was detained in the old military 
fort in Rashaya. Following their arrests in pre-dawn raids at their homes, the fort would hold 
al-Khouri, Takla, Chamoun and el-Solh, later joined that afternoon by Osseiran.651 The next 
day, they received another visitor. The old mufti, al-Karami, suffered a fate worse than the 
others. Like his comrades, his home was raided before dawn on November 11, during which 
Senegalese troops allegedly roused women and children still in their pajamas, stole valuables 
and assaulted the family’s servants; and upon discovering that al-Karami was nowhere to be 
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found, soldiers pressed their pistols to the head of his 7-year-old son Umar demanding that he 
denounce his father’s location.652 To add insult to injury, when al-Karami was found resting 
in his family’s estate outside of Tripoli, soldiers trained bayonets at his chest, pistol-whipped 
him when he moved to obtain his dentures and promptly dragged him from bed to prison, 
half-naked and bareheaded without his turban.653  
 Under pressure from Whitehall, Washington and sympathetic protests across the Arab 
world—not to mention the conspirators of Sidon and elsewhere—de Gaulle was forced to 
relent his stance. French plans to transfer the imprisoned cabinet to Algiers spurred Whitehall 
into action, afraid that mob violence across the Middle East would imperil British forces.654 
In response, the Spears mission offered an ultimatum for the release of the prisoners by 10:00 
on the morning of November 22, 1943 or else Britain would march troops from Cairo and do 
so on their behalf.655 Ultimately, Algiers released the prisoners, dismissing the coordinated 
raids of their homes and 11-day detention as “a painful misunderstanding.”656 To others, 
however, more was a stake than a misunderstanding. Upon their release, jubilant crowds 
championed the imprisoned men as national heroes across the Levant. The day of their 
release would come to mark national independence from France.657 Meanwhile, for the Free 
French government in exile, that day came to signify France’s biggest debacle in the Levant, 
marking the end of decades of expanding French influence in the eastern Mediterranean 
stretching back to the expeditions of Napoleon. The capitulation over Rashaya appeared as a 
scandal in France and personal embarrassment to de Gaulle.658 Shorn of the formal influence 
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 245 
over the government, the presence of France in Lebanon would wane until the final departure 
of troops in 1946.659  
The Game of Enemies 
 The aftermath of the 1943 uprising in Lebanon would set in motion a series of 
undisclosed developments that continued to re-shape the shifting political landscape between 
the Levant and the world empires. As a result, these developments further unbundled the 
territoriality of the newly independent state. On the one hand, the rise of post-colonial 
Lebanon would impact imperial rivalries. As chronicled in the essays and documents of 
Zamir, the French uncovering and response to the British plan to unify the Levant into a 
single state carried long-lasting ramifications in the region. First, France shared the cables 
that it had intercepted from Whitehall with the enemies of Britain in the Arab world, namely 
Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whose leaders worked vociferously to sabotage the 
potential unification between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. The role of Saudi Arabia 
proved instrumental in helping to change the mind of Shukri al-Quwatli, who reneged on his 
promise to Nuri al-Said and Whitehall by signing an agreement with Ibn Saud against 
unification after he was elected president.660 Around the same time as al-Quwatli’s 
misgivings, el-Solh harbored similar doubts, fearing that his newfound personal power would 
erode in a larger state.661 Second, Paris tried to expand its influence with its traditional 
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support base in Lebanon, the Maronite church, informing Patriarch Antoine Arida of the 
secret alliance between the Syrian National Bloc and el-Solh to unify the two countries.662 
Meanwhil, France shared its intelligence with President al-Khouri. Coincidentally or 
otherwise, during this same period of time, in January 1945, he suffered a nervous 
breakdown and retreated from public life.663 Third, the Quai d’Orsay sought revenge against 
the key protagonist in this plan, Riad el-Solh. On January 9, 1945, el-Solh’s cabinet resigned. 
Ostensibly, he bowed to pressure of widespread complaints over the rising costs of living and 
government inefficiency, trademarks of bureaucratic life prevalent since the 1920s as 
described in the previous three chapters.664 More than that, however, the resignation of el-
Solh was the work of French intrigues designed to scupper the coordinated opposition to its 
rule in the Levant.665  
In lieu of el-Solh, France used its influence to facilitate the appointment of another 
leading Sunni Muslim, none other than its one time public enemy, Abd al-Hamid al-
Karami.666 In succeeding el-Solh, the former mufti of Tripoli completed a remarkable series 
of transformations that had marked and in some ways divided the lives of the two men. 
Whereas al-Karami was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress of the Young 
Turks,667 el-Solh championed the cause of the Arab nationalists; whereas al-Karami followed 
the traditional paths to success as a religious figure and landowner, el-Solh studied abroad to 
become a lawyer and diplomat in exile of sorts in Switzerland; whereas al-Karami sought to 
overturn French rule through force of arms in November, 1936, el-Solh and his colleagues 
attempted to reduce French influence through diplomatic relations and worked to broker a 
                                              
662 Zamir, Meir, “The ‘Missing Dimension’: Britain's Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon, 1942–
45 , Part II.” Middle Eastern Studies, 46:6 (2010), 807. 
663 Zamir, 2010. 807. The degree to which the news of the secret alliance contributed to his  nervous breakdown 
is unknown. However, following his convalescence in Haifa, al-Khouri retreated to his family’s home in Mt. 
Lebanon, leaving the affairs of the country to his brother and son.  
664 This purported rationale appears in Seale, 2010, 571.  
665 Zamir, 2010, 807. 
666 Zamir, 2010, 807. 
667 Saliba, 2016, 99.  
 247 
settlement to the riots in Tripoli.668 As the appointment of al-Karami signaled the loss of 
Britain’s inside man in Lebanon, the secret plan to reshape the Levant had effectively died. 
Although it interfered in Lebanese affairs and stymied plans to reshape its borders, the Quai 
d’Orsay was never able to revive its foothold in the country and its final troops withdrew in 
1946.  
 On the other hand, the release of the prisoners would re-shape Lebanese politics 
under the rule of the Bishara al-Khouri regime. Lost in the joie de vivre of the French ouster 
was one important aspect best summed up by American military veteran and resident in the 
Levant George Britt. He wrote in the 1953 edition of Middle East Journal that, “in the 
rejoicing over the release from Rashaya and the restoration of the Constitution, all political 
opposition was silenced and no critical voice was heard to point out that the constitution was 
about the same as written during the mandate.”669 Save for the amendments to the provisions 
concerning France, the constitutional regime criticized by Gassouin, responsible for the 
plague of bureaucracy, at fault for the water crisis in the north, at the heart of rural violence 
and coercion in Akkar remained in place—even after France had undergone two subsequent 
iterations of its own constitution. Much of the executive power reserved for the high 
commissioner passed into the hands of the president.670 With the constitution preserved, the 
putative system of profiteers, their clients and would-be profiteers continued to underpin the 
formal institutions of governance while the mingled plights of the majority worsened. These 
dual systems of formal and informal politics expanded when the government won access to 
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the common interests.671 The concentration of power and clientelism that Gassouin described 
came to be known as the oligarchy under the rule of al-Khouri and his successor Camille 
Chamoun. The persistence of the constitution maintained the contradictions of rule that had 
characterized mandate politics and invited foreign designs for the Levant, as was the case 
with the secret war between Britain and France.  
Conclusion 
In considering the consequences of informal politics as a function of the 
contradictions of colonial rule, the events surrounding the 1943 constitutional crisis not only 
appear entirely predictable, but also confirm the predictions of officials like Gassouin. That 
concomitant with elections there developed an informal unwritten alliance between lawyers 
to transform the constitution, appropriate revenue from the common interests, fund street 
gangs, secure foreign funding for electoral candidates and even coordinate a series of riots, 
illustrate that the formal institutions of governance did not supplant informal relations among 
the population. At the same time, such experiences reveal the asymmetry of power relations 
that underpinned colonial territoriality. The contradictions of French authority had 
undermined its rule as the imperatives of civilian republican rule clashed with the goals of 
maintaining a military hierarchy. Analyzing the events of Lebanon from the perspective of 
territorial control indicates that the undoing of French rule owed as much to the 
consequences of its own colonial policies as to the machinations of foreign actors.  That is, 
the mechanisms designed to enforce territoriality contributed to its undoing.  
At the same time, the effects of the covert wars between Britain and France 
demonstrate that, upon the termination of the mandate, the post-colonial government failed to 
exercise effective territorial control over the country. Instead, territoriality remained subject 
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to the same shifting asymmetrical relations of power that had thrived during the mandate. 
While France was not able to exert the influence in the territory that it had anticipated and 
expected, neither were competing claims able to permanently alter the borders that General 
Gouraud had decreed in 1920. In this context, the national pact can be considered a 
temporary alliance and convenient expedience to prepare for an alternative political system 
backed by foreign governments. This intentionally flexible system invited foreign designs 
and intrigues in much the same way as the 1926 constitution. Weakened by the social 
networks that literally profited from the mandate, territoriality in Lebanon remained subject 
to competing foreign intrigues after independence.  
Post-Script 
The turbulent interwar years that witnessed the decline, nadir and re-emergence of 
transformative figures like Abd al-Hamid al-Karami and Riad el-Solh continued to generate 
unforeseen circumstances that affected the population in Lebanon and the world at large. In 
Lebanon, these tumultuous years are perhaps best represented in the fates of two of the most 
prominent members within the opposition to the mandate. On the one hand, the prominence 
of al-Karami began to waver shortly after his appointment to office. His tenure as premier 
ended after eight months in August 1945 due to the same petty politics, upheavals, standoffs 
and high turnovers that characterized the al-Khouri regim, Lebanese politics, in general, and 
the defeated third French Republic. Worse, weeks after his appointment as prime minister in 
late1944, al-Karami survived his own assassination during yet another gun battle in the 
streets of Tripoli, as described by Sgt. Pearse in his memoirs and mentioned in the previous 
chapter.672 Like in the 1935 Muqaddim affair, the opposite protagonist in this duel belonged 
to a rival family of notables from the Omary family.673 Later, once out of office, al-Karami’s 
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campaign to move from the backbench to the premiership was compromised by corruption 
scandals involving his uncle Mustafa, the director of the Tripoli municipality; in his post 
Mustafa had replaced another relative, Mohamad al-Karami, the erstwhile director of the 
water utility in Tripoli.674  
Further damaging was another public shootout in Tripoli in 1947. In the lead up to 
elections, al-Karami sought to garner public support by organizing a parade for the famed 
Arab nationalist war hero Fawzi al-Qawuqji.  Similar to al-Karami, al-Qawuqji was a native 
son of Tripoli and fellow member of Amir Faysal’s administration in Syria, and after the 
defeat of the regime to Gouraud’s forces in 1920, he went on to spend twenty years abroad 
serving in the 1925 Druze revolt, the 1936 Great Arab revolt in mandate Palestine and the 
1941 Iraqi uprising against the British.675 With the war over, Lebanese officials were eager to 
give this popular veteran a hero’s greeting in Tripoli. During the rally, however, the ongoing 
tensions that had simmered between supporters of al-Karami and his rivals in the al-
Muqaddem family culminated once again in violence, this time before Tall Square and the 
administrative building there.676 The ensuing melee not only targeted supporters of the rival 
families, but also the local police and gendarmerie,677 still under the thumb of criminal 
enterprise in a manner parallel to the descriptions of du Paty de Clam’s 1939 report. This 
latest blow to law and order left 14 dead and 68 injured.678 Not only did the casualties 
embarrass the Lebanese government by highlighting its inability to maintain any semblance 
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of order, it also effectively terminated al-Karami’s campaign for the premiership. He died 
three years later in 1950.679  
On the other hand and in different circumstances, the prominence of Riad el-Solh 
after his victory in 1943 was equally short-lived. The intrigues that helped him to obtain 
public office were responsible for his downfall. After the resignation of his cabinet, he 
managed to return to the throne, serving as prime minister during the volatile years that 
followed the 1948 creation of the state of Israel and the Palestinian nakba. His position in his 
office, however, was not as strong, since he was no longer able to count on external support. 
His previous ally, General Spears, was called back to London. His Syrian colleagues in the 
National Bloc confronted a series of internal coups and uprisings. By 1951, he was out of 
office and had decided to accept the invitation of King Abdallah for a visit to Jordan.680 His 
time away from his family turned out to be longer than expected, however. For, on his last 
day, while driving to the airport for his return flight, he died at the hands of assassins on July 
16, 1951; and four days later, his host King Abdallah, was slain outside of the al-Aqsa 
mosque in Jerusalem.681 In these ways, the halcyon that the national pact was supposed to 
inaugurate never lasted for the founding fathers, much less the population, at large. Instead, 
the petty politics and maneuverings for power became even more violent.   
 Not only did the interwar years leave its mark on the peoples of the Levant, it also 
transformed to fortunes of some of the administrators who had come to rule over them, 
perhaps none more publicly than the embattled French administrator in Tripoli, du Paty de 
Clam. Upon his exit from the Levant, his attempt to employ the same tactic as el-Solh, al-
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Khouri and al-Karami in sabotaging public office imperiled his life in Europe. Born in 1895, 
the count received his education at the Saint Cyr military academy before serving in WWI.682 
Like many officials within the high commission, he represented the initial martial spirit of 
the mandate that Gassouin proudly references in his letter, having joined the high 
commission following the war and serving under various capacities for twenty years. In 
1940, however, he reached a crossroads with the fall of the republic. As opposed to the 
minority of officials like Commandant Pechkoff who joined forces with the French 
resistance,683 du Paty de Clam chose to cooperate with the new Vichy government in 1940. 
Although well privy to the administrative anarchy that the regime inaugurated in the Levant, 
he opted to stay in the region for the next year. With the march of the Free French and the 
Spears mission, however, he faced another crossroads between residing in the colonies with 
the Free French and returning to the metropole. Ultimately, he took the well-traveled road 
back to France and joined other mandate veterans like former High Commissioner General 
Weygand in the Vichy administration.  
 In March 1944, the count became the Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs for 
the Vichy regime, heading the agency that, years before, had sent the Jews of France to the 
concentration camps of Europe.684 What had helped du Paty win the role under the Vichy 
regime was that his father, Armand, was a key conspirator in the Dreyfus Affair that 
displayed the rampant anti-Semitism within the elite echelons of the third republic.685 In 
accepting the role, he decided to publicly associate himself with the anti-Semitism of the 
                                              
682 Généaology de Jacques du Paty de Clam 
http://gw.geneanet.org/jdupaty?lang=fr&p=charles&n=mercier+du+paty+de+clam 
683 It just so happened that the commander of his troupe in the French foreign legion was none other than a 
young lieutenant named Charles de Gaulle. Later, he followed his former lieutenant into the French Resistance 
and eventually achieved the rank of Brigadier in the Free French before serving as the French ambassador to 
Japan after WWII. Seale, 2010, 492; Levkovsky, 2013.   
684  “France: Du Paty de Clam” Time Magazine 13 March 1944; Eric Roussel, “Un antisémitisme 
administrative”, Le Figaro, 15 October 2007, 22 June 2017  http://www.lefigaro.fr/livres/2006/05/26/03005-
20060526ARTWWW90250-un_antisemitisme_administratif.php. Also see Joly,Laurent, Vichy dans la 
"Solution finale". Histoire du Commissariat général aux questions juives (1941-1944), Paris: Grasset, 2006.  
685 “France: Du Paty de Clam” Time Magazine 13 March 1944.  
 253 
Nazis only six months before the Liberation of Paris in August of that year. Though he 
resigned from the post in May of that year, his association with the regime had tarnished his 
image.686 Arrested upon the liberation of Paris, he was detained as a suspected war criminal 
and became a social pariah.687 Yet, in his defense at trial, he revealed that he had accepted his 
post in the Jewish Affairs commission under a secret understanding with the French 
resistance that he would sabotage the office through inaction, in much the same way as the 
Arab nationalists whom he had vehemently opposed.688 Although he was freed from prison in 
1947, he languished from the poor conditions after almost three years of detainment. Prior to 
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A CONFUSED AND COMPLICATED BACKGROUND  
“It was a confused and complicated background, where Orient and Occident were 
inextricably mixed in a kind of life that belonged neither to East nor West,” remembers Sgt. 
Pearse of Tripoli in the aftermath of the 1943 constitutional crisis.690 On one level, the 
sergeant’s depiction points to the contested landscape of Tripoli at a time when he awaited 
the deadline for the final departure of European troops from the Levant. The city had 
managed to resist imperial designs to varying degrees of success even as the French 
attempted to re-orient the city and region, in general. In this manner, he portrays the 
contrasting cityscape where “many religious sects and all shades of political opinion 
existed… which was half-Muslim and half-Christian, half-feudal and half pseudo-
democratic,” adding that “alongside the modern hotels and Swiss style pâtisseries, were the 
mysterious soukhs, situated in a maze of narrow, dark alleyways where men were often found 
dead, where all sorts of illegality thrived and bullets whizzed.”691  
At the same time, this complicated background where men were found dead and 
crime thrived intimated the underbelly of government malfeasance, vice and coercion that 
had managed to transform the social, political and economic institutions of the mandate. 
Despite French intentions, informal networks and practices undermined French rule. The 
entrenched divides and resort to coercion that shaped the city’s layout in Pearse’s account at 
the twilight of the mandate bring to mind de Martel’s description a decade earlier about the 
barricades surrounding Tripoli amid the 1936 riots. In this sense, Pearse reports that, “out of 
the confusion emerged the general trends; the rackets crystallized themselves into large rival 
interests, whilst many unaccountable activities gradually clarified themselves as the details of 
large-scale corruption on the part of government officials came to light,” before adding that, 
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the “gendarmes and police had little to say in the rackets, and any meddlesomeness on their 
part was met by bands of thugs using force and firearms.”692 Yet, beyond the situation in 
Tripoli, Pearse’s account highlights the contradictions of colonial rule, which in the absence 
of the rule of law, relied upon a series of informal networks and practices at the expense of 
the metropole’s designs. 
ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRENCH MANDATE 
This study began with the related questions of how colonial rule managed to 
reproduce itself, and the consequences of this rule on statecraft in parts of the non-west. 
Pearse’s description of the second city in colonial Lebanon indicates the mixed fortunes of 
imperial rule as well as the ambiguities of power and resistance that had underpinned the 
production of space. The overall confusion and complications of the north bear witness to the 
contradictions constitutive in twentieth century imperialism and their consequences for the 
post-colonial state. Imperial designs did not eradicate existing practices and power-relations 
however much social, economic and political life changed within the colonies. Instead, many 
of the institutions involved in mandate affairs had already thrived prior to 1920 such as the 
family, force of arms, usury, intimidation and coercion, street politics and religious 
gatherings. By directly and indirectly bankrolling these practices, the administration 
undermined its ability to make inroads with the subject population. Such contradictions bring 
to light one of the many ironies of the French experience in Lebanon and Syria. By the time 
that Paris had consecrated decades of expanding French influence in the eastern 
Mediterranean, imperial rule was already in decline. The very construction of the mandate in 
1920 indicated that the forms of direct rule described in earlier chapters had already given 
way to more indirect practices of colonial governance. In practice, the persistence and even 
expansion of these practices amid western-modeled institutions like the army, gendarmerie, 
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agricultural banks, legislature and presidency contributed to the unbundling of French rule. 
At the same time, the interplay of these formal and informal institutions would presage the 
instability of the post-colonial state, unable to surmount the standoffs and stalemates that had 
characterized colonial governance.  
In terms of theory, the experiences of colonial Lebanon have revealed several trends 
worth reconsidering. First, this study has shown the ways in which territoriality is socially 
mediated rather than geographically imposed from above. Second, it has highlighted the 
contradictions of imperial rule that facilitated practices of resistance. Third, the focus on the 
flourishing of informal politics has gestured to the complicated legacy of the mandate for the 
post-colonial state. In these ways, it can be argued that colonial state power relied more upon 
the ability of a select few to re-appropriate the institutions of governance than on the 
uncontested spread of imperial designs from the metropole to the farthest reaches of the 
colony.  As a result, the colonial experience discloses the contradictions of modern rule and 
the diverse practices that constituted authority.  
1. Territoriality as Socially Mediated Institution 
When applied to colonial rule, territoriality does not appear to be a uniform, 
uncontested practice. Instead, territoriality was not so much enforced from the metropole as 
much as it was socially mediated within the colony. At the same time, it did not operate as a 
function of modern technologies that replaced pre-colonial practices as Sack may have 
predicted, nor as a product of new relations of power that linked colonial citizens to the 
empire as critical geo-politics might have implied. In place of a total transformation, colonial 
territoriality recycled and even strengthened political, economic and social institutions 
already present in the colony. At the same time, critical geo-politics proved useful in 
understanding the ways in which authority was socially mediated rather than geographically 
imposed in a uniform manner. In practice, then the exercise of power revealed the 
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unevenness of the reach of the colonial state. Colonial designs confronted various strategies 
of resistance from the general strikes and canonfire of the organized opposition to the quiet 
sabotage and vice of government officials. The presence of contrasting and contradictory 
political behaviors facilitated the unbundling of territoriality, undermining the reproduction 
of the strict boundaries and hierarchies that the French had sought to impose. In turn, French 
territoriality further waned until its troops were forced to retreat from the Levant. In these 
ways, state power remains subject to the shifting processes of domination and resistance.  
2. Contradictions of Colonial Rule  
 In addition, the unbundling of colonial territoriality has highlighted the contradictions 
of imperial rule. The social milieu that operated in the colony transformed the western 
institutions that Paris had expected would carry out its foreign policy. The formal institutions 
of the centralized bureaucracy did not erase existing and informal politics. Such alternative 
institutions strengthened by the mandate included the likes of the family structure, nepotism, 
racketeering, usury and force of arms. The transition from the relatively small civil service of 
the Ottomans to the behemoth imposed by the French magnified these practices. In addition 
to these institutions were the exercises of authority that directly emerged from the mandate 
such as the sweeping discretionary powers of the interior minister and president, their 
interference into other branches of the government, and the capacity of legislators to re-
appropriate public funds at will. In turn, the shadow state that developed from mandate 
policy did not expand the reach of the colonial state, but increasingly destabilized imperial 
rule and strengthened strategies of resistance.  
 At the same time, French colonial rule in the Levant suffered from the internal 
politics and contradictions within France. Several of the formal policies of the Quai d’Orsay 
conflicted with the informal priorities and practices of the high commission. The imperatives 
of land tenure reform contradicted the support of notable politics in the countryside; the 
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universalist principle of a centralized bureaucracy contravened the sectarian and regional 
biases of the national government and civil service; the re-design of Tripoli ceded higher 
ground to organized and often armed opposion; the recruitment of known and suspected 
racketeers undermined the enforcement of municipal administration; the establishment of a 
republican system of government clashed with the military spirit of senior mandate officials; 
and the high commission’s recourse to violence radicalized armed opposition. It was amid 
such contradictions that some of the most effective forms of resistance against mandate rule 
involved individuals linked to the colonial government. Figures like Mohamad and Abd al-
Hamid al-Karami in the Tripoli water utility as well as Riad el-Solh and Bishara al-Khouri in 
the legislature successfully sabotaged colonial institutions. In this manner, the constant talk 
of administrative reform within the high commission represented a muted confession of its 
inability to maintain France’s position in the Levant. 
However unintentionally, the informal practices of colonial governance increasingly 
marginalized the metropole from the subject population. As a result of the unevenness of 
state rule, France was forced to retreat from its formal mandate, much to the benefit of many 
of the privileged figures whom Paris had supported. From this, it is possible to conclude that 
the power to enforce colonial territoriality depended upon an array of complementary as well 
as contradictory practices of domination and resistance as Dodge asserted. Or, in the words 
of Satia, colonial rule was largely incoherent, and this incoherence carried consequences for 
the population after independence from the metropole.   
3. Informal Politics in the Post-Colonial State  
At the same time, the flourishing of informal politics during and after the mandate 
highlights the consequences of imperial rule. Namely, it indicates that the post-colonial 
period continued many of the contradictions of colonial rule. The capacities of the 
institutions of the state to meddle into the lives of residents in the manner that Dr. Boulos 
 260 
described; to facilitate racketeering in the fashion that Pearse, Mme. Lattouf and du Paty de 
Clam witnessed; and to personalize authority like Eddé, Abboud, al-Karami and others 
managed came to typify post-colonial politics. Such informal politics did not bolster colonial 
rule as much as it expanded political fields of politics and resistance. In turn, such 
developments revealed the shortcomings, contradictions and contested territoriality of the 
colonial and post-colonial states in the Levant. As a result, the ostensible gap between the 
shadow state and the marginalized majority in the post-colonial state is a function of the 
conflicting practices that underpinned colonial relations. In turn, one should not consider the 
post-colonial state to be divided from society but intricately connected via a series of overt 
and covert practices that came of age during the age of imperialism. In these ways, colonial 
rule not only characterized the arrival of modern technologies of power in the non-West, it 
also represented its contradictions, incoherencies and shortcomings, which have remained in 
place to varying degree.  
In sum, colonial state formation was not a fait accompli, but precipitated unintended 
consequences that cultivated different strategies of power and resistance from the likes of 
patronage, re-appropriation of money and judicial intervention to foreign meddling, force of 
arms and internal sabotage. In effect, the experiences in the Levant agreed with Bayart’s 
assertion that, “an apparatus of control or domination or a line of dependence are not just 
what the government or imperialism want them to be, they are also what the actors, even if 
they are subordinate, make of them.”693 In the context of Lebanon, colonial statecraft altered 
the ruling regimes tasked with carrying out the policies of the metropole. The foreign designs 
that helped to bring down the mandate were a function of the turbulent informal practices 
that thrived during the mandate. Whereas some of these informal practices preceded the 
mandate—like coercion, intimidation and debt—others institutions emerged directly from 
                                              
693 Bayart, 1993 37.  
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French foreign policy like patrimonialism and the re-appropriation of funds. Such 
contradictions imperiled effective rule and planted the seeds of the social, economic and 
political instability that pressured the end of the mandate. As a result, French colonial control 
decreased over time so that, within this milieu, its territoriality was socially mediated rather 
than geographically imposed. In these ways, the exercise of colonial state power transformed 
practices of domination and strategies of resistance in Lebanon.  
AFTER THE FLOOD 
With formal independence, the political trends of the mandate intensidied to further 
alter the political landscape and divide the already stratified population. The instability that 
had benefited some of the country’s politicians became even more precarious.  The circles of 
ambitious profiteers and would be profiteers would unite to unseat anyone who threatened 
the insecure status quo, only to become divided on the question of who would succeed the 
deposed leader. At the other end of this political spectrum, those most affected by this game 
were the poor and marginalized who became even more vulnerable to the machinations and 
mystiques of the notable politicians. With the goal of re-unifying Syria and Lebanon a mere 
pipe dream, political bosses set about to enlarge their constituencies through formal and 
informal means. Such developments characterized politics in Tripoli after independence.  
Returning to where this study began, by the 1960s the landscape of the north 
remained as instable as before.694 Upon independence, the promise of a better tomorrow that 
the constitutional crisis had cultivated crumbled under the increasing social, economic and 
                                              
694 Despite the lack of substantive sources on the conditions of the annexed territories during the 1940s and 
1950s, one helpful text is Lebanon and its Provinces, a collection of speeches delivered by the five muhafizin of 
Lebanon, edited by the muhafiz of the North, Dr. Halim Said Abu-Izzeddin, and published in 1963. The general 
picture of the speeches is that the chronic underdevelopment of the north, south and Bekaa, that had 
characterized the mandate persisted after independence. Through the winter 1960-1961 when the speeches were 
delivered, the muhafizin attest to the dire conditions of the majority of villages and towns within these areas, 
which suffered from a nearly total absence of the provision of electricity and roads; and inadequate spending on 
healthcare and education. In particular, the speech of Abu-Izzeddin suggests that several of the elements that 
contributed to the public health crisis during the mandate continued such as the lack of suitable water supplies, 
hospitals and public health investment in different parts of the region. Abu-Izzeddin, 1963, 43-44). 
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political pressures of the al-Khouri regime.695 His resignation in 1952 after nearly a decade in 
power followed another general strike and standoff reminiscent of the constitutional crisis. At 
the same time, his ouster overlapped with increasing turmoil and violence in the north. In 
1953, Muhammad Abboud—who in different circumstance had alerted the Quai d’Orsay to 
the structural inequality of the mandate during his tenure as the Sunni delegate of Akkar— 
was killed outside of the presidential palace in Beirut; his assailiant on the eve of legislative 
elections that year was a supporter of his political rival.696 His death imperiled a political 
dynasty to the point that his father Abboud Bey rued the erosion of law and order in the post-
mandate era.697  
Elsewhere, in Tripoli, developments were equally precarious. Informal politics there 
presaged more upheaval for the al-Karami familiy, in particular, and the overall population, 
in general. In 1955, the banks of the river flooded the city, especially the Old City,698 
prompting more families to move west into the new suburbs that sprung up following the 
                                              
695 For an account of the rise and fall of the al-Khouri regime, Traboulsi, 2007; Hudson, 1985; Atiyah, 1973, 
Kerr, 1966; Gates, 1998, Gilsenan, 1996, Bashir, 1966; Salibi, 1966.  
696 Gilsenan, 1996, 30. Abboud’s rival, Bashir Osman, won the campaign following his death, thus ensuring his 
re-election. Reporting of Abboud’s death comes from the American diplomatic mission in Beirut. “On 23 July, 
3 days before the elections, Muhammad al-Abboud had been shot five times as he was leaving the presidential 
palace. He died in the American University of Beirut hospital on 25 July 1953 ‘The Assailant, who readily 
surrendered, was a fanatical follower of Abboud’s rival in the parliamentary elections. The father of the 
deceased, Abboud Bey abd al-Razzaq…has refused to permit the burial of the corpse until retribution had been 
effected.’ The killing shows the ‘tribalistic nature of politics still prevailing in certain sections of Lebanon. All 
deputy candidates at the meeting with the President had firearms and the Minister of Public Works had to resign 
after two machine guns were discovered in his car.” (US National Archives and Records Administration/ C-
Washington D.C. 783A. 0017-2953, July 29, 1953, As mentioned in Gilsenan, 1996 page 322 footnote 2) 
 
The same files includes another dispatch of the 1953 elections, that still took place three days following the 
murder of one of the candidates on 26 July 1953. American officials wrote on the rampant violence and 
coercion that had underpinned elections, in which male voting for the first time was “mandatory.” Describing 
this atmosphere, officials wrote that, “‘virtually every candidate had his coterie of ward -healers, taxi-drivers, 
bribers, fixers, thugs, pan-hadlers, propangandists and rumor-mongers who roamed the streets with all the 
trappings of gangsterism.” (US National Archives and Records Administration/ C-Washington D.C. 853A 
52/12-453 December 4, 1953 as mentioned in Gilsenan, 1996, 323 footnote 2.)  
697 From State Department Files. 853 A 52/12-453 December 4, 1953. Abboud Bey visited the American 
embassy in Beirut following the murder of his son outside of the presidential palace and commented that 
“internal security in the country had evidenced a steady deterioration since the departure of the French in 1943. 
As mentioned in Gilsenan, 1996 Page 323. Footnote 2 
698 Gulick, 1967, 24.  
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development of lands that had once served as citrus orchards.699 This westward expansion 
widened the gap between the increasingly impoverished Old City in the east and the growth 
of the newer western quarters inhabited by the middle classes.700 This shifting landscape was 
the culmination of the political and socio-economic pressures that had thrived during the 
mandate.  
In a manner that the French had envisioned but never accomplished, the flood 
precipitated the re-orientation of the city. Amid a period of administrative reform under then 
President General Fuad Chebab designed to resolve the inequalities that had thrived since the 
mandate in the annexed territories, new funds were made available to develop the areas 
outside of Beirut.701 In particular, infrastructural development in the city was facilitated by 
one of Chehab’s prime minister, Rashid al-Karami. He had taken over his father’s seat in the 
legislature following his death to become one of the youngest delegates in the history of the 
country.702 Like his father before him, his profile rose to national prominence through his 
party’s armed standoff with the government forces during the 1958 civil war.703 As the prime 
minister, the younger al-Karami used the president’s policy initiative to penetrate the 
labyrinth that was the Old City. Several sections of the quarters there were demolished to 
                                              
699 Saliba, 2016, 40, 48, 236. In contrast, Rougier insists that following the flood, the cityscape represented the 
socio-economic divides, with more affluent families moving to the Western quarters and poorer residents from 
Tripoli and the surrounding countryside inhabiting the eastern quarters that now included the Old City. Rougier, 
2015, 24.  
700 For an account of 1950s Tripoli, see Collart, Paul et. al. Lebanon: Suggestions for the Plan of Tripoli and for 
the Surroundings of the Baalbek Acropolis. Report of the UNESCO Mission of 1953, Tours, France: Arrault & 
Co., 1954. The report highlights the piecemeal approach of city planning between the new quarters in Tripoli 
and the older ones, citing that, “widespread private initiative has resulted in a piecemeal approach to the same 
problems in the case of the modern buildings that have sprung up in the vicinity of the castle.” (UNESCO, 
1954, 18.) As a result of this piecemeal approach, the city grew divided between the modern quarters and the 
underdeveloped parts surrounding the Old City.  
701 For an account of the reforms under Chehab, See Bashir, 1966; Bashir, 1977;  Salibi, 1966; Abu-Izzeddin, 
1963; Culbertson, 1954; Traboulsi, 2007. Espcially informative is the group of speeches by the muhafizin and 
cabinet minister in Abu Izzeddin, 1963, which describes the widespread poverty in the annexed territories that 
had only worsened in the first twenty years of independence. 
702 According to the author, by 1960, 25% of the deputies in the legislature had inherited their seats from 
relatives. Salem, Elie Adib, Modernization without Revolution: Lebanon’s Experience, Bloomington: Indiana 
UP, 1973, 56. “Of the four deputies who died in office in 1960,” the author goes on to say, “three were 
succeeded by their children” (Salem, 1973, 56). Rashid’s rise to power is discussed in Rougier, 2015, 2. 
703 For an account of Rashid al-Karami during the 1958 war, see Rougier, 2015.  
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push through new boulevards that linked the Old City to Tall Square and the newer western 
quarters.704 In addition, other changes arrived. In particular, al- Karami managed to address 
the water crisis, finally completing in the 1960s the system of piped water begun by the 
French in the 1930s.705 As if to mark the new landscape, al-Karami commissioned a new 
public statue to mark the twentieth anniversary of Lebanese Independence on November 22, 
1963 which depicted his father, the former mufti, outlaw and national hero, Abd al-Hamid al-
Karami.706 Yet, as a sign of the increasing coercion, contradictions and social, economic and 
political pressures of the post-colonial regime, the statue of the mufti was demolished the 
following decade as civil war and foreign invasions mounted across the country.  
 
 
                                              
704 Describing this redesign, Gulick writes that, “All new streets laid out since the war have conformed to a 
street plan made by the French in the 1930s. Combining grid design with diagonal avenues intersecting at 
circles surrounded by concentric rings of streets, the plan was conceptually imposed on the entire triangular 
plain of Tripoli el-Mina.” (Gulick, 1967, 35.) 
 
This new city stood in sharp contrast to the older quarters. The boulevards pushed through the Old City gave the 
area an unseemly effect. In Gulick’s words, “a typical quality to these new streets is that they look as if the 
wreckers who cleared them arbitrarily ignored anything not standing in their path. At many points these new 
streets pass between the broken arches and even whole ground-floor rooms of buildings which were otherwise 
destroyed, and peddlers frequently set up booths in these ruins where they afford some shelter.” Gulick, 1967, 
209. 
 
In a similar fashion to the UNESCO report and Gulick ethnography, Saliba writes of the city’s growing divide 
with a nod to the to the autobiography series of Lebanese writer and Tripoli resident Khaled Ziadeh, describing 
that what had been considered the new city established during the mandate years like al-Tall Square had 
become old as families moved into the newer suburbs created in the 1950s and 1960s. (Saliba, 2016, 40).  
705 Gulick, 1967, 83. 
706 Saliba, 2016, 317.  
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
A/S On the subject of, the equivalent of RE: or in regards to, among French officials in the 
High Commission.  
 
C carton, the box containing files from the diplomatic archives.  
 
DHCF Delegation of the French High Commission according to its French acronym. Reports 
from this office were usually sent to the high commission from French advisors posted in one 
of the five administrative capitals.  
 
DSG Office of General Security according to its French initials. One of the security agencies 
of the High Commission.  
 
HCF French High Commission according to its French acronyms. Reports with this acronym 
were usually written by officials within the Cabinet Politique of the high commission. 
 
Info. Information, the term for reports within the Office of General Security.  
 
LL Lebanese pound, the currency of post-independent Lebanon.  
 
LS Lebanese Syrian pound, the currency that the French issued in the mandate.  
 
MAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to is French acronyms.  
 
SDN French acronym for the League of Nations.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Unofficial Population Estimates of Lebanon by Region 
and Town  
 
A. Estimated Population of Lebanon, Unofficial Census of 1921 
 
Region    Estimated Population 
 
Beirut    94,932 
Tripoli    37,412 
North Lebanon  136,498 
Mt. Lebanon   199,895 
South Lebanon  130,361 
Bekaa     111,965 
Total    710,563 
 
Source: Himadeh, Said, Economic Organization of Syria, 1936. Census of 1921. Appendix 1 C-2.410-411. As 
described in the next chapter, at the time of this census the city of Tripoli was an independent administrative 
zone separate from that of North Lebanon. Eventually, Tripoli would be incorporated within the muhafaza of 
North Lebanon in 1929.  
 
B. Estimated Population of Towns of Lebanon, 1931 
 
Town    Estimated Population 
 
Beirut    179,360 
Tripoli    51,220 
Zahleh    14,780 
Sidon    12,710 
Baalbek   6,010 
Tyre    5,890    
Total    805,000 
 
Source: Credit Foncier d’Algerie et de Tunisie, Reporoire Economique et Financier de la Syrie et du Liban, 
(Paris, 1932, 48) as appeared in Himadeh, Said, The Monetary and Banking System of Syria, Beirut: American 
Press, 1935, 7.  
 
C. Estimated Population of Lebanon, Unofficial Census of 31 January 1932 
 
Region    Estimated Population of Citizens Non-Citizens 
 
Beirut    113,404    1,852 
North Lebanon  174,921    1,584 
Mount Lebanon  227,399    1,610 
South Lebanon  151,988    845 
Bekaa    118,017    1,776    
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Total    785,729    7,667   
    
Overall Total:    793,396 
 
Source. Population Census of Lebanon, 31 January 1932,  Economic Organization of Syria, Ed. Said Himadeh, 
Beirut: American Press, 1936, Appendix 1-C-1, 408-409. The class of non-citizen residents include French 
nationals and inhabitants in Lebanon from other parts of the Levant.  
 
D. Estimated Population of Lebanon, 1942 
 
Region    Estimated Population 
Beirut    232,000 
North Lebanon  241,000 
Mt. Lebanon   278,000 
South Lebanon  198,000 
Bekaa     167,000   
Total    1,116,000 
 
Source: MAE Rapport a la Societe des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1942 as mentioned in 
Hourani, Albert, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1946, 85. 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Population Growth in Tripoli  
A. The Gulick Estimates 
 
Year   Estimate  Source 
1914   27,500   President Tripoli Municipal Council 
1922   36000   UNESCO report, 1954 
1932   54,876   Official Census, Includes El-Mina (13,400) 
1939   90,000   Pres, Tripoli Muncp Council, (30k unreg.) 
1943   80,000   UNESCO report, 1954 
1946   78,000   Longrigg, First edition 
1952   110,000  UNSECO report, 1954 
1961   210,000  Pres., Tripoli Council (30k el-Mina) 
 
Source: Gulick, John. Tripoli: A Modern Arab City. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1967, 31. 
Muhammad Misqawi served as the President of the Tripoli Municipal Council who advised 
Gulick on these statistics 
 
B. The Saliba Estimates  
 
Year    Estimate  Source 
1784   5,000   Volney 
1812   15,000   Burckhardt 
1830   17,000   Robinson 
1881   20,000   Yanni 
1894   24,000   Baedecker 
1913   33,000   Tammimi and Bahjat 
1921   36,000   Unofficial Census of Lebanon 
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1932   70,000   Unofficial Census of Lebanon 
1944   78,000   Edward, Mayow, Hastings, Lloyd 
 
Source: Saliba, 2016, 289, Table 3, Estimated Population Growth of Tripoli. 
 
C. UNESCO Estimates 
 
Year   Estimate 
1922   36,000 
1943   80,000 
1952   110,000        
 
Source: Collart, Paul, Chehab, Maurice, and Dillon, Armando, Eds. Lebanon: Suggestions 
for the Plan of Tripoli and for the Surroundings of the Baalbek Acropolis. Report of the 
UNESCO Mission of 1953, Tours, France: Arrault & Co., 1954, 13.  
 
Figure 3. Expansion of the Lebanese Public Budget 
Year     Revenue 
1924 (L-S pounds)     2,159,400 
1927        5,791,532    
1933 (Great depression)    4,513,500 
1936        4,351,200 
1939       6,369,000 
1942      12, 504,500 
1945      43,764,500 
1948 (Lebanese pounds)   67,000,000 
1954     125,400,000 
1957     170,000,000 
1960     222,235,000 
1963     425,400,000 
 
Source: Bashir, Iskander E. Planned Administrative change in Lebanon, Beirut: 








Of course there was a great deal that I did not notice,  
I had no suspicion of the things that were going on in  
front of me. I did not divine the presence of consolation  
in the midst of all that was hostile.  
 
-Dostoyevsky, House of the Dead. 
I had only common sense to rely on,  
and it was stimulated into action  
by the extraordinary situation.  
 
-Mikhail Bulgakov, A Country Doctor’s Notebook   
 
 
Standing on the edge of the southern coast of the île de Nantes, I wondered if I were to fall 
into this water and the river continued its course to carry me to the Atlantic, would anyone 
know that I had gone missing. There I was, close to the Atlantic, the body of water that I had 
practically lived my whole life around, whether in New York, Nassau, Baltimore. Yet I was 
so far from all the places that I had called home.  This side of the Atlantic, the relatively 
eastern coast far different from that which Americans know, was a different world. And over 
the next year, I had planned to travel farther east from here.  
 
There are two lessons that I have learned in the course of preparing this dissertation thesis. 
The first has to do with the ambiguity of evidence. When this odyssey began in the French 
Diplomatic archives in Nantes, I unexpectedly received special access to top secret files that 
had been archived for some sixty years. In the hope of answering the questions that 
developed in the course of reading these files, I searched for more clues in Massachusetts, 
Beirut, Maryland, and New York while also visiting Greece, Turkey, Britain, the Dominican 
Republic and the Bahamas. I spent almost every day from early November 2015 until June 
2016 when I began writing my own narrative and analysis haunted by what I discovered in 
France. It was only at the conclusion of this odyssey that I was able to reach any kind of 
coherent answer.  
 
In between those moments when I thought of the crisis in Tripoli described above and 
witnessing the refugee crisis in Lebanon, I received my first glimp I stumbled upon 
contemporary developments unfolding all around me. my first experience of the Syrian 
refugee crisis occurred in the French language courses at L’A.N.A.D.E. in the Hautes Paves 
quarter of Nantes—how I ended up in the highest level with only one year of education in 
French, I don’t know, and even now causes me to chuckle—where I met Moussa, the former 
director of the Port of Lattakia and best student in the class. How excited I was when I 
learned months later in the United States that you were able to reunite with your wife and 
two young children after two years of residing in France, I cannot express. For your story 
inspires me with hope even now. Shukran liMoussa.  
 
While in France I took a break from these files to meet old friends from my studies in 
Palestine in Paris. My best memories of that country occurred during that single day spent 
together In Paris. If it’s true that God looks out for babies and fools, the you two, Charlotte 
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and Tomas, are my guardian angels. I don’t think that I’ve been the only person to get lost in 
the trains heading toward the Paris suburbs late at night, but you two were kind enough to 
come to my rescue both times this occurred and spare me my blushes. I really am the Russian 
cousin that Bulgakov described, yet because of you two, I somehow felt at home. Merci de 
vous.  
 
The week after this rendez-vous and four days after I left Paris to return to Nantes, the 
Bataclan attacks occurred a few miles from where I was staying. The people of France—
decent deep down—were kinder to one another afterwards, even the woman at the archives 
suspicious that I was a thief who insisted that I empty the contents of my notebooks before 
her eyes whenever it was time to leave the archives. People in Nantes even went so far as 
acknowledging me in the streets after November 13 for the first time. Despite the 
pleasantries, Paris was a different city upon my return there a few weeks later. The security, 
guns, checkpoints may well have been the West Bank. The empty streets around La Place de 
la Concorde during COP 21 was a stark reminder of how much things had changed. Still, I 
remember that kind French national at the US Embassy who went the extra mile to find my 
passport and application lost in the mail. You could have given me the run-around like 
everyone else and just stated the official policy when I showed up in desperation and 
disbelief that a parcel with a tracking number and address can suddenly disappear without a 
trace. I always knew that the agents of Chronopost in Nantes were lying. Merci beaucoup 
monsieur.  
 
Other than this good Samaritan and Charlotte and Tomas, the best interactions that I had with 
the French people occurred in the archives and within that small converted hotel that I made 
to me home. Djamel and Jamila were courteous enough to speak to me in French every 
morning whenever we crossed paths in the narrow hallways, no matter how tired and 
discombobulated I sounded. Because of you two I will always hold a special affinity with 
Algerians and French Algerians—no matter the horror stories that Djamel recounted of his 
memories of the second Algerian civil war.   I never did follow your advice to marry a 
French national in order to stay in the country, but if things get too bleak here in America, I 
may keep that in mind for another day.  
 
Outside of the residence, a strange cosmopolitan insouciance developed between the Spanish, 
Moroccans, Italians and few Americans who were forced to make friends with one another 
during around the lockers and vending machines outside of the library. My interactions with 
the staff at Le Centre des Archives Diplomatiques meant so much to me. Even now, I am 
surprised that Paul has cousins in the neighborhood of Baltimore where I went to high 
school. Your tale of the crabs and beer that you enjoyed when you came over for their 
weddings brought a smile to my face. Thank you for that.  
 
A special tribute lies with Hanen, who almost spend as many weeks in the archives as I did, 
in her case struggling to decipher the cursive script of the French administrators overseeing 
North Africa. I hope that you are still alive my dear. If it were not for you and Marwan, I 
would have passed every day in the archives in almost complete silence. So many ups and 
downs we did share together over that year. I do hope to see you again in better times.  
 
The question that menaced me from Halloween was, how could one stand by and watch 
suffering on a grand scale and not be moved to act in some way to relieve the kinds of 
desperation recounted in mandate Tripoli and North Lebanon? For months, I was haunted by 
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the images of faceless bodies languishing and dropping in the streets. I thought that sitting at 
my desk and going through my notes from the archives would relieve this waking nightmare. 
In a way it did, but somehow this image would always bring to mind my fresh memories of 
my time in Beirut.  
 
The humanitarian crisis that I read in the archives became the reality that I witnessed walking 
the streets of Hamra. Without a doubt, the hardest sight to see were the infants and children, 
barefoot, hungry sleeping facedown on the sidewalk, or chasing after me for change, or being 
swaddled in their mother’s arms from the cold at night. I never became inured to the plight of 
the Syrian refugees in Lebanon.  
 
Such daily and short encounters revealed to me that for all the archives and records and files 
that I or anyone could ever hope to access, there remained an unspeakable level of suffering 
and experience difficult to grasp. So that no matter how much I learned about a given point in 
time, there would exist something else just beyond my reach that I could not express.  
 
Once, I was traveling along the same road looking for a bus to a different part of the city (I 
think) when I saw ahead of me a little girl, maybe 3 or 4, playing in the street as she wore a 
pink tee shirt that was ripped down the center. As I wondered how it came to pass that this 
girl was wearing a ripped shirt, a modestly dressed old lady in a hijab yelled to get my 
attention and pointed at the girl’s shirt. I could not make out what she said, it might not have 
even been a word, but the girl’s shirt juxtaposed with her modest attire all to clearly indicated 
the dire poverty that the family faced. I offered the grandmother the little money that I could 
dig from my pocket at the time and felt ashamed that I could not offer more. From this I 
learned that however much some aspects of experience escape my consciousness, it is always 
possible to see the obvious staring in front of us. Because of this, there exists no cloud of 
mystery that prevents us from addressing the obvious needs of one another. Still, I just wish 
that I had more to offer.  
 
 
The memories never fade, but it has taken me a year to continue where I stopped up to this 
point. The past year from the moment that I began composing this thesis and 
acknowledgement until now has been full of setbacks, disappointments, accidents and 
illnesses. I never thought that it would take me this long to record my souvenirs. In such 
underestimations there were many.  
 
I saw many more families trickle into Hamra and became more aware of the Syrians 
employed in the service sector and informal economy of Beirut. These were always the 
people who smiled at me and seemed interested in something other than money. Even people 
with jobs would ask me for money, and I grew tired of appearing as some foreign savior.  
 
But the Syrians, they were something else. The more I came to know you, the more terrified I 
became at the journeys that took you so far, and amazed at the courage you displayed every 
day. Every destination resembled the news reports that had dominated international headlines 
for the past two years: Aleppo, Deir al-Zor, Idlib and Damascus, the centers of a dangerous 
and escalating war only a few hours drive from where I stayed.  
 
My brothers Ammar and Muhammad, you two ran the only vegetable shop that didn’t give 
me food poisoning in Hamra. I shuddered when I learned that you two came from Idlib. Did 
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you notice the smile on my face when I met our other brother Bashar? He was so funny, even 
younger than I was, and eager to supply jokes and practice the English that he had learned in 
university.  
 
Then there was the staff in my home away from home on Hamra street. Muhammad, Myyar 
and Saher, you were always so generous with your time, even if you never understood why I 
always ordered a Greek salad for dinner, nor why I ordered it at 6:00 in the evening. Neither 
the time nor the dish were suitable for dinner according to your tastes, but you never held my 
eccentricities against me. Those moments when the restaurant was empty and we could just 
talk and exchange stories sustained me in ways that I never told you.  
 
I was so touched to receive Saher’s only watch. He could not have offered a gift more 
generous in the circumstances. That’s the souvenir that I remember the most, the total 
generosity of strangers who tried their best to welcome and accommodate another stranger in 
their midst.  
 
The most humbling encounter came one cold spring night as I walked back home from the 
AUB track. I noticed out of the corner of my eye a family huddled together under the awning 
of a bookshop: mother, father and their three children under the age of 8 with no place to go 
for the evening. Their plight weighed on me. The parents could have been my age. Minutes 
later I gathered up the airplane blankets and money that I had with me and went out to find 
the family. There they were, in the same place, looking as frightened and bewildered at their 
sudden circumstances as I was. As I approached, I realized that they were afraid of me—and 
with good reason. Hamra was full of vice, especially at night. When I handed the family the 
provisions that I had with me, I noticed the mother swaddling an infant in her arms. These 
young parents, no older than I was, found themselves homeless with four young children. I 
suspected that they had just arrived in Lebanon from Syria.  
 
When days later, I saw the family in the same place, this time in the afternoon, I witnessed 
the agony that the past week had brought to father’s face. Despite resembling the strain and 
stress of the dustbowl mother, he took a break from anxiously smoking cigarettes to say, 
“thank you” to me in English after I offered him my pocket change. I was so touched and 
humbled that this stranger sought to accommodate me in my native tongue. (Was my Arabic 
really that bad?)  
 
The kindness and gentle playfulness of the Syrians that I met sustained my spirits in a way 
that I didn’t realize at the time. My time in Lebanon and memories of the country 
immediately after leaving oscillated between the humanitarian crisis that I learned of in the 
archives and the one that I witnessed every day on the street, from reading accounts of those 
who watched people starve to death to seeing the same helpless desperation and misery day 
after day.  
 
Even the most intrusive peddlers, hustlers and borrowers were somehow playful with me, 
especially the children. My last week in Lebanon, I sought one of the shoe-shine boys that 
menaced the streets of Hamra to clean the boots that I soiled in Baalbek. Shortly after finding 
him, one of his colleagues approached me and inquired as to whether he could clean the 
shoes that I was wearing at the time. When I told him that my sneakers did not need cleaning, 
he insisted and I relented. After he finished, he refused to accept the price that we agreed 
upon. The first boy, who was still cleaning my boots, told me in English no less “no money. 
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He did only water.” In fact, he made my shoes worse than they really were. After I refused to 
offer him more cash—I had almost ran out of Lebanese lira and decided to save my last 
20,000 note for the taxi—he threatened to denounce me to the police. He then proceeded to 
(pretend to) call the police. When the first boy from Deir al-Zor, finished, I offered him the 
money and went away. My accuser followed me and finally accepted the money that we had 
agreed to exchange.  
 
During another late-night walk home from the track, I saw another family sleeping under the 
stars, this time at the entrance to an underground garage. I watched I the mother attempted to 
nurse her infant baby with a milk bottle, making vivid the story of Jesus and Marry in the 
manger. Quickly, however, my thoughts were interrupted. Apparently, the mother noticed me 
as well. Before I could realize what was unfolding, her two daughters had chased me down 
the street. They must have been twins I later realized. But at the time, one pulled at my arms 
while the other attempted to jump on me, both shouting, “Halib! Halib! Halib lil baby.” How 
in the world, I wondered, could I provide them with money to buy milk for the bay if these 
two five years-olds continued to jump on me and precluded me from moving the hands that 
were still ensconced in my pockets. Eventually, I stepped back and offered them the little 
pocket money that I had with me. it wasn’t much, since I rarely kept money with me at night 
to avoid getting accosted in the manner that the two girls and their shrewd mother had 
accomplished. Before I could regret my meager offering, the girls had scurried back to their 
mother. That offering was the closest I came to playing the role of one of the three wise men. 
Afterward, I looked for that family but never managed to find them again.  
 
Maybe they found a home. Once, while getting lost invariably, this time in search of the 
Bibliotheque Orientale, I passed by a small road and saw coming out of the doorway (for 
there was no door) of an abandoned home a whole family of women and children. I rarely 
saw men. They must have not been able to bear residing in the vacant house during the day. 
The old women looked as if they had just stepped out of a war zone. Yet, the children, like so 
many children I came across, always had a different look beyond the grief and terror and 
stress.  
 
I was never able to discern this look until my final week in Lebanon. I sat down with Ali and 
Ayman. The lock on the door of my apartment broke when I went out for breakfast. Before I 
could scarf down the food that I picked up in my room, my landlord told me that it would 
take some time for the locksmith to come. Equal parts dejected, hungry and in need of a 
shower, I tried to suppress my emotions while standing in the street. My only recourse was to 
eat that sandwich as quickly as I could. The boys recognized my sorry state and motioned for 
me to first wipe my face of the tahini sauce there and later invited me to join them.  
 
That was the moment that I learned the backgrounds of the two boys whom I had always 
seen since my first arrival, sitting on the car outside of my building. This day I joined them 
on the open trunk of the car parked outside of the tiny convenience store where they worked. 
Their shop was in the firs floor of my building and run by the family who rented the space 
from my landlord, the building’s owner. The two boys from Aleppo found employment in the 
shop after coming to Beirut by themselves. They were more interested in the goings-on of my 
apartment than in describing their background. So I told them what I thought of my fellow 
roommates: they were all crazy, came from different parts of the world, and were poorly 
liked by me.  
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While I had initially misunderstood their question in my tired, frustrated and bewildered 
state, that conversation taught me the second lesson that I learned in the course of my 
fieldwork. In my confusion, I told them that I had no friends in Beirut in response to their 
question of what my roommates were like. Always polite, they told me, they recognized my 
error and said, “Oh no. Don’t worry. We’ll be your friends. Sit down for a while with us and 
together, you can gain the strength you lack now.” All my problems wouldn’t disappear, but 
if I were patient, enough of them would to allow me to carry on like the little drummer boy.  
 
It was in such moments as these that I realized that I was never as close to the river’s edge as 
I had feared. The kind ad generosity of so many held me up even when I didn’t realize it. I 
love you all.  
 
Dr. Wafa Daouk, you comforted me when I was at my lowest, confused and bewildered by 
the throbbing pain in my hand. I’m still embarrassed that I screamed when you pressed down 
into the insect bite that I had. I don’t know what I would have done had you not given me 
free samples of the antibiotics that my wound required. One day I hope to have health 
insurance. 
 
Dr. Youssef, you were more than my landlord but a treasured guide and gentleman. In truth, I 
see a little bit of the sage Yoda in you. You and your wife opened your door to me when I 
knocked in the middle of the night with a dire case of food poisoning. Always you guided me 
with directions whenever I was lost and did your best to make me feel comfortable. I want to 
be like you when I grow up.  
 
Little Nour, my favorite part of the day was passing you and your sisters on the street. I was 
always amazed at how all for of you resembled your mother there beside you. One of my 
proudest moments was receiving a smile from her on the day that I donated the dishware and 
food that my roommates left behind. You are al lovely. But I hope to never see you on the 
streets again.  
 
Serkan and Federico, you made that madhouse what was our shared apartment bearable. My 
only wish was that you had arrived earlier. The few times that I actually felt at ease were in 
your presence.  Grazie mille.  
 
Ahmad and habibi al-brazili, Rodrigo, you two represented the best of times. Its’ amazing to 
think that neither one of us is actually from Lebanon. But here’s to many more times together 
abroad.  
 
Back in London, I don’t know what I would have done without you Dzenita. I never told you, 
but the moment when we met in the computer lab at SOAS, I was in the middle of looking 
for a place to stay. That was the third time that I had arrived in an international city without a 
home. From then until now, you have been my good luck charm. Thank you so very very 
much.  
 
To old friendships renewed: Kayla, Boin, Johanne, Sophia, Pauline, Taryn, Soukaina, Joseph, 
Aisha and Melissa. The women in my life have made it all the better. In a way you’re all like 
my fairy godmothers.  Thank you for putting up with all of my meanderings.  
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Patrick, you’ve landed me in more trouble that I ever cared for, but it has sure been a lot of 
fun, the perfect kindling for countless stories that I will tell by the fire when I’m old.  
 
Professors Gilsenan, Khalidi, Mitchell, Neep, Sbaiti, Corinna and Nisrine, thank you for your 
kind words of encouragement, suggestions and comments. I was overwhelmed with the 
material, but somehow your words reassured me.  
 
To my family, who have brooked my disappearances, distractions, doubts and difficulties. 
Your unwavering support and unconditional love have sustained me in all my travels so that I 
know that I’m always in reach of home wherever I go.  
 
To my dear mother, who has encouraged me to broaden my horizons and cheered me on 
along the way from the initial first day of school at 5 to the last first day at 26. 
 
Jeff, I have not yet managed to find that avatar font, but I’m still looking. My thesis would 
have looked sleeker if I had, but I deep down I know that it doesn’t come from ClipArt. 
Maybe I will find it in time for my next publication.  
 
To my grandfather Stafford David Coakley, whose stories of the London that he knew as a 
resident in the 1960s planted the seeds for my own residence there. By the time you went 
there, you were around the same age as I was upon entering my doctoral program, except that 
you were responsible for five children whereas I could hardly manage to find secure housing 
for myself. It is a tribute to you and my grandmother Joan, that somehow you managed to 
inspire the rest of your family with that same progressive outlook.  
 
David, you have carried me when I could barely walk, fed me, chauffeured me and done 
everything that a brother could request from another. Through the lows and the more 
profound lows, you have been my real twin. Ever since we rode the bus to Ms. Lil’s school 
for pre-K, you have been by my side. You once (partially, foreshadowing the snark that has 
since become a mainstay) joked that I owe all my success in life to you when we studied 
together at Calvert Hall College. You were more right than I realized.  
 
And last but not least, this work is dedicated to the memory of A.E.C. and his surviving 
family. I had the pleasure of sending you my master’s thesis, but sadly, not my doctoral 
work. Even now, you are the best of all the friends whom I’ve had and lost.  
 
D.S.O.  
Somewhere on the train 
Between Washington and Baltimore.  
August 2017 
